Schluß
Final Remarks
Réflexions finales

289. Names and Their Study

1. The Presence of Names

Just as language does, names permeate our lives and all the world, real and imaginary, in which we live. Indeed, one can say that for us as humans, the very existence of individual entities is connected with their being given a name; or at least our taking cognizance of them and our perception of them as individual entities is related to our having a name for them. There is a remarkable coincidence of examples collected by chance, not by effort, that shows how widespread and how permanent this importance of having a name is. The reader of the preceding pages knows that a Roman child got a name only a few days after birth, when it was possible to assume that death would not occur and if the father (in his legal capacity as 'pater familias') did not reject it as unfit because of some deformity, but accepted it into the family. With some modifications, we find this custom in other societies in different parts of the world. This seems to indicate that the name was given only when the new individual was accepted into the society, and that the name symbolized, or was the expression of, such acceptance. The rejected child was exposed to death; it was easier to do this to an unnamed non-member of society. Second example: The family of the German playwright and author Carl Zuckmayer spent the war in America, mostly farming in Vermont; Mrs. Herdan-

Zuckmayer published (1956) a charming narrative about their experience. She movingly describes that in order to be able to send the animals on their way to the butcher, it was necessary to treat them as a mass, anonymously, preventing any contact or liaison with them. Occasionally, a particularly attractive member of the species was selected for continuous existence as a sort of house pet, but otherwise one had to refrain from discerning individual features in the animals; and there were no names but for the selected pets. And lastly, we read in art. 172 (Payne) that in the tracts of land in the U.S. designed as Wilderness Areas, the recent law that has established these areas also explicitly forbids (with negligible exceptions) giving names to geographic features (mountains, streams, configurations of rocks, etc.) contained in them: wilderness is not a place where man disposes.

All three of these instances show that a name performs more than the communicative and identifying function: whether the purpose is to accept a new member of the social group, or to turn an animal into a house pet, or to keep wilderness as unpolluted as possible, the name symbolizes and indeed establishes a personal relation. Also, it establishes the individuality of the entity named; the reverse can be seen in the depersonalizing effect of distinguishing prisoners only by numbers, and not by their names.

2. Linguistic and Cultural Variation

Names are linguistic signs (sui generis, but signs nevertheless); hence, their forms vary just as the languages of which they are part differ from one another. However, names are as strongly connected with cultures as they are with languages; therefore, there is not only
linguistic variation, but also cultural variation to cope with when names are studied. To make things even more complicated, there is a double cultural variation to cope with: on the one hand, each set of names is embedded in the context of a certain culture and these possible cultural differences must be considered when names are compared; on the other hand, the researcher who studies names also is embedded in a culture which is not always identical with the culture of the names studied.

The linguistic variation does not cause any major problems, at least not on the theoretical, or notional, level; the reason for this is probably that we (that is, linguists in general and onomatologists in particular) are accustomed and trained to cope with differences in languages, both synchronic and diachronic ones.

The culture in which we (onomatologists) live does, however, influence our attitudes. For instance, it is quite easy to perceive how interest in single onomastic problems (for instance, names of women after marriage) varies with changes in our culture. However, since the presence of onomastics as a scholarly pursuit is strongly connected with modern scientific and scholarly culture, which is basically international in its character and is to a degree homogeneous, such differences in the onomatologists’ attitudes are observable mostly only in the diachronic changes in methods and foci of interest. Such differences do not cause any major theoretical or notional problems. In other words, there is not much cultural difference among contemporary onomatologists.

It is the cultures in which the names themselves are embedded that are difficult to cope with, because they differ synchronically and they change diachronically. Naturally, culture being the product of human endeavor, such differences are stronger when the names and naming practices have to do with human institutions than when they deal with natural phenomena. Therefore, we shall try to show how personal names are embedded in various cultures. Personal names were chosen for this purpose because while we cannot discuss the cultural embedding of all kinds of names (place names, names of gods, etc.), personal names offer a particularly rich variety of examples. As is normal, cultural phenomena display a mixture of generally human features and single-culture idiosyncrasies. We shall take the most outstanding focal points in human life (at least from the point of view of their relation to onomatography) as the framework for our discussion.

3. Invariant Factors and Various Cultural Idiosyncrasies

There are invariant factors in human life (some of them unavoidable, some optional) and there are cultural idiosyncrasies that accompany them and give them a form. Let us survey a few such invariant situations and their cultural accompaniment.

1. A child is born. Is it of cultural importance that the father be exactly identified?
2. After some time (How long? What are the reasons for the postponement?)
3. The child is given a name. Is it the definitive name, or only a provisional one? Is the name simple or complex? Who decides which name will be chosen and on the basis of what considerations? Is the choice completely free, or are there limitations? If there are any, what is their character and how broad is the field of possible choices? Is the sex or social standing of the child to be taken into consideration? If the name is complex, how are its other constituents determined? If there is a hereditary name, is it patronymic, metronymic, or is the unity of the name of the family pursued? Or is there a hereditary name stemming from a more distant, or possibly mythical, ancestor? Or are several names of this type combined in a complex name for the child?
4. If there are maturity rites taking place at a suitable age, are additional names given, or is there a change of name? Or is there a name change or additional naming which takes place when the child turns into an adult, even without maturity rites?
5. Most societies know some form of a cultural institution, usually called marriage, that expresses the intention of two individuals of opposite sex to stabilize their relations. (Similar intentions, mostly uninstitutionalized, of members of the same sex are without consequence for onomastics, because as of now, they do not affect any names; the same can be said about so-called group marriages, levirate, etc.) What happens to the names of the two partners after marriage? There seems to be a plethora of possibilities. The basic constellations seem to be: (a) both partners keep their names; this must necessarily be the case if there is only one personal name for
each person, given after birth, but the spouses can stick to their respective hereditary names as well, if that is a choice accepted by that society; (b) in the case where personal names are complex, one of the spouses can assume the hereditary name of the other spouse and use it as her (less frequently, as his) own; (c) the two hereditary names of the two spouses are combined either into a hyphenated form or into a sequence, which is used either by only one of them or by both, the sequence sometimes being different for the man and for the woman; (d) the hereditary part of the child’s name largely depends on the choices made under (a) – (c).

(6) If the two partners dissolve such a union, what happens to their names and to the names of their children? What happens to their names and to the names of their children if one of them or both enter another such union, i.e., if they remarry?

(7) If a child is born without any previous arrangement of such a union, does it have some consequences for the selection of the child’s name?

(8) Does a child’s adoption entail a change of his name?

