Published by De Gruyter

Volume 11 Issue 1

Issue of Wittgenstein-Studien

Contents
Journal Overview

Front matter

Publicly Available January 20, 2020

Titelseiten

Page range: I-IV

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Publicly Available January 20, 2020

Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers

Page range: V-V

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Publicly Available January 20, 2020

Articles

January 20, 2020

Abstract

In 1929 Ludwig Wittgenstein met Raffaello Piccoli, the Serena Professor of Italian, with whom he arranged several meetings in the following terms. For a long time their intellectual friendship was suggested only by the occurrences of Piccoli’s name in Wittgenstein’s Cambridge Pocket Diaries, then a paper about Piccoli including hypothesis on his meetings with Wittgenstein was published (Marjanović 2005), and more recently, the diaries of a student of both Piccoli and Wittgenstein in 1929 – 1930 were discovered. The new material, on the background of data now available about Piccoli’s life and works, throws new light onto his relationship with Wittgenstein, and hypothesis on the topics of their conversations are also advanced. Piccoli’s perspective on the difference between ethics, religion and philosophy on the one hand and science on the other was in tune with Wittgenstein’s view and similar was also their aversion towards scientism; furthermore, Piccoli had read many of the authors for which Wittgenstein showed an interest in 1930 – 1931 – Freud, Spengler, Frazer, Augustine, and also James.

January 20, 2020

Wittgenstein’s Four-Stroke Faces and the Idea of Visual Philosophy

Kristijan Krkač

Page range: 31-52

Abstract

In the paper the author explores the question ‘Did Wittgenstein (re)invent emoticons?’ in three sub-questions. What did he draw and for which purposes? What are emoticons? Are there similarities and differences between his drawings and emoticons? The answers are following. Wittgenstein has drawn faces from the 1930s to the 1940s which are graphically and by use like emoticons. He presented a philosophical problem of interpretation of faces. Emoticons as made of written and typed punctuation marks or as drawings were invented and used centuries before the 1930s, but common and popular use started in the 1960s. Previous inventions were probably unknown to Wittgenstein, and his faces probably didn’t influence later inventions. His faces and emoticons are graphically similar and made with the similar purposes. Differences are that he only used drawings and never written or typed punctuation marks, and he used them to deal with problems of emotions and perception (similar to his problems of the duck-rabbit head). These answers are connected to available textual and interpretative evidence, interpretations are given in propositions from (a) to (p), and summarized in the conclusion (r). Some consequences of visual thinking on philosophical thinking are also drawn in terms of a future research.

January 20, 2020

Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs

Some Remarks against Incommensurability and Scepticism

Yuliya Fadeeva

Page range: 53-78

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s writings on religious and magical beliefs, especially the “Lectures on Religious Belief” and “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough ” are taken to imply semantic incommensurability and inaccessibility by the Wittgensteinian Fideism and, in part, the expressivist interpretation. According to these interpretations, religious and non-religious discourses are self-contained, closed, and not intertranslatable. Wittgenstein is taken to deny mutual understanding between believers and non-believers with respect to religious and magical discourse. I argue against such interpretations and support readings by Kusch, Schroeder, and Tripodi that are optimistic of the possibility of mutual understanding. Nevertheless, there is a danger of scepticism for such optimistic readings when they refer to a special attitude that is needed to understand religious belief and speech. I offer a reply to this problem and suggest to see Wittgenstein’s stance on understanding religious discourse in a greater proximity to his general views about language in his later writings. Then, however, any fideist view of the religious (and magical) form of life as self-contained and isolated from the non-religious has to be repudiated.

January 20, 2020

The Threat of Privacy in Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Kripke vs. Cavell

Jônadas Techio

Page range: 79-104

Abstract

Most readers of the Investigations take skepticism as a target of Wittgenstein’s remarks, something to be refuted by means of a clear grasp of our criteria. Stanley Cavell was the first to challenge that consensual view by reminding us that our criteria are constantly open to skeptical repudiation, hence that privacy is a standing human possibility. In an apparently similar vein, Saul Kripke has argued that a skeptical paradox concerning rules and meaning is the central problem of the Investigations – and one that receives a skeptical solution. Following the orthodoxy, however, Kripke does not take privacy as a real threat but instead reads Wittgenstein as offering an argument against its very possibility. This paper offers a critical assessment of Kripke’s and Cavell’s readings, and concludes by delineating an understanding of our linguistic practices that acknowledges the seriousness of skepticism while avoiding the kind of evasion shared by Kripke and the orthodoxy, enabling us to see agreement and meaning as continual tasks whose failure is imbued with high existential costs.

