

contrast to this initial impermanent emptiness, “the Upaniṣads situate themselves from the beginning in fullness, and choose to know that alone.” (p. 200) Buddhism refuses to posit eternal substantial realities such as the *ātman* and *brahman* and sides in this respect with the Brāhmanas and the MS. The Buddhist conception of *dharma*s as the ultimate realities has similarities with Jaimini’s use of the term, both remaining “stubbornly reliant on the irreducible plurality of actions and events ... Like Buddhism, Mīmāṃsā gives primacy to the notion of *dharma* as the proper object of inquiry.” (p. 208) “Duty, law, moral norm, righteousness” etc. are obviously inadequate translations in this context; “functional identity” would come closer and can elucidate even the usage of *dharma* in texts like the Dharmasāstras. *dharma* and *artha* “goal” are closely linked both in Buddhism and in the MS. Buddhism regarded Vedic ritual as essentially worthless and stressed instead the importance of moral action; reliance on the Veda was considered to be without reason, because the Vedic authors lacked verifiable authority. Jaimini, possibly to counter this challenge, acclaimed the word, especially the word of the Veda, as an ultimate irreducible component of reality, not created but eternal; this word generates ritual action. Its central position cannot be ceded to the morality of Buddhism or the spiritual knowledge of Vedānta.

The attempt to read the MS as a text by itself confirms an earlier observation made by W. Halbfass that *apūrva* which occurs several times in the original meaning “new”, never denotes in the MS the unseen link between the sacrifice and its anticipated blessings as it does in the works of Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila. Clooney suggests that in the intervening centuries the impermanent action of sacrifice was devalued and a more permanent basis was sought for the significance of the sacrifice. Śabarasvāmin introduced *apūrva* as a necessary device to explain the delayed effect of sacrifice, without offering any explanation of its ontological status, and he expanded its application to other areas, e.g., claiming “that verbs, being expressive of activity, express the *apūrva*.” (p. 228) In fact for Śabarasvāmin *apūrva* became the center and meaning of the sacrifice, and man for whom the *apūrva* arises, assumed a central position in the sacrifice. Kumārila developed this theory further by locating *apūrva* as a potency (*śakti*) in the soul (*ātman*) of the performer. Prabhākara who may have been a contemporary of Kumārila, reverted largely to the thought of Jaimini for whom the sacrificial action itself was central, so much so that Jaimini did not bother to ask how the ashes left over at the completion of a sacrifice could lead to heaven, abundant crops, etc.

It is a pity that the reading of this rich and rewarding study is marred by so many annoying mistakes and oversights. *varṇa* in Indian grammatical texts is never “letter” (p. 78) but “sound”, and

Pāṇini’s *kāraṅkas* are not “case relations” but relations between the factors of an action that may, inter alia, be expressed by case forms but cannot be put in fixed one-on-one relations to the cases (p. 42). In several places the Sanskrit text of discussed passages is missing, *paribhāṣā* is misspelled frequently, as is *attattha* (p. 209). The wrong sūtra is quoted on pp. 182 and 265 (VI 1,40 instead of VI 1,39), and a word is missing (subsequent) in the quote from Halbfass (p. 243). In IX 4,23 (p. 267) Clooney copies the misprint found in several Indian editions (*asyābhidhānam* instead of *asyābhidhānam*), and in X 7,58 (p. 109) he constructs the feminine *sarvāsām* with the masculine *guṇānām* instead of *codanānām* (as Śabarasvāmin correctly does). The flimsy binding of the book provided by the publisher did not survive this reviewer’s reading, giving a new meaning to the Indian expression *pañcatvaṃ gataḥ*. In spite of these occasional flaws, this is a remarkable book.

Ostasien

Chin, Ann-ping, and Mansfield Freeman [Eds.]: **Tai Chen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and Meaning.**

A translation of the *Meng Tzu tzu-i shu-cheng* with a critical introduction. New Haven – London: Yale University Press [1990]. XI, 222 S. gr. 8°. Lw. \$ 35.00. – Bespr. von T. H. Barrett, London.

It is no mean testimony to the consolations of scholarship, and of the study of Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) in particular, that a translation of that thinker’s chief work should appear under the name of Mansfield Freeman more than six decades after his first pioneering efforts in bringing the twentieth-century Chinese reassessment of Qing thought to the attention of a Western audience. As his collaborator, Ann-ping Chin, explains (p. ix), in his early life Mr. Freeman taught English in China, where a friendship with Hu Shi led him to Dai Zhen, on whom Hu was about to publish a major study. Though Mr. Freeman’s subsequent career was in insurance, his ‘inexplicable fondness for classical Chinese’ never left him, and in his retirement he turned once more to translating the works of the Qing scholars who had so fascinated him in earlier days.

To Freeman’s manuscript, which renders Dai’s mature monograph, the *Mengzi ziyi shuzheng*, Chin has contributed the necessary revision and annotation, and also an introduction of over sixty pages giving a balanced and compendious account of Dai’s life and thought. These labours have resulted in a volume that at last does justice to Dai’s achievement by representing him in English translation to the same standard as has been attained long since for Dai’s great bugbears, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, through the renditions of Wing-tsit Chan. This has clearly been no easy task: Dai’s highly personal blend