(9) Does success in the individual’s career bring in an additional or perhaps even a substitutive honorific name? Does the individual’s career require the selection of a pseudonym? Is it normal and usual for the individual to be given a nickname by colleagues? Or is such a nickname obligatory?

(10) In a society with complex personal names, how is one addressed or referred to by other people? In which situations and for whom are nicknames, positive or negative, used?

(11) Is it possible to change one’s name?

(12) When a person dies, is the name banned by a taboo?

4. Examples of Various Situations

Needless to say, the preceding list of points does not come anywhere close to being exhaustive. Let us now add some examples, most of which are taken from the articles published in these volumes; these examples are not intended to exhaust all the wealth of documentation there. Some of them are somewhat simplified as to details and exceptions, so as to make the broad structural lines clearer.

To (3.1). In most organized societies, the lack of the father’s identity can cause much trouble later on, when paternity is accepted or proved, among other things with respect to the determination of the child’s hereditary name.

To (3.2). The Vietnamese child gets an apotropaeic name first, to avert misfortune; the giving of the real name comes only later (Nguyễn, art. 133). In older days, the Chinese child got a provisional name (called ‘milk name’) at birth, whereas the definitive, official name was given at about the age of 15 (Creamer, art. 137).

To (3.3). In Western countries, the personal name is divided into two basic components, one of them individually selected for the child, one hereditary. (This discussion is concerned with what is called in German bürgerliche Namen, i.e. non-aristocratic names; the aristocratic families sometimes follow other rules of naming, cf. Schwenzer/Menne, art. 276.) The individually selected name is usually called given name or first name; another designation of it is forename or (somewhat obsolete) baptismal or Christian name. The usual German designation is Vornamen or (somewhat obsolete) Taufname. Since, however, several such forenames can be given, the main one by which the child normally is addressed, is called in German Rufname (German ‘Ruf’ = ‘call’), whereas the remaining forenames are called Beinamen (Seibicke, art. 177). However, the term Rufname is sometimes used just as Vornamen for any first or given name, to serve as the terminological opposite to the notion of Nachname or Familienname (surname, last name) that came into existence only later (Debus, art. 57). The hereditary part of the personal name largely depends on what choices the child’s parents had made at point (5). Until recently, the unity of the family name was quite strictly respected, particularly in Western societies, but also elsewhere, so that there was patronymic transmission of what is called the surname and, more frequently in recent times, last name. The usual German terms are Familienname and Zusatzname. Indeed, the notion of the family name was of such importance in Russian that the Russian word ‘família’ does not mean ‘family’ but ‘family name’. (‘Family’ is ‘sемья’ in Russian.)

None of these terms is really good. The disadvantage of family name is that the social institution of the family seems to be getting weaker lately, so that the absence of a name common to all the members of the family can be considered just one of the symptoms of
that decline. Terms such as surname or Zu-
name reflect the historical development of he-
ereditary names, some of which came into ex-
istence precisely as such additional elements
for better identification. The terms first name
and last name have the disadvantage that
while in many languages the individually
given name stands first and the hereditary
one last in the complex personal name, there
are languages such as Chinese, Hungarian,
and Vietnamese in which the order is re-
versed: the hereditary part comes first and the
individual part last. (The situation is exacer-
bated by the circumstance that the Hungari-
ans when writing in English, e.g., use the
same order as in English, Nagy Imre becom-
ing Mr. Imre Nagy, but the Chinese stick to
their own usual order. The Vietnamese vac-
cillate in this respect: see Nguyêñ, art. 133.)

R. Kohlheim (art. 191) calls the whole per-
sonal name Gesamtnname (complete name), its
individually given part individueller Teil (in-
dividual part), and the hereditary part über-
individueller Teil (supraindividual part). This
is very adroit, particularly because the suprain-
dividual part is not always hereditary in the
narrow sense of the word and the given part
is not always freely given in the true sense of
the word. But to be usable terminologically
outside of a clarifying context, the terms
would have to be expanded into Gesamtper-
sonenname (complete personal name) etc.

Van Langendonck (art. 188) has a different
classification: he divides personal names into
individual names and collective names. The
former, in turn, can be either first names (=
forenames, = Christian names) or bynames
(= all the individual personal names that are
not first names). Collective names, the second
main category of personal names, are divided
into family names and surnames, the latter
being bynames or collective names that modi-
ify individual personal names. (For details,
see the article.)

Let us mention that the most frequent type
of hereditary names is the patronymic one,
with the metonymic principle being a distant
second. Even rarer is the descendance of the
name from the grandparents (usually the
grandfather, hence sometimes called pappo-
rnyn or propatronymy (cf. the term Lineage-
name in Köhler, art. 149). But there are cases
of hereditary names that go back into the
mythological past, to some common but
mythical ancestor of a clan. Such is the situa-
tion in Vietnamese (art. 133): the hereditary
part of the author's name, Nguyêñ, goes back
to such an ancestor of the clan. Let us remark
that the institution of such hereditary 'family'
names or clannames sometimes causes their
very restricted number, as in Vietnamese, Chi-
inese (Creamer, art. 137), and Korean (Kim,
art. 140). Celtic names with the morphemes
Mac, Ó, and P. (Schmidt, art. 111) belong
here, although they are not restricted in the
same way.

A similar situation exists in Ossetic, where
most of the names that we know in their
Russified, hence exonymic, form in -ev are in
Ossetic genitive plurals of the name of the
clan of descendants of such a mythical ances-
tor: the exonym of the well-known Ossetic
linguist, Abaev, stands for the indigenous
form Abäity 'of the Abäits', gen. pl. of the
nom. Abäitâ 'Abäits, i.e. the clan of the
descendants of Aba'. I do not know of a
designation for such a type of name. Clan
name, perhaps (cf. the term Klannname used
in art. 149: Köhler on Maya). The situation
is not dissimilar to the hereditary parts of
Scottish personal names derived from the
clans. Ultimately, totem-derived personal
names would seem to belong to a closely
related category, the basic difference being
that the mythical ancestor is not of human
character, but as of now, not much is known
about these names.

On the other hand, a hereditary principle
for naming can be applied without there being
a unity of the name for the family and without
a really different form of name developing.
This is the situation in Icelandic, where a child
gets a given name and a patronymic (only
infrequently a metronymic), which is easily
recognizable as such. There is no change in
these names after marriage. Thus, Jon Sigurdf-
don may have a daughter called Guðrun Jons-
dottir and a son Sigurður Jonsson. (Cf., how-
ever, what is said about Swedish hereditary
names in -son below.) There is a suggestion
to call such a patronymic Nachname (Kvaran,
art. 8), which is good, because this term is
only infrequently used in the sense of family
name; the English candidate for a translation
would be byname, or surname, which, how-
ever, are more loaded with other usages than
their German counterpart.

