

## BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Immanuel Kant: *Logic*. Translated by Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz. The Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974. Pp. cxv + 164.

This is the first complete translation into English of Kant's *Logik: Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*. Previously T. K. Abbot translated Kant's Introduction, but left out both Jäsche's Preface and the main body of the text. The unavailability of this important text, or its representation by a partial and inaccurate translation, cannot but have helped perpetrate some of the misunderstandings so wide spread among Anglo-American philosophers regarding Kant's philosophy. He who cannot read German has had to rely on the commentators for Kant's conception of formal logic, and, with the possible exception of H. J. Paton (*Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*), the better known expositors (e.g. Ewing, Körner, Smith, Strawson, Weldon, Wolff) barely discuss the topic, and their comments are usually based on passages from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which are not sufficient for an adequate understanding of the topic. None of these commentators explain in detail that Kant formulated in the *Logic* — and presupposed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* — a conception of judgment different than that found in Aristotle, in his rationalist and empiricist predecessors, or in mathematical logic. Kant's logic is not a propositional logic, but a judgmental logic; the act of judging is either more fundamental than or equally as fundamental as the act of conception; a distinct concept is not possible without judgment; judgment is not a stringing together of independent and external concepts by means of a connective, but a act grounded in the unity of consciousness. Moreover, neither the law of non-contradiction nor the *dictum de omni et nullo* is the basic principle of Kant's logic, as is the case in both Aristotelian and mathematical logic. To be sure, Norman Kemp Smith notes that Kant modified certain aspects of traditional logic, but Kemp Smith does not elaborate; he thinks that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* "no sufficient statement is given either of the nature of the discursive concept or of its relation to judgment" (*A commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 176), and of the *Logic* he opines that:

The limitations of Kant's view of the concept would hardly find more definite expression. The only type of judgment which receives recognition is the categorical, interpreted in the traditional manner (*Ibid.*, p. 180).

While the first statement is not without some basis, a fact which should indicate to us the importance of a study of the *Logic*, the latter is patently false in light of Kant's definition of judgment as an act grounded in the unity of consciousness — "the presentation of the unity of the consciousness of several presentations, or the presentation of their relation so far as they make up one concept" (*Logic*, p. 106)