Published by De Gruyter

Volume 3 Issue 2 - Negligence in the Law (Part I)

July 2002

Issue of Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Contents
Journal Overview

Article

October 11, 2002

The Fault of Not Knowing

George Fletcher

Abstract

Despite the outpouring of interest in tort and criminal theory over the last thirty years, not much progress has been made toward understanding the basic concepts for analyzing liability. Common law theorists of torts and criminal law tend to accept the conventional distinction between objective and subjective standards and the view that objective negligence is not really fault in the way that subjective negligence is. The author’s view is that this distinction between objective and subjective standards is misunderstood and that, in fact, so-called objective negligence is a test of fault or culpability in the same way that subjective standards are. This paper seeks to defend inadvertent negligence as a proper basis for blaming someone for causing harm, whether in the context of tort law or criminal law, whether the standard is regarded as objective or subjective. The first part of the paper, the historical part, engages in an extended analysis of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ writings on negligence. The second part of the paper, the philosophical part, addresses the general question of how people can be considered at fault and be blamed for not knowing critical attributes of their conduct, which might be either matters-of-fact or matters of moral evaluation.

October 11, 2002

Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law

Kenneth W. Simons

Abstract

This article explores different dimensions of the concept of negligence in the law. The first sections focus on the fundamental distinction between conduct negligence (unreasonable creation of a risk of harm), a conception that dominates tort law; and cognitive negligence (unreasonable failure to be aware of a risk either through inadvertence or through mistake), a conception that is much more important in criminal law. The last major section identifies five significant institutional functions served by a legal negligence standard: expressing a legal norm in the form of a standard rather than a rule; personifying fault; empowering the trier of fact to give content to the standard; creating a secondary legal norm parasitic on a primary legal norm; and distinguishing grades of fault. These functions reveal the distinctive significance of negligence, but also disclose numerous problems that the use of such a legal standard can pose. Careful analysis of these different dimensions of negligence clarifies certain misconceptions and has important implications. For example, the question whether "negligence" is an appropriate minimum standard of liability (e.g., for criminal punishment) is unanswerable until we identify the type of negligence at issue (conduct or cognitive) and its role in norm-definition (providing a general standard of liability for harm-creation or, instead, merely an interstitial standard applying only to some elements of a crime). Similarly, comparing negligenceto supposedly "more serious" forms of fault, such as recklessness, knowledge, and purpose, is treacherous and sometimes amounts to comparing apples and oranges. A better understanding of the different conceptions of negligence and of the distinctive institutional functions of a legal negligence standard can facilitate the development of more coherent, and more justifiable, fault criteria in criminal law, torts, and other legal domains.

October 11, 2002

Negligence in the Air

Heidi M. Hurd, Michael S. Moore

Abstract

The article examines what has come to be known as "the risk analysis" in Anglo-American tort law and contract law. The risk analysis essentially consists of: (1) viewing negligence as a relational concept, so that a defendant is never simply negligent tout cour, but is negligent only with respect to certain persons and certain harms — other harms suffered by other persons are said not to be "within the risk" that makes the defendant negligent; and (2) the supplanting of proximate cause doctrine with doctrines of duty, the duty question being determined by the question of whether a certain person and a certain harm are within the risk that makes a defendant negligent. The article aims to explode entirely the risk analysis. After beginning with an examination of the historical roots of the risk analysis, we then seek to show that the risk analysis is: (1) conceptually incoherent because it seeks to isolate a risk that makes someone negligent; (2) normatively undesirable because it allows quite blameworthy actors not to pay for the harms they culpably cause; and (3) descriptively inaccurate of the cases decided on the more traditional, proximate cause bases.

October 11, 2002

An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment of Omissions in Tort Law: The Principle of Salience

Alon Harel, Assaf Jacob

Abstract

This paper provides an economic justification for the exemption from liability for omissions in torts and for the exceptions to this exemption. It interprets the differential treatment of acts and omissions under tort law as a proxy for a more fundamental distinction between harms caused by multiple injurers, where each one can single-handedly prevent the harm (either by acting or failing to act), and harms caused by a single injurer (either by acting or failing to act). Since the overall cost to which a group of injurers is exposed is constant, attributing liability to many injurers reduces the part each has to pay and, consequently, reduces each one’s incentives to take precautions. Broad exemption from liability for omissions is a way of carving a simple, practical rule to distinguish between the typical cases in which an agent can be easily selected and provided with sufficient incentives (typically, cases of acts) and cases in which there is a serious problem of dilution of liability (typically, cases of omissions). The exceptions to the rule exempting from liability for omissions are explained in terms of efficiency. The imposition of liability for omissions depends on the ability to identify a salient agent, i.e., to single out one or few liable agents and differentiate their role(s) from that of others. Tort law designs three types of "salience rules." It either creates salience directly (by attributing liability to a single agent), or it can exploit salience created "naturally," or it can induce injurers to create salience voluntarily.

