

Wayne Waxman: A Guide to Kant's Psychologism – via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge 2019, 351 pages, \$115.00 (Hardback), ISBN 978-0-367-14111-0

Wayne Waxman's *A Guide to Kant's Psychologism – via Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Wittgenstein* is the successor to *Understanding Understanding* (2005) and *Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind* (2014). We find in this latest book of Waxman's a view of Kantian philosophy framed within the group of British empiricists in which Locke, Berkeley and Hume stand out. Waxman also relates Kant's philosophy to the Wittgensteinian concept of language games. The book is divided into two parts. The first part argues that the path to understanding Kant is psychologism and conventionalism and presents four chapters of which I would draw particular attention to "From Hume to Kant via Wittgenstein". The second part of the book is entitled "Nature in Mind: Through Kant's I's" and has five chapters that constitute one unit. The conclusion gives an overview of Waxman's main ideas. This is a brilliant book that presents an original interpretation of Kant's philosophy and one in which Waxman discusses the fundamental problems of our understanding using a methodology of direct confrontation with the questions. The main idea of the book is to consider that Kant's critical project, far from opposing Hume's psychologism, is actually a priori psychologism. Waxman's distinction between psychologism and psychology is fundamental to understanding what Waxman stands for. He says:

Psychology, in the sense most relevant to Kant, is psychological philosophy of the kind exemplified by early modern "theory of ideas". It concerns itself with the origin of notions familiar from language as conscious representations in the mind, and this is how scholars today understand 'psychology' in relation to Kant. But if the notion at issue is non-psychological, and particularly if it is deemed *a priori* and/or objective – as commonly is the case with logical, mathematical, scientific, and metaphysical notions – then, while a psychological account of its origin in us may be interesting and even have important epistemic implications, it can tell us nothing whatsoever about the notion itself – its meaning, the scope of its application, or its origin – and, for these reasons, does not yet count as psychologism. (9)

What is at stake in psychologism is not a theory of ideas, but rather whether our representations are determined by our consciousness and whether this is essential to their meaning. If consciousness is essential to their outcome, Waxman considers it to be psychologism. I agree with Waxman's criterion but disagree with some of the conclusions he draws in the book. I shall briefly review two major arguments Waxman makes in the book and present my own doubts regarding his proposals.