January 20, 2020

What is it that Wittgenstein denies in his philosophy of psychology?

Hans Julius Schneider

Page range: 105-131

Abstract

Taking up some of W.’s paradoxical remarks about the existence of ‘mental things’ the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one’s own ‘mental events’ W.’s general criticism of the ‘object-and-name model’ is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between ‘things’ and ‘objects of reference’: With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional ‘something’ a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.’s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of ‘the higher’ are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent.

Spezialsektion: Wittgenstein über das Psychische

January 20, 2020

Spezialsektion: Wittgenstein über das Psychische

Herausgegeben von Richard Raatzsch, Östrich-Winkel

Page range: 133-133

January 20, 2020

Einführung

Richard Raatzsch

Page range: 135-136

January 20, 2020

Wittgenstein und die Begriffe des Psychischen bei Hegel

Alexander Berg

Page range: 137-168

Abstract

Wittgenstein and the Concepts of Mind in Hegel. Hegel distinguishes three main forms of the (subjective) mind – the soul, the consciousness and the spirit. He seeks to use these concepts to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle’s works on the soul (Περὶ ψυχῆς) and, at the same time, to counteract certain scientistic tendencies within the philosophy of mind. Although Wittgenstein (most likely) was not aware of these Hegelian distinctions, his own use of the concepts of mind exhibits some remarkable similarities to Hegel’s, and Wittgenstein too develops his understanding of mind by first examining the scientific psychology of his time and delineating his own position by way of contrast with it. This article examines three areas in which Wittgenstein substantially developed his understanding of the concepts of mind. The sequence of the investigation follows the order in which these areas became significant for Wittgenstein’s thinking, and compares them in each case with the three main Hegelian forms of the concepts of mind.

January 20, 2020

„Eine irreführende Parallele“

Wittgenstein über Begriffsverwirrung in der Psychologie und die Semantik psychologischer Begriffe

Stefan Majetschak

Page range: 169-182

Abstract

“A Misleading Parallel”. Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. After the Philosophical Investigations , except for details, were largely finished in 1945, Wittgenstein, in his final years, undertook an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them. Anyone looking through these extensive collections of philosophical remarks will probably quite often find it difficult to understand which questions Wittgenstein was addressing with individual remarks or groups of remarks and where the philosophical problems lay for which he was trying to find a solution, whether therapeutic or otherwise appropriate. In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In part 1 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In part 2 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion.

January 20, 2020

„Denken wir wieder an die Intention, Schach zu spielen.“

Zur Rolle von Schachanalogien in Wittgensteins Philosophie ab 1929

Ingolf Max

Page range: 183-206

Abstract

“Let us think of the intention to play chess”. On the Role of Chess Analogies in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy starting from 1929. Chess analogies represent a neglected topic in the studies on Wittgenstein. However, already a closer look at the Philosophical Investigations shows the great variety of contexts in which there are analogies to very different aspects of chess. An examination of the entire Nachlass illustrates Wittgenstein’s ongoing interest in chess which began in 1929 and lasted until his death in 1951. The integration of a thorough analysis of the references to chess sheds new light on an adequate understanding of the transition from his early philosophy of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his later philosophy, especially in the years 1929 to 1931. In our language of analysis, chess is understood as a codex-based strategy game. In this context and in contrast to it, we consider selected instructive uses of chess analogies in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. By means of such analogies similarities as well as filigree or significant differences in the meanings of linguistic expressions can be very convincingly illustrated, misunderstandings can be removed and complete clarity can be attained. Starting from Wittgenstein's considerations, the method of finding and inventing chess analogies can be developed in perspective into a creative form of practice of linguistic-analytic philosophizing.

