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References ARMSTRONG, M., (2002). The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection, in CAVE, M. E., MAJUNDAR, S. K., VOGELSANG, I., (Eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics: Vol. 1, structure, regulation and competition. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, North-Holland (pp. 295-384). ARMSTRONG, M., VICKERS, J., (1998). The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. Journal of Industrial Economics , 46, pp. 115-121. ARMSTRONG, M., DOYLE, C., VICKERS, J., (1996). The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis, Journal of Industrial Economics , 44, pp. 131

References AMIR, R.-LAMBSONV. E. (2000). On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets. Review of Economic Studies , 67(2), Pp. 235 - 254. DIXIT, A. (1986). Comparative Statics for Oligopoly. International economic review , 27(1), Pp. 107 - 112 . EGGERTSSON, T. (1990). Economic behavior and institutions , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ONEMLI, M. B. (2012). Access Pricing Under Imperfect Competition”, Review of Economic Perspectives . 12(1). Pp. 3-21. SPENCER, B. J.-BRANDER, J. A. (1983). Second Best Pricing of Publicly Produced Inputs. Journal of

pricing problem. The retail-minus rule, the main subject of this paper, has been popular in reality as a one-way access pricing approach. Cost-based pricing with the long-run incremental cost (LRIC) method may be preferred by the regulators themselves, as it makes their policies more effective and visible. However, Laffont and Tirole (2000) pointed out that it is not easily justified in an economic sense, unlike the broad regulatory consensus. Sarmento and Brandao (2007) explained in detail the problems with cost-based regulation relative to retail-minus regulation

Review of Network Economics Vol.7, Issue 2 – June 2008 207 Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector FRANCIS BLOCH GREQAM, Université de la Méditerranée and Warwick University AXEL GAUTIER * HEC, Université de Liège and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain Abstract In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent’s network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing

Review of Network Economics Vol.7, Issue 2 – June 2008 172 Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post MARK ARMSTRONG * University College London Abstract A postal regulator typically faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult and which complicate the process of liberalizing the industry. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of fixed costs, require retail prices to depart from

Review of Network Economics Vol.2, Issue 4 – December 2003 440 The Arbitrage Mirage: Regulated Access Prices with Free Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets THOMAS W. HAZLETT* Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and Columbia Institute for Tele-Information ARTHUR M. HAVENNER Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis Abstract Incumbent telecommunications carriers have been mandated to share their networks with new retail service providers at regulated wholesale rates. This regulatory structure

Introduction of Price Cap Regulation John Panzar Abstract This paper analyzes the pricing incentives facing the U.S. Postal Service due to the change from the Cost of Service Regulation practiced under the Postal Reform Act (PRA) to the Price Cap Regulation required by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). KEYWORDS: postal pricing, access pricing, quantity discounts Author Notes: John Panzar, Professor of Economics, University of Auckland and Louis W. Menk Professor (Emeritus), Northwestern University. This paper was commissioned by the Office of the

. The paper studies the net effect of restructuring on retail prices and cost-reducing investment and discusses policy implications. JEL classification: D43, L43. Keywords: Access pricing; investment; double marginalization; vertical fore- closure; product differentiation. 1. INTRODUCTION It is widely believed that introducing competition is the key to achieving the full benefits of privatization in previously monopolized and regulated network industries, such as telecommunications, electricity or railways.1 The recent wave of ‘deregulation’ in these industries – i

Abstract We analyze the impact of mandatory access on a race for investments and show that for a low (high) access price, firms wait (preempt each other). An access price increase tends to accelerate investment in general but may delay the first investment. While the first best cannot be achieved with a time-invariant access tariff, simple instruments such as ending access at a preset date or granting access holidays can improve efficiency. The former forces earlier investment when it would happen too late otherwise, while the latter allows for lower access prices later

infrastructures, used simultaneously for downstream international service provision. Initially, the welfare losses from non-cooperative investment financing policy and access pricing are derived. The impact of strategic interaction between the countries’ access prices on the choice of financing policy is investigated. Under strict budget balancing, there are no incentives for efficiency improving investments. Further, investment coordination is shown useless in the absence of regulatory coordination. Illustrations from European network regulation policy for energy and rail