Impact Factor: 0.7

Published since January 1, 2002

Review of Network Economics

ISSN: 1446-9022

Editor-in-chief: Lukasz Grzybowski

Edited by: Georg Goetz, Pedro Pereira, Byung-Cheol Kim

About this journal

The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries.

By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.

Topics

Network industries
Economics of networks
Regulation and competition law
Industrial organization
Energy
Market exchanges and intermediaries
Media
On-line services
Payment systems
Postal services
Software platforms
Telecommunications and transportation networks

Article formats

Up-to-date surveys, theoretical and empirical research articles, book reviews, and comments

Your Benefits

Your benefits

Big outreach of RNE in academia, and beyond
Newest research and policy debates in network economics
High quality research publications providing a better understanding of network industries
Authoritative reviewers boosting the prestige of your paper
Ahead of print publication

History

Four issues/year
Content available since 2002 (Volume 1, Issue 1)
ISSN: 1446-9022

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Topics

External Links

Volume 21 Issue 3

October 2022

Publicly Available September 8, 2023

Frontmatter

Page range: i-iii

Download PDF

Articles

July 14, 2023

Monopolistic Screening Under Mental Accounting: Applications to Loan Markets with Collateral

Byung-Cheol Kim

Page range: 111-142

Abstract

This paper extends the standard model of monopolistic screening to allow for some consumers who engage in narrow framing, a prominent behavioral bias of mental accounting. Narrow framing generates a bias toward high quality-price ratios, which induces even high-type consumers to choose a menu that targets low-type consumers. To strategically account for narrow framing, when the monopolist induces the high-type consumers to stay with the more expensive menu, there arises a downward quality distortion even at the top and a smaller downward distortion at the bottom. Then, we apply this model to optimal loan contracts to screen heterogeneous borrowers with different default risks. We find that the lender optimally reduces the collateral requirement for low-risk borrowers when some high-risk borrowers are subject to narrow framing. This result empirically implies that narrow framing may lead to smaller credit rationing and lower monitoring intensity in the lending markets.

Open Access September 4, 2023

Welfare Effects of Platforms’ Exclusivity Clauses

Marit Holler

Page range: 143-170

More Download PDF

Abstract

Buyers are often active on multiple digital platforms, while gatekeeper platforms can force sellers contractually to use one platform exclusively. This paper considers the welfare effects of such exclusivity clauses for buyers, sellers and platforms in a platform duopoly with a seller membership fee. A setting with partially multihoming buyers and sellers is compared to one with partially multihoming buyers and singlehoming sellers. It is shown that exclusivity clauses predominately harm total welfare. Buyers suffer if sellers are exclusive on one platform, while platforms and sellers benefit from exclusivity clauses under certain conditions. In an environment with exclusivity clauses, when strong cross-group benefits and weak platform differentiation result in fierce price competition, exclusivity clauses can be welfare-enhancing.

Ahead of Print / Just Accepted

Ahead of Print / Just Accepted

Volume 21 (2022)

Volume 20 (2021)

Volume 19 (2020)

Volume 18 (2019)

Volume 17 (2018)

Volume 16 (2017)

Volume 15 (2016)

Volume 14 (2015)

Volume 13 (2014)

Volume 12 (2013)

Volume 11 (2012)

Volume 10 (2011)

Volume 9 (2010)

Volume 8 (2009)

Volume 7 (2008)

Volume 6 (2007)

Volume 5 (2006)

Volume 4 (2005)

Volume 3 (2004)

Volume 2 (2003)

Volume 1 (2002)

Journal Impact Factor	0.7	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	0.7	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.17	2022, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2023)
CiteScore	0.7	2022, Scopus (Elsevier B.V., 2023)
SCImago Journal Rank	0.198	2022, SJR (Scimago Lab, 2023; Data Source: Scopus)
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	0.849	2022, CWTS Journal Indicators (CWTS B.V., 2023; Data Source: Scopus)

More information about journal rankings

Submit

Submission

You can easily submit your manuscript online. Simply go to http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/dgrne and you will be guided through the whole peer-reviewing and publishing process.