Two different hereditary principles can op-
erate in one personal name, as institutional-
ized by society. That is the case of the Russian
personal name which consists of three parts.
There is the first, or given name (called inja)
and the last name (called familija), which are
comparable to their counterparts in other
European languages. Between them there is the patronymic (Russ. otčestvo, derived from otec 'father'), derived from the father's given name by the suffix -ović for sons, and the suffix -ovna for daughters. Hence, a person called Ivan Petrović Kärenin can have a son named Dimitrij Ivanović Kärenin and a daughter called Anna Ivanovna Kärenina. (The example shows that the family name is sensitive to gender as well.)

In America, the element inserted between the first (or given) name and the hereditary (usually family) name is called the middle name. Many middle names are based on the metronymic principle, or on what one could try to call gynaeconomy: the mother's or the wife's name, in this case, her hereditary pre- or post-marriage name. Many middle names are derived by other considerations; the best, or onomastically most interesting are the cases where the middle name means nothing and refers to nothing. Such was the case of President Harry S Truman (mind the absence of the period after the S), where the middle name was just S (Ashley, art. 186). The inserted element owes its existence to the pressure of the system: a functional slot must be filled. A similar pressure from the system can be observed among the Eskimos: if an Eskimo gets baptized, thereby acquiring a first (baptismal) name, what had been his single personal name up to that point of time changes into his family name: de Reuse, art. 151.

However, the reader of the preceding articles will have noticed that there are also other systems of personal names than those just described. Among the Mayas (Köhler, art. 149) the personal name consisted of the name given to the young child, called Knabenname in the text, which was followed by the Muttermame (about which we do not know whether it was derived from the mother's mother or from the mother's father), the Vatername, and the Spitzname. It is not fully clear whether all these parts of the complex personal name were bestowed at once: the interesting thing, however, is that the Spitzname (= nickname) is not an additional, complementary or optional element of the personal name, but an inherent part of it. (Some additional Spitzname or several of them could be added optionally to this obligatory one.) This reminds us of the structure of the Roman names (Rix, art. 106; Solin, art. 162). The normal Roman personal name at the time of the Republic consisted of a praenomen (e.g. Marcus) and nomen gentile (e.g., Tullius); to this, a cognomen was added (e.g., Cicero), so that the normal name was tripartite. However, some of the cognomina became hereditary (e.g. Publius Cornelius Scipio), and so individual cognomina were added, either derived from the person's achievements (Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus), or from any other circumstance (Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio). Seeing this, one wonders whether a Mayan 'nickname' (Spitzname) would not be better called cognomen.

Arabic and Egyptian names will be mentioned later (in the remarks to 3.9).

So far discussion has been about the structure of personal names. As to some other aspects of name-giving, let us remind ourselves that in many languages, names are sensitive to gender. The situation in the European languages is too well known to be recapitulated here. Let us mention, however, that in Northern India (Kachru, art. 99), rules stemming from 200–300 A.D. prescribe that names of boys should consist of an even number of syllables, those of girls of an uneven number. By the same rules, the names of the brahmans (the highest caste in society) should end in -sharma or -deva, the names of the kshatriyas (the second caste) in -varna or -raja, those of vaisyas in -gupta or -datta, and those of the Sudras (the lowest caste) in -dasä.

Finally, as concerns freedom of choice, the European and American situation is well known, with nearly complete freedom in America and Great Britain practically unrestricted, but some restrictions obtaining in the repertory of admissible given names in France and in the countries of Eastern Europe (R. Kohlheim, art. 191); but let us mention in this connection that since the easiest way to find whether a name is admissible or not is to check in the calendar, or several calendars, the term Kalendername (Knappová 1991/92) developed for a name that was not invented ad hoc for the purpose of the naming at hand, but had been known before. However, no reader should miss the description of such an elaborate scheme of name choice as the one discussed in art. 134 (Okell, Burma).

Apart from legal, institutional, or ecclesiastic constraints, there are personal considerations, preferences, or inhibitions that can be purely euphonic or esthetic (based on the form of the name), or associative (patriotic names, names of revered saints, or of admired historical or political persons), or purely private (memory of a family member, caputio benevolentiae, or consideration for the impor-
tant members of the naming ritual, such as the godfather or godmother). The esthetic considerations, it might be noted, are particularly sensitive to fashion.

To (3.4). The approaching adulthood of the child is signalled in many Christian churches by a sacrament called in some of them ‘confirmation’. In the Roman Catholic ceremony, the confirmand theoretically gets an additional name of the first-name type (or several of them), usually derived from the first name of the godfather or godmother. To my knowledge, this name is never used by anyone and does not even appear in ecclesiastic records.

That the Chinese child, in older days, received the official name only at the age of 15 has already been noted (to 3.2). At the age of 20, he would get a courtesy (or style) name. In aristocratic families, the naming was part of the capping ceremony, after which the person’s given name would consist of the (official) name and the style name (Cremer, art. 137). On the other hand, the Hindu upanayanam ceremony had no influence on the name.

To (3.5). The main effect of marriage on things onomastic consists in the possible or obligatory change of the name (usually the hereditary one) that takes place in some cultures. The situation in the Western countries is so well known and so well described in the preceding articles that it is hardly necessary to recapitulate it. However, there are some interesting terms that it will be useful to mention. A name derived from the name of the spouse and accepted after marriage is frequently called the ganonym (e.g., Schmitt, art. 96). In most cultures it has been the wife that changed her original name (or the hereditary part of it) to the ganonym. The masculine derivation of the ganonym is explicitly obvious in the term andronymic family name (andronymischer Familienname: Syoneinis, art. 103). The interesting thing there is that such a name can be derived, of course, from the husband’s name, but also from his profession: he Giatrów η Γιατρώμα derived from Mod. Greek γιατρός γιατρος ‘physician’. Since the physician in question must have had a name of his own, it probably would be better to call this an andronymic ganonym.

