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The Story of John and Abigail Adams in Europe

foreign relations, in which I am totally and emotionally involved is the issue of United States – European relations. I feel myself committed to do everything I can (although I know that I cannot do very much) to foster and defend the closest possible relations with, and friendship for the United States. I know that I have the reputation of being sometimes “plus américain que les américains” but I very much love that country of yours and I consider the world a liveable place only if we recognize your undisputed leadership. 30 Although rooted in Dutch diplomacy van der

Protestants in France and the volatility of Franco-Dutch diplomacy. The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis confirmed the sovereign author- ity of William of Nassau over the tiny principality in 1559, but dynastic in- stability and the presence of Protestant communities in Orange and Courthé- zon provoked endless maneuvering among French and papal agents and drew the principality into the vortex of religious war.11 Between 1562 and 1598, the principality of Orange was subjected to the depredations of foreign troops and the governorship of various warlords, Catholic and Protestant

. Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868, C a m - bridge Mass 2009; Arano Yasunori , The Entrenchment of the Concept of <National Seclu- sion), in: Mark Caprio/Matsuda Koichiro (eds.), Japan and the Pacific, 1540-1920, F a r n h a m 2006, 8 7 - 1 0 9 . 23 Kees Camfferman/Terence E . C o o k e , The Profits of the Dutch East India Company's Japan Trade, in: A b a c u s 1 (2004), 49-76. 24 Minor i Kogure , National Prestige and Economic Interest. Dutch Diplomacy toward Japan 1850-1863, Maastricht 2008; A m r y Vanden- bosch, Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815. A Study

) had borne the weight of the war and been, in fact, "the state." Hence, the direction of Dutch foreign policy by Holland's chief functionary was not only a matter of the absence of a particular official assigned to that task, but even more of the primacy of Holland within the republic.2 Although the lack of a clear-cut final sovereignty in the States General made diplomatic decision-making in the United Provinces extraordinarily difficult, perhaps even ultimately a failure (as is held by the first general historian of Dutch diplomacy),3 this was primarily a

C H A P T E R 3 6 The Army Insists on a Decision for War; Konoye Quits; Tojo Takes Over IN THE statement of policy approved at the Imperial Conference of September 6, the men of peace and the men of war had each written a part. The time for the curtain call was set. The actors read over Clause 3: "If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland)." Diplomacy was

buyers. The French used the additional profits to buy more cotton in the Levant and thereby increase their volume of trade. Despite the diminishing commercial significance of the Netherlands, Anglo-Dutch diplomacy proved critical during the reign of William III, the 'stadholder-king' (which lasted from 1672 to 1702. Turkish forces besieged Vienna in 1683, the setting-in of a prolonged war with the Habsburgs and their allies in Central and Southeast Europe. Jacobus Colyer, the Dutch ambassador to the Sublime Porte, assumed the role of mediator, in a peace

C H A P T E R F I F T E E N THE EMBROILED BALTIC (1652-1657) ONCE PEACE had been made at Westminster, the problem that pressed hardest upon Dutch diplomacy concerned neither England nor France, and certainly not the lesser states. It was the Baltic, where the heirs of Gustavus Adolphus still sought dominion over the great inland sea for Sweden. The Dutch wanted something else for the Baltic, however—peace, which would enable them to trade cheaply and sail safely. It was a region that provided them with essential grain, metal, and naval stores and

the republican party in Holland.31 He had stood up to Frederick Henry in the conduct of Dutch diplomacy and then had carried through the negotiation and conclusion of the peace treaty with Spain in 1648 over the vehement opposition of the Orangists and the province of Zeeland.32 Old though he was, he was still a forceful politician, unlike the easy-going Cats. For all that, his appointment was obviously an interim measure, and it was made possible by the already demonstrated capacity of young De Witt for hard work and effective statement, which would be at

which Mohawk ambassadors attended the peace treaty signing in August. Mahican sachem Aepjen spoke for several Hudson Valley groups at this treaty, but his presence had more to do with the dynamics of inter-Indian relations than with Dutch diplomacy.35 The two wars between the Dutch and the Esopus Indians show the persis- tence of older sources of tension, as well as the growing danger presented by European land hunger. The events leading up to the First Esopus War show that unresolved violence, the depredations of livestock, alcohol, and personal grudges still