I consider the problem of an independent inventor attempting to sell a cost-reducing innovation in an oligopoly setting. There are N potential buyers and the inventor possesses private information regarding the value of the invention. A revealing equilibrium is characterized in which the inventors demand signals the value of the invention to each potential buyer. I find that both the inventors demand and his continuation value increase as the number of firms left in the sequence of potential buyers increases. I also find that a firms probability of rejecting the inventors demand is higher the sooner the firm is approached in the sequence.
John Henry Newman made two translations of Athanasius's Orations Against the Arians: in the first half of the 1840s, when still an Anglican, for the Oxford Library of the Fathers series and a second attempt late in his life, a “free translation” published in 1881, by which time he was a Cardinal. The changes that he made to his original translation reflect thirty-five years of reading Catholic theology. In various ways, the new translation shares the theology of Leo XIII's Thomistic revival.