Returning to Western ganonyms, we shall mention some pertinent German terms and try to translate them. They are all taken from art. 276 (Schwenzel/Menne). A family name common to both the spouses is called Ehe-

name, perhaps spousal name. (The purpose of this seems to be to avoid cultural accretions connected with the term Familienname, family name, and to maintain the distinction obtaining between the two terms; the distinction itself will be clarified in the following) If the spouses use a spousal name (an Ehename) but one of them puts his or her original family name before or after the Ehename, such a name is called a Begleitname, perhaps accompanying name. If, however, the two spouses create a spousal name (Ehename) consisting of a combination of both the original family names, and they both use this combined form, such a name is called Allianzname, perhaps united or alliance-name. To preserve some clarity in all these changes as to the original family name, there is the term Geburtsname, birth name, that refers to the child’s family name at birth. The terms Begleitname and Allianzname are reserved for the post-marriage situation; a double, or combined (usually hyphenated) family name used or originated outside of such a situation is called a Doppelname, double name. Let us remark that the constantly spreading use of alliance names brings up the question of what will happen when a young man who has a double name because he inherited his parents’ alliance name marries a girl who also has a double name for the same reason: if they form an alliance name, will it be quadrifol it? Or will they form a Klammerzusammensetzung, a bracket compound name? (See below.) Truncated combinations are already here; e.g., Mr. Johnson + Miss Harris = Mr. and Mrs. Harrjohn (David L. Gold, private communication).

In any case, we also read in article 276 (Schwenzer/Menne) that by French law, the wife’s legal name remains unchanged after marriage, at least in the eyes of the law. The fact that practically all French wives, with very few, quite recent exceptions, accept their husbands’ family names does not change this: such an accepted family name is nom d’usage, Gebrauchsname (perhaps usage name). This situation probably explains why all French legal or official forms so insistently ask for the nom de jeune fille (echoed in German Mädchename, Engl. maiden name, recently also birth name). Vietnamese authorities (as reported in Nguyễn, art. 133) proceed in the reverse way: the girl keeps her name intact upon marriage, but in official documents, the name of the husband is added to that of the wife.
A completely different custom obtains on Java, where the husband after the wedding takes a new name, derived from the designation of his job (Jones/Phillips, art. 135). Although this will be a sort of byname, it still shows a completely different effect of marriage on naming.

To (3.6). The only onomastic importance of divorce consists in the various attitudes toward names acquired through marriage. Frequently, the married spouses keep their names as modified by marriage, but sometimes they revert to the onomastic situation as it was before the marriage. Some socially interesting cases may be observed, but they are rare. For instance, I know several married couples in which the woman was married previously and after divorce kept the name of the husband, but upon her second marriage, she did not change her last name. The result is that she has neither her own original family name (or maiden name), nor that of her present husband. The explanation probably lies in a change of attitude toward the importance of naming.

The problem of whether a divorced spouse (usually the wife) can be legally forced to drop the name of the spouse divorced and resume the family name received at birth (maiden name) is differently solved in various legal systems; it largely depends on which (if any) party was found guilty.

We may perhaps insert here that if a divorced spouse in whose care the children proceed from the divorced marriage live, remarries and accepts the family name of the new spouse, the children from the previous marriage can, under various conditions and by procedures that vary from one legal system to another, acquire the family name of the new family. There is a German term for this, *Einbenennung* (Schwenzer/Menne, art. 276); while a good, short English translation escapes me, the morphemes suggest something like 'naming into' (the new family).

To (3.7). The naming of a child born to a single mother is more or less her exclusive business, with the father having an influence only on the private level and insofar as he accepts paternity. There can arise, however, interesting onomastic problems. One is reported in Zgusta (1994). A single mother gives her child a name that suggests the paternity of an important member of the community. Can the man thus 'honored', whose paternity is not proved or not even suspected, stop her from doing so? In other words, can one person influence somebody else's right to give a name? In business, this is commonplace, the purpose of registered brandnames being exactly this: to prevent somebody's using the name of the product. In the area of personal names, however, the problem is new.

To (3.8). Adoption does not cause any onomastic problems, the adopted child receiving the name from the adopting spouses. Problems may arise only if the biological parent or parents revive their interest in the abandoned child, acquire the right of legal custody, and have parental rights restituted.

To (3.9). This is an area as vast as it is amorphous. There are onomastic systems in which the personal name more of less obligatorily contains some bynames. The Mayan and the Roman situations have already been mentioned above, to (3.3). We can add here that Egyptian anthroponymy had a system of surnames, epithets, and other elements that are described in art. 121 (Quaegebeur), where the Egyptian designations of such names (e.g. 'beautiful name') are indicated and the different names of kings analyzed. In a similar way, the Arabic personal name (Fischer, art. 128) consists of the individual name of the person (called *ism*), the patronymic (or sometimes metronymic) or even papponymic (called *nasab*), and the byname that is used instead of the ism, called *lagad*. Another additional element added to the Arabic personal name is what is called the *Herkunftsname* (perhaps *cognomen of origin* or else *ethnicon*, in Arabic *nisba*), indicating the tribe, place, or societal group from which the bearer of the name originates. It would perhaps be useful to call such elements of personal names *cognomina*, or *cognomens*; the term *byname* is overloaded and not quite clear, *surname* has acquired a meaning different from the original one, and *nickname* does not fit.

Sometimes, a name is uniformly added to the whole personal name in order to proclaim the bearer's being a member of a group. One example is the widespread habit in the Philippines of proclaiming one's Christianity by inserting the name *Maria* into a suitable position within the personal name (Zorc, art. 141). A particularly tragic case of such obligatory additional names was the legal duty of Jews in Germany after 1939 to add *Israel* or *Sara* to their names (Bering, art. 200). Another case that belongs to this group seems to be the *secret names* of the brahmans: besides the public name they have a particular name that remains secret (Kachru, art. 99).
Let us rather turn our attention to other situations. There are habitual additions of names in the most diverse cultural areas. For instance, when a child is born on Bali, the father is called by what is known as a tecnonya: a name derived from that of the child. The usual morphemic structure of such a teconony is 'father of'. (Jones/Phillips, art. 135).

In America, but also in Great Britain and to some extent in France, the married woman for social purposes uses the whole name of her husband, preceded by an honorific that shows her femininity. Thus, my wife's social name is Mrs. Ladislav Zgusta. In the Orangerie of Paris, there is the portrait of Madame Paul Guillaume, by Laurencin. While the social name is slowly receding, the so-called business name of women is gaining ground: it is the name under which a woman decides to run her business. Of particular interest is the fact that some such names are accompanied by the masculine title Esq., to show that the woman is in legal business and to equalize her name with those of her male colleagues: Madeleine Koopsmuth, Esq. (Ashley, art. 186).

