In this paper, we examine the use of signs as instruments of thought in Semitic languages of the ancient Near East. We employ a Peircean concept of “sign” together with derived typologies based upon Categorical (after Peirce), temporal, and effectual relations between events, as conceived by the intended interpreter. Following a brief discussion of the “sign” concept as attested in extinct Semitic languages and in Biblical Hebrew, we perform a typological analysis of the use of signs in Biblical narrative. On this basis, we infer that some Biblical writers had a tacit awareness of a tripartite concept of “sign.” Furthermore, we demonstrate that different Biblical writers had different preferences for the use of signs: symbolic (abstract) signs were favored in the Torah and iconic (embodied) signs were favored by the Major Prophets.
In this study, we characterize a ground of meaning for each relate of a Roentgen sign. In this scheme, each relate ground includes a perceptual domain, a domanial segmentation, and a temporal phenomenology. The temporal phenomenology is selected to satisfy the requirements of diagnostic imaging and is based upon the categorical ontology of Peirce and the formal ontology of Grenon and Smith. Our objective is to show that these relate grounds provide the interpreter of Roentgen signs with the minimum collateral knowledge necessary to initiate the process of diagnostic semiosis.
After defining the concept of error as it applies to Roentgen semiotics, we present a typology of the sources of semiotic error in clinical practice. It is a typology based on clinical observation, with the Peircean Categories and the triadic structure of Roentgen signs as organizing principles. This is followed by a review of a general psychological typology of the sources of human error (after James Reason). We conclude with the demonstration of a Category preserving correspondence between psychologic and semiotic sources of error. Thus, independently derived and empirically based typologies of psychologic and semiotic error are shown to have the same categorical structure (i.e., the same basis in thought).
We distinguish between concepts of semiosis in an individual mind and in a community of minds. We show that diagnostic semiosis, as it occurs in Roentgen diagnosis, differs fundamentally from the Peircean concept of semiosis. At all stages of the argument, basic concepts are derived from the Peircean categories of thought.
In this paper, we demonstrate an empirical basis for Roentgen semiotics in vision science. We first observe that the triad of phases in the process of Roentgen diagnosis, previously termed detection, localization, and identification, originate at the cellular level in well-described visual pathways in the brain. We then demonstrate that the phenomenology of local Roentgen signs is derived from the physiology of cells in the detection, localization, and identification pathways. Furthermore, we infer that a fundamental duality principle in the interpretation of local Roentgen signs may be derived from a similar duality principle that governs the physiology of cells in the detection pathway. In this way, perceptual phenomenology of the mind is determined by cellular physiology of the brain.