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In recent papers ( Gibb 2013 , 2014 ) S.C. Gibb aims to provide an anti-physicalist solution to the problem of mental causation through a “Double Prevention” theory founded on a powers theory of causation. The aim of this paper is not to engage with the causal powers metaphysic or the concept of double prevention themselves, both of which have significant merits, but to question the plausibility of the solution thereby provided to the mental causation issue. The initial problem is set out in familiar terms ( Gibb 2013 , 193): Each of the following four claims

Investigating the Mind’s Powers in a Natural World
The Mind-Body Problem

s e A R L e o n M e n t A L C A U s A t I o n Biological Natur alism, or Something Near Enough Beate Krickel, Alexander Reutlinger Abstract: searle intends to solve the problem of mental causation by rejecting the traditional vocab- ulary of the “mental” and the “physical”. Instead, he takes consciousness to be a higher-level state of the brain caused by neuronal lower-level states. We will investigate this theory called “Biological naturalism” and give a plausible, mechanistic interpretation of it that we suppose fits searle’s ideas. We ask whether

Antonella Corradini Mental Causation and Nonreductive Physicalism, an Unhappy Marriage? Abstract: Peter Menzies is among those contemporary philosophers of mind who have tried most deliberately to make mental causation compatible with nonreductive physicalism, thus proving the invalidity of Kim’s causal exclusion argument (Kim (2005), p. 17). The compatibility between mental causation and nonreductive physicalism will be the focus of this essay. In the first part, I shall expound the tenets of Menzies’ theory of mental causation. In the second, I shall emphasise

Tropes’ Simplicity and Mental Causation SIMONE GOZZANO Università di L’Aquila simone.gozzano@cc.univaq.it ABSTRACT. In this paper I first try to clarify the essential features of tropes and then I use the resulting analysis to cope with the problem of mental causation. As to the first step, I argue that tropes, beside being essentially particular and abstract, are simple, where such a simplicity can be considered either from a phenomenal point of view or from a structural point of view. Once this feature is spelled out, the role tropes may play in

Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION This chapter proposes to establish mental causation as a genuine philosophical problem. The contemporary version of the mind-body problem is framed by four premises that each, individually, are intuitively reasonable, but that, brought together, form an inconsistent whole. The list of the four premises goes like this: 1. Mental property tokens cause physical property tokens. 2. Mental property tokens are distinct from physical property tokens. 3. The causal completeness of physics. 4. The absence of causal

N. Psarros and K. Schulte-Ostermann, Facets of Sociality, Frankfurt 2007: 51-83; ontos verlag Mental Causation and the Notion of Action Wolfgang Detel, Frankfurt 1. Introduction The standard theory of action distinguishes actions from mere behaviour by claiming that actions are behaviour that is describable under, and caused by, contentful mental states like intentions and beliefs. Are we supposed to conclude, then, that collective actions are not only describable under, but also caused by collective mental states? It seems that we are1, although this

Chapter 3 New compatibilism and mental causation If the general line of argument of the preceding chapter is correct, the current debate on the problem of mental causation faces an unpleasant dilemma. The solutions that have been offered by the various versions of functionalism, in- teractionist dualism, anomalous monism, and functional reductionism face se- vere difficulties either by not being able to avoid an elimination of virtually all mental phenomena from their respective ontologies, or by ultimately failing to provide a plausible account of how mental

BASIC ONTOLOGY, MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND MENTAL CAUSATION FRANCESCO ORILIA Università di Macerata orilia@unimc.it ABSTRACT. In basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events. Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured entities involving as constituents (in a typical case) a particular, a property qua universal and a time. In contrast, according to tropism, properties are tropes, abstract particulars that can