A vast group of various pseudonyms is connected with the necessities of one's profession. This is particularly well known in respect to artists and their frequent pseudonyms (not infrequently better known than the real name; Kühn, art. 77). In some societies, however, literary names were not pseudonyms, but were added to the name of the person as a sort of byname (Creamer, art. 137; China). A particularly disagreeable sort of pseudonyms are the Decknamen (Tarnnamen, Scheinnamen), i.e. cover names of spies and informers (Kühn, art. 77).

In the article just mentioned, Kühn mentions a group of various bynames: Spitznamen, Beinamen, Übernamen, Necknamen, Scherznamen, Ekelnamen, Spottnamen; Kany (art. 76) adds Kösenamen and Kurznamen and Rübekeil (art. 203) adds Prunknamen to the list. The list covers the most different types of bynames, all terms which it would be futile to translate; the types range from pejorative to adulatory, from pleasant to disagreeable, and from jocose to serious. A clarification of all these types will yet require some effort; it will be particularly necessary to discern the occasional from the recurrent bynames and byname types, and to establish well discernible categories. To achieve this, Kany constitutes all these types of bynames as unofficial personal names, in contradistinction to official ones. (He makes the distinction also with respect to place names, street names, etc., which is very useful.) The decision as to the status of the byname will not always be easy or even possible. Such is the case, for instance, of the late Roman supernomina, which were added to the name with the formula qui et (these are called agnominia: ... qui et Avellus) or the formula signo (these are called signa: ... signo Avellus; Solin, art. 162) and are mostly of a character that would suggest an unofficial status, although the fact that they are indicated even on epitaphs shows that they were more than occasional. A structural comparison can be made with the American custom of including, sometimes even in obituary notices, the byname in quotation marks: e.g., Marybeth "Babs" Ioannidou Geanious.

In Burma we find a society in which not only changes in lifestyle (such as becoming a monk) entail the application of a conferred name, or an elevation of one's status requires the addition of the honorific name or its substitution for the original name, but many other stages of life, as well, have an onomastic correlate (Okell, art. 134).

To (3.10). Forms of address, on one hand, are stabilized within the customs of the society, and on the other hand, largely depend on the degree of intimacy and social status of the interlocutors. A discussion of the latter type of address is impossible within this short article. As to the former type, let us note only that, e.g., the normal Russian way of addressing even superiors is by the name and patronymic. An interesting change in the form of address has been taking place in Western societies in recent years: contrary to former times when the use of the first name was considered a correlate of degree of intimacy and the last name was reserved for all other cases, the use of the first name is now spreading into situations where the interlocutor is a complete stranger. The phenomenon is sometimes called first-nameism (David L. Gold, private communication). The optimistic interpretation of this phenomenon is that people are trying to be more informal, the pessimistic one, that people such as employees are aiming to protect their privacy (e.g., from customers) by giving a name which makes identification of the bearer more difficult.

To (3.11). Various remarks on changing names have already been made above. The methods of changing one's name for some
private reasons vary from one society to another. In general, it is much easier to change one’s hereditary (family, last) name than one’s individual (given, first) name. Great Britain and the U.S. have the most liberal regulation (or absence of regulation) of such name changes. The change must not be made for fraudulent purposes. Even if such an intention is absent, there are (though admittedly, extremely rare) cases of rejection of a name that would cause impossible trouble. In Zgusta (1994) one case of such a rejection is reported: the person wished to have his name changed to a number. (Not to the words that express the number in English, but to the very number itself.) The reason for the rejection was the slew of difficulties this would have caused for the person’s bankers, brokers, and insurance agents, not to mention the Internal Revenue Service (= Steuerbehörde).

Apart from such private changes of names, there are in some societies obligatory changes, connected with changes happening during one’s life. Outstanding examples of such renaming are the names assumed by some orders of Christian monks and friars (Schwenz/ Menne, art. 276), by a newly elected Pope, etc. As to the latter category, it is perhaps not without interest that even the Pope has an official and an unofficial name: in Rome, the usual thing in conversation is not to talk about Papa Giovanni Paolo II, but about Papa Wojtyla, not about Papa Giovanni XXIII but Papa Roncalli, etc. Thus, the pressure of the system provides the change of status: what was the official name of the prelate becomes the unofficial name of the pope.

To (3.12). In some societies, death causes a taboo surrounding the name of the deceased. A particularly interesting case occurs among the Eskimos (de Reuse, art. 151): there is a strong taboo on the deceased’s name, and since personal names are mostly derived from appellatives (general nouns), the appellative is under taboo as well; hence, it becomes necessary to invent a new one for the object to be denoted.

5. The Main Dimensions of Linguistic Variation and Their Terminology

It has been said at the beginning that names are linguistic signs sui generis that are embedded in culture. In the preceding sections we discussed some points connected with cultural variation. We shall now turn to the linguistic side of onomastics. Our survey will be more succinct, because the linguistic problems of names have been more studied than the cultural and societal ones. Since the linguistic approaches and terms are well known, this discussion concentrates on points of pertinent onomatological terminology.

A thorough discussion of the theme indicated in the section title should contain at least the following topics:

(1) The semantics of names
   (1 a) The objects of naming
   (1 b) The methods of naming
   (1 c) Apotropaic and benedictive names; hypocoristica
   (1 d) Types of morphemic meaning
   (1 e) Etymologies and aetiology of names

(2) The structures of names
   (2 a) Monomorphemic names
   (2 b) Derivations
   (2 c) Compounds
   (2 d) Phrases
   (2 e) Sentences as names
   (2 f) Abbreviations and truncations
   (2 g) Artificial names and blends

(3) Names and historical linguistics
   (3 a) Names as a source for historical linguistics
   (3 b) Names and substrata
   (3 c) Primary and secondary names
   (3 d) Names and nouns
   (3 e) Names and antonomasies; Vossian antonomasies
   (3 f) Names and descriptive phrases

(4) Names and linguistic areas
   (4 a) Foreign names, borrowed names, translated names
   (4 b) Names in bilingual areas

(5) The pragmatics of names
   (5 a) Reasons for selecting a name
   (5 b) Purposes of using a name
   (5 c) Names and deixis
   (5 d) Names and existential binders

