

–. 1992. 'Explaining language use'. *Philosophical Topics* 20: 1. 205–230.

–. 1994. "Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind". *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 2: 2.181–209.

–. 1995. "Language and nature." *Mind* 104.1–61.

Dennet, Daniel C. 1978. *Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology*. Brighton: Harvester.

Itkonen, Esa. 1978. *Grammatical Theory and Metascience*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Katz, Jerrold. J. 1981. *Language and Other Abstract Objects*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lieb, Hans-Heinrich. 1986. "Language is external: A reply to Helmut Schnelle". *Theoretical Linguistics* 12(3): 239–255.

–. 1992. "The case for a new structuralism". *Prospects for a new structuralism* ed. by H.-H. Lieb, 33–71. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Philip Carr, Montpellier (France)

265. Linguistics and semiotics I: The impact of Ogden & Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning*

1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. Triadicity
4. Word magic and orthology
5. Leonard Bloomfield and *The Meaning of Meaning*
6. Alfred Korzybski and *The Meaning of Meaning*
7. Psychology
8. John Oesterle and *The Meaning of Meaning*
9. Philosophy
10. Charles S. Peirce
11. Indirect impact of *The Meaning of Meaning*
12. Bibliography

1. Introduction

Linguistics and semiotics are as inseparable in the work of Charles Kay Ogden (1889–1957) and Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893–1979) as the lives and careers of the two authors themselves. *The Meaning of Meaning* (henceforth *MM*, with all page references to the critical edition of 1994, unless otherwise noted), their only joint work, remains better known than any of their separately authored publications. Placing itself at the crossroads not only of linguistics and semiotics, but psychology, philosophy, and anthropology, it was reviewed on first publication by Malinowski (1923), Sapir (1923), Kantor (1924), and Russell (1926). Leonard Bloomfield dismissed it summarily (Bloomfield 1927), while his chief disciple, Charles Hockett, eventually contributed a partial solution to one of its conundrums (Hockett 1977). Substantial commentaries continued to appear regularly during that interval (*inter alia* Chase 1938; Oesterle 1944, Black 1949, 1968; Morris

1955, Hotopf 1965, Hill 1971, Hardy 1978). More recently, *MM* has inspired commentary in semiotics (*inter alia* Eco 1989, Norris 1986, Schmitz 1990); linguistics (Waugh 1984, Wolf 1988); and intellectual history (Gordon 1990, Russo 1989). Given their disparate points of view and objectives, some of these commentaries arrive at conflicting interpretations. Behavioral psychologists detect and reject the work's mentalism; philosophers repudiate its behaviorism. Ogden & Richards excoriate Saussure because he incorporates the process of interpretation within the definition of the linguistic sign; Charles Morris condemns their work for the same error. Misreadings of *MM* can be found alongside insights, and some aspects of the book have been neglected altogether.

2. Terminology

Ogden & Richards (1994 [1923]: 10) are critical of Saussure for rejecting the term *symbol* to designate the linguistic sign. (Saussure reserves *symbol* for partially motivated signs.) They view Saussure's distinction between sign and symbol as irrelevant and substitute their own: symbols communicate by putting signs into sign-situations. All symbols are signs; not all signs are symbols. The definitions of *sign* and *symbol* in Ogden's *General Basic English Dictionary* confirm this. Ogden & Richards thus establish a taxonomic relation between sign and symbol on the basis of *function*, whereas Saussure establishes their mutual exclusion on the basis of their relative *qualities*.