Proponents of supervaluationism claim super-truth, i. e., truth on every admissible precisification, is identical to truth or, at least, is a suitable truth proxy. I object that super-truth is neither identical to nor a suitable proxy for truth. I argue that to claim a statement is super-true is simply to maintain that a certain counterfactual holds, and that a claim is true, counterfactually, is no reason to treat it as true. I further argue that, with super-truth undermined, Roy Sorensen’s objection that supervaluationism cannot accommodate vague directly referential terms presents supervaluationism’s defenders with a significant challenge.
Everyday experience presents us with a world of ordinary objects, but philosophers struggle to devise a useful principle of composition that even comes close to generating just those composites we perceive the world to contain. This paper presents such a principle as a first step toward defending “object dispositionalism” as a theory of material objects. According to object dispositionalism, a plurality composes a whole just when it has the disposition to cause us to perceive a unity in the region it occupies and because it possesses features that in combination realize that disposition. Sections “Object dispositionalism” and “Object dispositionalism’s color counterpart” introduce object dispositionalism and argue it satisfies plausible desiderata for a theory of material objects extant views do not. Relying on cognitive psychologists’ research on object perception, sections “The disposition to what?” through “The general mechanism” explicate the manifestation and basis of the causal power object dispositionalists propose is present wherever composition occurs. Sections “Why object perception researchers are realists” and “When we disagree” describe the perceivers with and conditions in which that causal power manifests and argues object-perception variation doesn’t undermine object dispositionalism’s status as a realist view.
In recent years, an increasing numbers of internet users have become regular users of on-line social networking services such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and Second Life. These services provide a social space for users to connect with friends, network with business contacts and create “virtual” alter egos. Regulators have begun to take a particular interest in the privacy practices of social networking services. One of the most significant initiatives in this respect was recently undertaken by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, in the form of a 113 page report on its investigation and critique of Facebook’s privacy policies and practices.Notably, the investigation addressed a range of the privacy concerns cited above: (i) collection and use of personal information by third-party application developers; (ii) account deactivation and deletion; (iii) accounts of deceased users; and (iv) the collection of personal information of non-users. This report is worthy of closer examination for a number of reasons. First, it provides useful lessons to both users and providers of social networking services, in identifying and suggesting solutions to certain privacy risk areas. This report also illustrates the willingness of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to investigate, and publicly report on, the privacy practices of non-Canadian organizations. Finally, this report provides some significant direction on how overtly the purposes for personal information should be identified to each subject individual.
Unsolicited electronic communication (i.e. “spam”) is a very real problem, causing harms which range from lost productivity to threats to the security of the receiving machine. This paper contrasts the anti-spam legislation in Canada to that in the United States, and in one representative European jurisdiction (i.e. the United Kingdom), in order to highlight the differences in approach regarding the types of email communications targeted by the legislation, the level of consent required from the receiver, and the type and severity of penalties levied.
The study assessed allocation, criteria and allotment effectiveness of performance risks in Build- Operate-Transfer (BOT) transportation infrastructure in Nigeria using Lagos Infrastructure Project (LIP) as a case study. LIP is the only BOT-procured tolled road that has attained ‘operate’ stage of BOT cycle in Nigeria. It revealed that more operating risks were actually allocated to the concessionaire than the grantor and most of the risks were preferred retained by the allottee. Significant fraction of the risks was effectively allocated between the concessionaire and grantor except those that involve close interface between participants. While grantor rated nine risks high and seven risks very high; the concessionaire assessed nine risks to be high and five risks to be very high; the grantor rated the effectiveness level to be seventy three per cent and the concessionaire assessed it to be sixty four per cent. The study recommended that the evolving knowledge from Lagos Infrastructure Project (LIP) should be documented to guide future BOT transactions in Nigeria.