(Many more points could be given here, but there is no sense in rewriting the titles of all the pertinent preceding articles and their sections.) However, to discuss all this, even to summarize what has been said on the preceding pages about these topics, would be equivalent to writing another book. Hence, we shall proceed in the same way as in section (4), making only remarks and observations on some points of interest, particularly on those concerning terminology.
Anyone who has studied names knows that names do not have a meaning in the sense in which appellatives (general nouns) do carry one. The meaning of the latter (if they are words with full lexical meaning) can be said to consist in the ability to be used in reference to a certain class of extralinguistic (real or hypothetical) objects, actions, properties, or relations (of a static, processual or any other character), or to any member or subset of the class. Instead of this ability, names have the purpose of individualizing single members of a certain class, or groups conceived of as units. In art. 56, Nicolaisen calls this ability or purpose the onomastic content (Nomeninhalt) of the name. If we leave aside some complexities, the matter is simple: the onomastic content of the name John is to be used referentially to identify a single person, namely the one so called. On the other hand, some names (and when coined, perhaps nearly all) are what is called in German redende oder sprechende Namen: ‘talking names’; they are called so, because their morphemes do say something. For instance, the Slavic personal name Kazimir consists of two morphemes which mean, respectively, ‘spoil’ and ‘peace’. The difference between this what we could call morphemic meaning and the onomastic content of the name, is not much different from the morphemic meaning of some appellative words and their lexicalized meaning; for instance, the morphemes of the word atom carry the meanings ‘not’ and ‘split’, whereas the lexicalized meaning of the word denotes a part of matter that has been and can be split into a tremendous number of smaller particles. This is a case of the morphemic meaning losing its relevance; sometimes it is lost completely: we can sail from New York on a steamer that is propelled by combustion engines, without any linguistic or other compunction. The morphemic meaning is largely evanescent in names as well. (As Nicolaisen says, even a girl with a dark complexion can be called Fiona, even though fionn means ‘white’ in Gaelic.) Few people would call such designations as atom for something that can be split, steamer for a ship without steam-power, or Fiona for a dark girl misnomers, because the morphemic meaning is evanescent or has completely vanished in the popular understanding. This can happen even when the morphemes themselves are not opaque: e.g., a Swedish girl can have the hereditary name Andreasson, although she cannot be anybody’s son at all.

However, there are cases where it was the morphemic meaning that was decisive in giving the name. An excellent example has been found by von Hinüber (art. 97): the name Rāpājīvā (fem.) consists of morphemes that mean ‘form, beauty (of body)’ and ‘living’. As an appellative, the word means ‘von körperlicher Schönheit lebend, Freudenmädchen’. When some parents were giving this name to their daughters, they must have had in mind the pleasant etymological meaning of the single morphemes. So, the morphemic meaning of the name can play a role, particularly in such benedictive, wishful, and, conversely, apotropaic names. The selection of intimate names offers many examples that belong here; see Fischer, art. 128 (Arabic); Leslau, art. 129 (Amharic, noms de guerre); Nguyễn, art. 133 (Vietnamese); Okell, art. 134 (Burmese); Creamer, art. 137 (Chinese), and many others. Every good translator pays attention to whether the original contains personae with such names (Kalverkämper, art. 158). The morphemic meaning of a name can also be translated for nationalistic purposes; e.g., Basque Nekarraren for Span. Dolores (from B. neke ‘pain’), Bakarne for Soledad (from B. bakar ‘alone’): Gorrochategui, art. 109.

The morphemic meaning plays a particular role in toponymy, because many place names evolved from descriptive phrases: Red River was originally the description of a river that was red.

While the evanescence of morphemic meaning is not overwhelmingly important in names nor in general nouns (appellatives), it is rather decisively important in scientific terminology, because terms should indicate their meaning by their morphemic composition, and should form unified systems of nomenclature, ones correlated with the classification of the denotata. The traditional terminology used in name studies cannot boast a systematic character, nor does it cover the whole field of name studies with all its distinctions.

An attempt at a new, systematic terminology is described in art. 40 (Witkowski), and the new terms are used in several articles. We shall make some observations (without any attempt at exhaustivity) on the sets of terms, old and new, as they occur in this volume.

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phemes, not all of those that are constitutive to the meaning.

Sometimes the same notion can be expressed by several Greek morphemes; hence, synonymic, competing terms can occur. In art. 205, Back uses the by-now-usual terms when calling Sverige (the Swedish form of the name of Sweden) the endonym of the name (Gr. endon ‘inside’), but the foreign forms of the name, such as Germ. Schweden or Engl. Sweden, its exonym (Gr. exo ‘outside’). However, Witkowski (art. 40) would call Sverige an autethnonym and Schweden an allethnonym. The relative advantages of either pair are obvious: the first is already known, but the second one more precise (at least if we disregard the problem of the morpheme -ethno- vs. -choro-; see below), because it would allow other combinations such as allotoponym, allotanthroponym (e.g., Greek Dareios for the Persian autanthroponym Dārayavās) whereas exonym traditionally is used in relation to place names only, although nothing in the morphemic structure of the terms indicates such a restriction. On the other hand, Back classifies his exonym as one case of what he calls interlingual allonymy, so he reaches the same higher level of classification as Witkowski, with even the additional advantage that one could coin on that model the term intralingual allonymy, to cover such examples as the ‘diastratal’ L. A., pronounced [ley] for Los Angeles, or Boulenich for Boulevard St. Michel, or ‘diatopical’ variants such as Holomóc in the local dialect for the official Olomouc in Moravia.

The Greek series can be continued. Quite a few more examples can be gleaned from the preceding articles: anemonyms are names of winds (H. and R. Kahane, art. 159); porotoynymy (Knappówá, art. 239) are names of means of locomotion (Greek poréla, poróia ‘journey’), theonymy names of gods (Srámek, art. 26).

In some cases, the meaning of the Greek morphemes is too broad for a real terminological precision. For instance, since Gr. hodos to this very day means either a street or a highway, the term hodonym is used in either meaning (Fuchshuber-Weiβ, art. 227), although Via Appia in ancient and Autostrada del sole in modern Italy are quite a different set of nomenclature from Vicus Tauricus in ancient and Via Panisperna in modern Rome. Another case: in art. 22, Hirša speaks about the ethnonyms of the ‘Stämme, die die lettische Nation bilden’, which is as good as can be; however, when Superanskaja (art. 24) talks about ‘folk and tribe names’, would it be proper to call them ethnonyms, and if not, what would the Greek term be? Some distinctive points of Greek orthography are sometimes lost in the transliteration: choronymy is a good term for names of lands (Srámek, art. 26), because of Gr. chora γῆ ‘land’; however, the term could also be derived from Gr. choros χορός ‘choir’ or ‘dance’ and then it would mean ‘names of music bands, orchestras, etc.’