January 20, 2020

Nicht einmal ein Etwas

Felix Mühlhölzer

Page range: 207-244

Abstract

Not Even a Something. If one exclaims that a pain is not a Nothing, what one means is that one feels it and that, when felt, it is simply there. Why shouldn’t one then also say, contrary to PI 293 & 304, that it is ‘a Something’? One has to admit, however, that, as felt, it is only momentarily there, and when I ask whether the pain that I feel now is the same as the pain I felt earlier, I realize that for me there are no objective criteria of sameness: for me, what counts as the same is what appears to be the same. In the sparse privacy-scenario of PI 258 this talking about ‘sameness’ is totally empty, and so also our talking about ‘pain’, ‘sensation’, and so on, quite generally. In our public language, however, the situation is different, because there our use of a word like “pain” and our talking about the sameness of our own pains is embedded in our intersubjectively assessable speaking about pains. Nevertheless, also in this familiar case Wittgenstein’s statement near the end of PI 258 persists, at least under normal circumstances, and is accepted with regard to my own pain: “whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct”. But now, as part of our normal way of speaking, to claim this correctness is not empty. At the same time, however, it is not justified in a substantial way. With assertions like “I am in pain” or like “This is the same pain as earlier” the language-game does not end, as Wittgenstein says; it begins with them. This view, expressed in PI 290, can appear outrageous and may lead to the reaction, scrutinized in the beetle-paragraph PI 293, that everyone can tell from her own case that she knows what pain is. To talk in this way involves a grammatical model, “the model of ‘object and name’”, that presumably underlies our reference to our own private objects and according to which our language-game with sensation words would ‘begin’ with the objects. However, by this severing of reference from our use of language, the objects referred to prove to be completely indeterminate. – In the two ways just described, regarding sameness and determinateness, our talk of a ‘Something’ in the case of sensations turns out to be problematic.

January 20, 2020

„Wenn sie vergeht, dann war es nicht die rechte Liebe.“

Zu zwei Bemerkungen Wittgensteins über die Liebe

Richard Raatzsch

Page range: 245-269

Abstract

“If it passes, then it was not true love.” On two Remarks by Wittgenstein about Love. Wittgenstein’s Nachlass does not contain many philosophical remarks on love. Yet, the ones it does contain can be made fruitful for the long-lasting philosophical debate on love’s nature. This text, however, focuses on just two of these remarks, preparing their discussion extensively by sketching part of the philosophical background against which their points become visible.

January 20, 2020

„12 × 12 = 144“

Psychologische Sicherheit versus logischer Ausschluss des Irrtums in Über Gewißheit am Beispiel des Rechnens

Anja Weiberg

Page range: 271-282

Abstract

“12 × 12 = 144”. Psychological Certainty versus Logical Exclusion of Error in On Certainty , Illustrated by the Example of Artihmetic. The aim of this paper is to exemplify Wittgenstein’s distinction between a psychological certainty and the logical exclusion of error by considering his discussion of our use of simple calculations like “12 × 12 =144” in On Certainty . Three aspects seem to be relevant in this context: 1. Wittgenstein’s notes on our use of the word “to know” in the context of these simple calculations (and on the irrelevance of inner states or processes for this use); 2. his discussion of the wish for “transcendental certainty” (OC 1975: 47); 3. his remarks on the logical exclusion of error.

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews

January 20, 2020

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews

Page range: 283-283

January 20, 2020

Gorazd Andrejč: Wittgenstein and Interreligious Disagreement. A Philosophical and Theological Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2016. xii + 278 pages, $69.99 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-137-50307-7

Guy Axtell

Page range: 285-290

January 20, 2020

Thomas D. Carroll: Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016, x + 209 pages, £59.99 (Paperback), ISBN 978-1-349-48827-8

Ricardo N. Henriques

Page range: 291-294

January 20, 2020

Christian Erbacher (ed.): Friedrich August von Hayek’s Draft Biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Text and Its History. Leiden: mentis Verlag 2019, 88 pages, 25,13 € (Paperback), ISBN 978-3-95743-157-8