Your benefits of publishing with us

Easy-to-use online submission, peer review, and publication system
Short turnaround times
High quality independent peer-review
Every article easily discoverable because of Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and comprehensive abstracting and indexing services
Impact Factor (5 year: 0.723)
Secure archiving by De Gruyter and the independent archiving service Portico
Professional sales and marketing activities

Submission process

Submission of your paper via our submission management tool following the Instructions for Authors
Peer review process (you will be guided through every step)
Decision on your paper
If accepted – publication of your paper (ahead of print as well)

Please note

Before submitting your article please have a look at our Ethical Guidelines and our Copyright Transfer Agreement
Once your article is accepted you have the option to publish it open access
Our Repository Policy allows you to distribute 30 PDF copies of your published article to colleagues (the PDF has to include the information that it is an author's copy). Please also feel free to distribute the link to the online abstract
If you have any general questions please visit our FAQ for authors
For more detailed information please contact the RNE Editorial Office

We look forward to receiving your manuscript!

Hybrid Open Access

In this journal, authors have the option to publish their article under an open access license. Open Access allows you as an author to retain copyright and share your findings with colleagues and interested parties worldwide without any restraints.
Please note that authors from institutions with which we have a transformative agreement can publish open access without paying an article processing charge (APC). More information on the eligible institutions and articles can be found under the "Funding and Support" tab here.

Editorial

Editor-in-Chief
Lukasz Grzybowski (University of Cape Town & University of Warsaw)

Coordinating Editors

Georg Goetz (Justus-Liebig-University Glessen)
Byung-Cheol Kim (Alabama University)
Pedro Pereira (University of Evora)

Editorial Board
Marc Bourreau (Telecom ParisTech)
Jan Brueckner (Univesity of California-Irvine)
Carlo Cambini (Polytechnic University of Turin)
Lapo Filistrucchi (University of Florence)
Neil Gandal (Tel Aviv University)
Hanna Halaburda (New York University Stern School of Business)
Steffen Hoernig (Nova School of Business and Economics, INOVA)
Kai Hüschelrath (ZEW, Mannheim & University of Mannheim)
Marc Ivaldi (Toulouse School of Economics)
Doh Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics)
Tobias Klein (CentER, TILEC, Tilburg University)
Jan Kramer (University of Passau)
Tobias Kretschmer (University of Munich)
Jean-Charles Rochet (University of Toulouse & University of Zurich)
Juan Rosellon (CIDE/Mexico City and DIW Berlin)
David Sappington (University of Florida)
Marius Schwartz (Georgetown University)
Tommasso Valletti (Imperial College London)
Frank Verboven (University of Leuven)
Alex White (Tsinghua University School of Economics)
Christine Zulehner (Goethe University Frankfurt)

(Deutsch)

Online ISSN: 1446-9022
Print ISSN: 2194-5993
Type: Journal
Language: English
Publisher: De Gruyter
First published: January 1, 2002
Publication Frequency: 4 Issues per Year
Audience: Since 2002, the Review of Network Economics (RNE) has been a leading forum for new insights in network economics, providing essential reading for anyone interested in the economics of network industries. Publishing high quality theoretical and empirical research, along with surveys and reviews that either cover specific industries or have relevance to multiple different network industries, the journal seeks to keep academics, policy makers, and practitioners informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects. Specific sectors of interest include (but are not limited to) energy, market exchanges and intermediaries, media, on-line services, payment systems, postal services, software platforms, telecommunications and transportation networks. Published quarterly in March, June, September, and December, the Review of Network Economics is committed to promoting a deeper understanding of the economic issues that underpin such network industries. The founding editors (John Panzar and Julian Wright) also wish to express their deep appreciation to Henry Ergas who kindly sponsored the initial development of the journal and has enabled the full text of the 2002-2008 issues to be made freely available. Publication History Four issues/year Content available since 2002 (Volume 1, Issue 1) ISSN: 1446-9022