However, the preceding cases show one of the main points of trouble in this pattern of terminological coinages: the Greek morphemes do not always have the necessary precision to make the term understandable outside of its context, or the necessary ones simply do not exist. The most outstanding case is that of Greek oikós and oikía, οἰκός, oikía, ‘house, dwelling’. Toponyms can be subdivided into oikonyms and anoiotonyms (or oeconymy, anoeconymy, or even econy, ancone) sets of names of places inhabited and uninhabited. However, there is no word for ‘family’ in Greek other than oikós and oikía again. (To attempt a derivation from Gr. génos γένος ‘race, kin, generation’ would result in genonym or geneonym, which would hardly be acceptable.) Perhaps usage could one day distribute oikonym in one way and oikonym in the other, or one could just tolerate the polysemy. In any case, one cannot even salvage the situation by trying to gain some inspiration from Modern Greek, because in that language the family name, as a part of a person’s name, is called the epinymo, ἐπώνυμο while the first name is called simply the onoma Ónoma or (colloquially) mikró onoma µικρὸ ὄνομα and the whole personal name is the onomepáthonymo ὀνοματεπώνυμο (communication of Prof. Ioannes Kazazis). One possible solution would be to coin some hybrid term like familonymous; but that would be, at least for the taste of this writer, too crude a formation.

In a situation like this, those colleagues who try to develop this pattern of terminological resort to basically two methods: as we have seen, either they use Greek morphemes in an approximative meaning, or they use Latin morphemes, sometimes also in an approximative meaning. For instance, les stratoynymes is (apart from its hybrid character) a seemingly clear formation, meaning ‘names of strata’, but the fact that the reference is to layers and veins of coal in pits is clear only
because the article deals with ‘toponymic souterraine’ (Germain, art. 233). More than that: We have already mentioned that synonymy and polysemy are pitfalls for any terminological coinage, and Graeco-Latin false friends are another: while Lat. *stratum* = ‘layer’, Greek *stratós* στρατός = ‘army’; hence, *stratonomy* could mean also ‘names of armies’. When discussing what he calls *städtisches Namengut* (‘urban names’), Handke (art. 228) uses the terms *Plateonomy* (Greek *plateía* πλατεία [scil. δόξα] ‘street’), *Urbanonomy, Urbanonymie,* or *städtische Toponymie to refer to names of subdivisions, developments, suburbs, streets, boulevards, market places, parks, bridges, railway stations, cemeteries, etc. (One could perhaps try to make — or create — the requisite distinction: *plateonomy* ‘street names’ vs. *hodononym* ‘highway names’. The difficulty here is, however, that all the modern descendants of the Greek word — Sp. *plaza*, It. *piazza*, Fr. *place* — denote not streets but squares, only *Engl. place,* as used in English street names, being capable of referring to streets; but that is quite an unusual case.)

A host of such hybrid terms or terms semantically restricted by fiat is given (in German) in art. 239 (Knappová): *Chrononyme* ‘names of epochs, holidays’ (Gr. *chronós* χρόνος ‘time’), *Aktonyme* ‘names of happenings, wars, festivals’ (Lat. *actio* ‘action’), *Fileronyme* (in English this would be *phaleronyme*) ‘names of titles, orders’ (Lat. *phalerae* ‘ornaments, military decorations’); *Ergonyme* ‘names of social institutions, military, parties, theaters, associations’ (Gr. *érgon* ‘work, something done’); *Aktonyme* ‘names of diplomatic documents’ (Lat. *acta* ‘things done, reports’); let us remark that *actonyms, Aktonyme* could also mean ‘names of pleasure resorts’ if derived from Lat. *acta* < ἀκτή ‘sea-shore’; *Ideonyme* ‘works of art, musical pieces, movies’ (Gr. *idea* ἰδέα ‘kind, sort’); *Pragmatonyme* ‘industrial products produced in series (hence also called *Serionyme*; Kuba, art. 241), trademarks, agronomically husbanded species of animals and of produce’ (Gr. *prágma* πράγμα ‘thing, affair, circumstance’); *Unikatonyme* ‘names for single, unique objects’ (Lat. *unicus* ‘sole, unique’). However, products, phenomena, and notions are called *chrematomyne* in art. 55 (Šrámek; Gr. *chrêmata* χρήματα ‘things, goods, affaires’), so that there seems to be some overlapping and partial synonymy.

One cannot fail to see that in some cases the suggested terminological meaning is quite removed from that of the Greek and Latin morphemes. In the case of *Unikatonym,* one even tends to think that the first part of the compound in reality is not the Lat. morpheme *unicus* ‘single’, but the German derivation *Unikat,* Czech *unikát* ‘a unique, single piece of something’ nonexistent in English or French. A similar point can be made in relation to the term *Sozionym* (Rübekeil, art. 203); it is used in the meaning ‘name of a social rank’. This is a *Klammierzusammensetzung* again, because Lat. *socius* means ‘ally, friend’; so the term could refer to names used among friends or such; one must leap to *societas/société* to understand, at least partly, the derivation. However, one could consider *sociology* too to be a *Klammierzusammensetzung,* because it is the study of society, not friends, so the coinage of *Sozionym* is supported by that precedent.

One more remark in this connection: if the purpose of this systematic, or modern, terminology is to create unity in the way things are discussed, the authors who use it should consider whether it is useful to make a graphic, let alone semantic, concessions to their native language.

So on the whole, it may be clear that this terminological pattern will take root only if it is built up with real consistency to cover the whole field of onomastics, and only if there is a sufficient bulk of usage so that the terms become generally known. On this terminological pattern, see the already mentioned art. 40 (Witkowski). In this article, Witkowski proposes a classification that begins with the distinction of *bionyms* ‘names of living beings’ and *abionyms* ‘names of non-living beings’.

The terminology of any subject must cope with the endless complexity of the real world, and onomastics is no exception. One example of this: In art. 40, Witkowski offers the terms *indigene Onym* ‘indigenous onym’ and *hybrides Onym* ‘hybrid onym’ as equivalents in systematic terminology for the traditional *Erbname* and *Mischname.* These two German traditional terms suggest by their morphemes the meaning ‘inherited name’ and ‘mixed name’. However, the Czech hydronym *Vltava* is an *Erbname,* because it has been in Czech since the earliest historical sources, yet it is not an indigenous onym, since it is borrowed from a Germanic form *wild-ahwa* ‘wild water’.
As is the case with every innovation, this terminology has its weaknesses, some of which have been mentioned above; in addition to that, there will always be scholars who prefer new terms for new notions and scholars who prefer evolution of new senses in traditional terms. Both approaches have their uses. The innovative terminology has as its goal a set of terms uniquely and autonomously onomatopoeic, uninhibited and unburdened by traditional accretions of former usage. It is systematic in discerning the objects of study (i.e. names and sets of names) indicated by the second part -onymy (toponymy, onomony, etc.) from the study itself, characterized by -onomastics in the second part of the compound (toponomastics, oronomastics, etc.). Ononymy and ononomastics can, then, stand for the higher categories, whereas the addition of successive morphemes to the first part of the compound can distinguish lower categories (allo- or exotoponymy vs. endo- or autotoponymy [but why not eso = Greek 'inside'? resulting in esoteronymy]).