October 11, 2002

Liability of Experts and the Boundary between Tort and Contract

Hans Bernd-Schäfer

Abstract

This paper offers an economic analysis of one aspect of the possible liability for incorrect information traded on information markets: expert liability for incorrect asset valuation. The article does not address the questions of whether and under what circumstances an expert should bear contractual liability for an incorrect valuation. Rather, it assumes such contractual liability towards the person who has solicited the opinion and focuses instead on analyzing the circumstances under which the expert’s liability should be extended to third parties as well.

October 11, 2002

A Reexamination of 'Glanzer v. Shepard': Surveyors on the Tort-Contract Boundary

Victor P. Goldberg

Abstract

In international commodity transactions, intermediary certifiers of quantity and quality play a crucial role. Sometimes they err, and when they do, the aggrieved party can pursue remedies against the counterparty or against the intermediary, either in contract or tort. The remedy against the intermediary has depended, at least in part, on whether the plaintiff was in privity. Even absent privity, the aggrieved party could possibly recover in tort (or perhaps as a third-party beneficiary). So held Cardozo in the leading New York case Glanzer v. Shepard. Section I of this paper reviews the Glanzer litigation, with special emphasis on how the court suppressed many of the significant facts. Section II then turns to restitution by the principals. Section III explores the courts’ general hostility to intermediaries’ attempts to limit their liability by contract, and Section IV considers the judiciary’s sporadic efforts to place extra-contractual limits on intermediaries’ liability. Section V examines the surveyors’ response.

October 11, 2002

Non-Consensual Liability of a Contractual Party: Contract, Negligence, Both, or In-Between?

Israel Gilead

Abstract

This article makes a comparative examination of the widening spectrum of cases in which both tort law and contract law are employed, jointly or separately, to impose non-consensual liability on a contracting party. The article focuses on liability imposed on a contracting party either toward another contracting party or toward a third party for failure to perform an obligation that, on the one hand, is predicated on and arises from the contract, but, on the other hand, does not genuinely originate in the consent of the liable party because it is external to her genuine intention. The primary objective of this article is to propose general guidelines for either choosing between tort law and contract law when imposing non-consensual liability on a contracting party or else allowing liability under both headings. These guidelines for the classification of non-consensual liability also bear on the preliminary question of whether to impose non-consensual liability at all and on the delicate interplay between contract and tort in general and particularly when the two lead to conflicting legal outcomes.

October 11, 2002

Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What Is So Problematic in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?

Menachem Mautner

Abstract

This article examines the role culture plays in contract law. It demonstrates that even in contract law, the branch of law most committed to the ideal of individual autonomy, law’s reliance on culture makes compulsion by the law an unavoidable outcome. The concept of culture is applied to contract law in two principal ways. First, it attempts to explain the rise of objectivism in late nineteenth-century contract law as a manifestation of some central experiences prevalent in modern culture. Second, it analyzes the role played by culture within the context of some of the central doctrines of contract law, namely, the doctrines on the formation and interpretation of contracts.

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Theoretical Inquiries in Law is devoted to the application to legal thought of insights developed by diverse disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, economics, history and psychology. The range of legal issues dealt with by the journal is virtually unlimited, subject only to the journal's commitment to cross-disciplinary fertilization of ideas. We strive to provide a forum for all those interested in looking at law from more than a single theoretical perspective and who share our view that only a multi-disciplinary analysis can provide a comprehensive account of the complex interrelationships between law, society and individuals.

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Volume 3 Issue 2 - Negligence in the Law (Part I)

Issue of Theoretical Inquiries in Law

The Fault of Not Knowing

Abstract

Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law

Abstract

Negligence in the Air

Abstract

An Economic Rationale for the Legal Treatment of Omissions in Tort Law: The Principle of Salience

Abstract

Liability of Experts and the Boundary between Tort and Contract

Abstract

A Reexamination of 'Glanzer v. Shepard': Surveyors on the Tort-Contract Boundary

Abstract

Non-Consensual Liability of a Contractual Party: Contract, Negligence, Both, or In-Between?

Abstract

Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What Is So Problematic in the Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law?

Abstract