The article addresses the administration of the law in terms of a hermeneutical-action-based approach in contrast to the theory of systems. The focus thereby lies in the interpretation of the so-called camel’s parable introduced into the juridic-sociological discussion by Niklas Luhmann. It is argued that Luhmann’s interpretation may have literary merits but does not leave a metaphoric level, whereas the lecturer of Luhmann’s essay is left alone with a text neither matching sociological standards nor fitting with legal doctrine, although both analysis are announced at the outset. The litigants, three brothers and testamentary heirs, are not seriously taken into account. Thus, the solution to the conflict does not reveal the existing problem, which is the uncomplete distribution of the heritage, but disguises the ratio of the decision. Therefore, Luhmann’s essay may mislead to the conclusion that law suits are generally introduced without justified claims. As a consequence, a judge’s task would not be to balance legitime interests according to the rule of law that applies equally to every litigant, but its function would rather be to exploit erroneous convictions in order to be perceived as an enigmatic and diffuse authority. Interesting enough, the camel’s parable was interpreted long before by Bertolt Brecht who gave a short but genuine interpretation according to which the person deciding was not a judge, but a friend of the heirs. Such interpretation is in a line with the basic sociological difference between diffuse and role-playing social relations. The author argues that only role-playing relations may guarantee independence in a sense democratic institutions depend on. That is why, in contrast, another parable of Brecht, the Caucasian cercle, is referred to. Brecht’s judge operates in a nearly perfectly just manner which is obviously inspired by biblical examples. On the other hand, he violates the principle of modern law according to which legal decisions must be foreseeable. The author emphasizes that further hermeneutic-empirical, action-based studies appear useful in order to determine how these two social requirements of a modern administration of law, the production of foreseeable decisions which may also be said to be just, are dealt with among legal professionals.