One cannot fail to notice, however, that this pair of terms (with the derivations) does not cover the whole area of name studies. For instance, the discussion of the sociological aspects of name studies has shown, I think, that it is necessary not only to study the names themselves, but also the circumstances and modalities of the naming. (See, e.g., Crocombe, art. 144.) Clearly, neither the term ononymy nor the term ononomastics covers that aspect. A good Greek coinage would be onomatoothesis (from Greek onoma titheshai ðv-
 oiqá tìbòsthun 'to name'). However, since the systematic terminology posits the term ononym, not onoma, for 'name', the objection could be raised that the term should be onomyomethesis, which would then allow further specified coinages like toponymomethesis etc. But this would yield only the string of terms that pertain to names as objects of study (i.e., parallel to the ononymy series); how to call the 'study of naming', i.e., how to coin the string of terms parallel to the ononomic series, remains quite unclear. Obviously, any further development of the systematic terminology will be fraught with difficulties of all sorts, because each foray in a new direction will have problems of its own.

On the other hand, when one reads in art. 109 (Gorrochategui) about a simple personal name, a personal name plus cognomen, a name plus patronymic, a name plus indication of origin, or about surnames of toponymical origin, the text is immediately comprehensible to any linguist, even one who is not an onomatologist nor a Hellenist. When the idea of developing onomastic terminology was first launched, I helped the initiator of the systematic terminology, Professor Vladimir Smilauer, piae memoriæ, to overcome some criticisms concerning the term ononymy (see Zgusta 1966 and 1967). Now, nearly thirty years later, it would seem that the future of the innovative terminology will depend, apart from the necessary emendations and additions, on how many onomastic works are written in the new jargon and how widely influential they turn out to be.

When we cast a glance at the scheme of linguistic variation given above, we see that the new terminology covers only a relatively small number of the topics enumerated there. This is perfectly natural, since the study of names was part of linguistics long before onomatology (or onomastics) evolved into a somewhat autonomous branch of linguistics, and before the new field developed strong cooperation with geography, history, sociology and other disciplines. It is, then, perfectly natural that many notions and terms of linguistics, and above all those of historical linguistics, are part and parcel of the panoply of onomastic terms and notions, and that they will remain so.

It is, then, not outside the limits of conceivability to suppose that new terms will be coined in the first line to cover recent areas of study. Indeed, for instance, the study of the whole politics of names can be highly informative in these days of rising nationalisms: somebody will perhaps write a study of endochoric interlingual alloponymy or alittoponomastics (which would be, of course, a study of toponymic variants stemming from different languages within a country) or even a study with more sinister political implications but of a terminologically even more delightful character, namely on endochoric diastratointertermicrolingual nomodeontalloanthroponymy or nomodeontalloanthroponymothyomethesis (which would be a study of the legally obligatory personal name variants reflecting differences of social standing and differences of minority language within one country). This 'term' will most probably never be printed again and will remain a perennial hapax, but as far as the notion itself is concerned, the Turkish citizens of Bulgaria were under exactly this pressure a few years ago, to mention one example out of many. But let us drop such
levity-imbued flights of phantasy and let us turn to other things, more pedestrian if not less imaginary.

6. The Purposes of Onomatography

As with any other field of scholarship, onomatography is protected against too strong a consideration of its practical aspects, or results, by the authority of Aristotle’s dictum pantes hoi anthrопoi тоu eidénai oréngontai phýsei pántes ol ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὄρος·γοντας φύσα (in free translation, ‘It is in human nature to yearn for knowledge’). But onomatography has more aspects than knowledge for knowledge’s sake. In reality, there are so many useful results of onomastic studies that the protection by Aristotle is not much needed. Within the framework of historical linguistics, the study of names opened new vistas in the history of many languages; let us mention only the example of the languages and the substrata around the Mediterranean Sea (see Lindner, art. 101: Mycenean; Untermann, art. 107; 108: Pre-Roman). There is no reason to doubt that the linguistically oriented study of names will continue to be as useful as it has been. This can be expected not only of historical linguistic studies, but generally. However, in the same way that linguistics has expanded the field of its study in the last decades, onomatography too, while becoming more autonomous by also taking into consideration approaches and insights other than purely linguistic ones, has become a much broader and manifold field of research. Sociological considerations and research in pragmatics will give onomatography many new insights. Such studies can be highly theoretical, but they can have a practical impact as well. Those practical aspects range from the rather commercial ones, such as the selection of successful brand names for various merchandise or attractive pseudonyms, to the mostest problems of synesthesia, symbolism, and cultural associations. To give only one example: most general nouns are used by speakers automatically, without much deliberation. They are the ergon, as Humboldt would have called it, or the already established lexicum of the language. Fully conscious selection takes place only in searches for the mot juste, but then the choice usually is governed mostly by intellectual and esthetic considerations; and usually only selection from existing possibilities takes place.

Free selection of a word or even creation of a new one is rare in the case of general nouns. Hence, freedom of choice or even of creation in the case of, e.g., pseudonyms can and, as we hope, will help to elucidate the underlying motifs and consequently the underlying deeper, not fully intellectual layers of language. For instance, which cultural associations and which euphonic or other elements do render the pseudonym Woody Allen preferable as a pseudonym to the real name Allen Stewart Königsberg? (See Lawson, art. 271.)

There is yet another consequence of this. In the history of Western culture it occasionally happened that names were replaced by numbers. The outstanding example is the replacement by numbers of the names of houses in cities. Something like this will hardly happen with other names, above all not with personal names. It is true that for the purposes of administrative evidence, numbers, such as passport or social security numbers, are already most effectively used. However, for the foreseeable future, names will remain so connected with individuality that numbers probably will remain an important, maybe even the most important, means for a person’s identification, but in personal contact they will hardly replace names. The same can be expected in the case of other names, such as geographical ones.

7. Selected Bibliography


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