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  • Author: Toshihiro Matsumura x
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Abstract

This paper investigates an asymmetric duopoly model with R&D competition and product positioning. We find that an inefficient (small) firm may engage in R&D more intensively than an efficient (large) firm in spite of economies of scale in R&D activities. Contrary to the findings of previous studies, competition is more likely to have a positive effect on the investments of the small firm than on those of the large firm. We also find that improving the efficiency of the inefficient firm can reduce both social and consumer surplus.

Abstract

It is known that if the number of entering firms is endogenous (free entry markets), privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a uniform production subsidy policy. We revisit this problem by considering another policy tool, the output floor regulation. We investigate three free entry models with different time structures, a Cournot and two Stackelberg models. We find that neutrality is restored in free entry markets under the optimal output floor regulation, regardless of the time structure.

Abstract

We investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and Nm followers compete. We find an important welfare effect that relates to anti-monopoly policies when we move from the Cournot model (m=N) to the Stackelberg model: Exchanging a small number of Cournot firms for Stackelberg followers always improves welfare under moderate conditions. This contrasts with the welfare effect that can reduce welfare when a small number of Cournot firms are exchanged for Stackelberg leaders. The key result behind this asymmetry is the contrasting limit results in the cases where m converges to N and m converges to 0. We also discuss the optimal number of leaders and the integer constraint for the number of firms.