David Loner

Page range: 295-298

January 20, 2020

Cora Diamond: Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2019, 331 pages, $39.95 (Hardcover), ISBN 978-0-674-05168-3

Sofia Miguens

Page range: 299-304

January 20, 2020

Sára Bereczki: Wittgensteins Sprachspiel und die Spieltheorie. Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie und ihre Relevanz für das Verständnis ökonomischer Rationalität. München: Herbert Utz Verlag 2018, 220 Seiten, 59,00 € (Paperback), ISBN 978-3-8316-4706-4

Elke Muchlinski

Page range: 305-310

January 20, 2020

Wayne Waxman: A Guide to Kant’s Psychologism – via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge 2019, 351 pages, $115.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-0-367-14111-0

Inês Salgueiro

Page range: 311-317

January 20, 2020

Guy Axtell: Problems of Religious Luck. Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham: Lexington Books 2019, 290 pages, $95.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-4985-5017-8

Robert Vinten

Page range: 319-330

Back matter

Publicly Available January 20, 2020

Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume

Page range: 331-334

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Publicly Available January 20, 2020

Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes

Page range: 335-344

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About this journal

The yearbook is designed as an annual forum for Wittgenstein research. The Wittgenstein Studies publishes articles and materials on Ludwig Wittgenstein's life, work and philosophy and on his philosophical and cultural environment. All submitted articles are single-blind peer reviewed.

Corresponding book series:
Über Wittgenstein (http://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/182334)
On Wittgenstein (http://www.degruyter.com/view/serial/182356)

Volume 11 Issue 1

Issue of Wittgenstein-Studien

Titelseiten

Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers

Inhalt / Table of Contents

Wittgenstein and Piccoli

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s Four-Stroke Faces and the Idea of Visual Philosophy

Abstract

Wittgenstein on Understanding Religious Beliefs

Some Remarks against Incommensurability and Scepticism

Abstract

The Threat of Privacy in Wittgenstein’s Investigations: Kripke vs. Cavell

Abstract

What is it that Wittgenstein denies in his philosophy of psychology?

Abstract

Spezialsektion: Wittgenstein über das Psychische

Herausgegeben von Richard Raatzsch, Östrich-Winkel

Einführung

Wittgenstein und die Begriffe des Psychischen bei Hegel

Abstract

„Eine irreführende Parallele“

Wittgenstein über Begriffsverwirrung in der Psychologie und die Semantik psychologischer Begriffe

Abstract

„Denken wir wieder an die Intention, Schach zu spielen.“

Zur Rolle von Schachanalogien in Wittgensteins Philosophie ab 1929

Abstract

Nicht einmal ein Etwas

Abstract

„Wenn sie vergeht, dann war es nicht die rechte Liebe.“

Zu zwei Bemerkungen Wittgensteins über die Liebe

Abstract

„12 × 12 = 144“

Psychologische Sicherheit versus logischer Ausschluss des Irrtums in Über Gewißheit am Beispiel des Rechnens

Abstract

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews

Gorazd Andrejč: Wittgenstein and Interreligious Disagreement. A Philosophical and Theological Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2016. xii + 278 pages, $69.99 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-137-50307-7

Thomas D. Carroll: Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016, x + 209 pages, £59.99 (Paperback), ISBN 978-1-349-48827-8

Christian Erbacher (ed.): Friedrich August von Hayek’s Draft Biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Text and Its History. Leiden: mentis Verlag 2019, 88 pages, 25,13 € (Paperback), ISBN 978-3-95743-157-8

Cora Diamond: Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2019, 331 pages, $39.95 (Hardcover), ISBN 978-0-674-05168-3

Sára Bereczki: Wittgensteins Sprachspiel und die Spieltheorie. Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie und ihre Relevanz für das Verständnis ökonomischer Rationalität. München: Herbert Utz Verlag 2018, 220 Seiten, 59,00 € (Paperback), ISBN 978-3-8316-4706-4

Wayne Waxman: A Guide to Kant’s Psychologism – via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge 2019, 351 pages, $115.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-0-367-14111-0

Guy Axtell: Problems of Religious Luck. Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham: Lexington Books 2019, 290 pages, $95.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-1-4985-5017-8

Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume

Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes