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(2): 337-351, DOI: 10.1515/amcs-2015-0019. Trejo, K.K., Clempner, J.B. and Poznyak, A.S. (2017). Nash bargaining equilibria for controllable Markov chains games, 20th World Congress of the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), Toulouse, France, pp. 12772-12777. Vaysman, I. (1998). A model of negotiated transfer pricing, Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(3): 349-384. Wahab, O.A., Bentahar, J., Otrok, H. and Mourad, A. (2016). A Stackelberg game for distributed formation of business-driven services communities, Expert Systems with Applications 45

. This note is not a proof of the Nash assertion. Nash and others have done this amply. It simply shows how the mathematical structure can be transformed. It is hoped that the note may influence the way Nash bargaining is presented in both upper division and graduate-level courses in microeconomics. 2 Pareto Optimum condition and the contract curve In the context of the simple duopoly game, I show below that the equality of the MRS’s is given by the van- ishing determinant of the Jacobianmatrix for the two profit functions of the two firms. It is convenient to show the

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Topics Volume 7, Issue 1 2007 Article 29 Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players Eran Hanany∗ Rotem Gal† ∗Tel Aviv University, †Tel Aviv University, Recommended Citation Eran Hanany and Rotem Gal (2007) “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 7: Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 29. Asymmetric Nash Bargaining with Surprised Players∗ Eran Hanany and Rotem Gal Abstract This paper introduces two-player bargaining

those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein’s result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution. KEYWORDS: Rubinstein bargaining, simultaneous offers, Nash bargaining solution 1 Introduction This paper analyzes a one-period bargaining game with complete information in which the players make simultaneous offers. This game differs in the following two ways from the simultaneous-offer extensive forms found in the existing literature. (i) The

bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy. KEYWORDS: complementary alliance, parallel alliance, Nash bargaining, antitrust policy ∗This paper was presented at the 2008 Fall Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association. We wish to thank Takeshi Ikeda for valuable comments. We are also grateful to the co-editor (Roger

a theoretical model that presumes the video distributor has some degree of countervailing bargaining power against the RSN. Standard Nash bargaining models applied by the FCC and others to multichannel programming markets show that threat points are higher for a vertically integrated RSN that internalizes the effects of an upstream price increase on its downstream business, which leads it to negotiate a license fee with its downstream distribution rivals in excess of what an independent RSN would negotiate. 17 We show that the Nash framework also implies, under

, he will be forced to a) either abandon the notion of a genuine plurality of values, or b) make an arbitrary decision. This article argues that neither of these options need be accepted and that rational choice is in- deed possible in the presence of incommensurable values. Specifically, it contends that the Nash bargaining solution provides a means, at least in certain circumstances, of rationally understand- ing and undertaking the weighing of distinct and mutually irreducible values which adjudication frequently requires. The Nash framework can both elucidate

Arnold and Lippman (1998) and Wang (1995) for models in which the seller incurs a search cost to identify potential buyers and chooses between sequential search, a simultaneous auction and a posted price. The two parties may then bargain to determine the wholesale price $\omega$ ω of the product. Consistent with the applications discussed in the introduction, we assume the upstream and downstream firm do not negotiate terms of sale (e.g., price and quantity) in the downstream market. We assume negotiation between the two firms results in the Nash bargaining

. Under more restrictive conditions, we extend the analysis and show that consumer and social welfare under bundling or a la carte depends on both bargaining power and advertising rates. Our results imply a monopolist does not necessarily increase deadweight loss, and under certain circumstances a monopolist’s bargaining outcomes yield higher social welfare. KEYWORDS: bundling, a la carte, division of surplus, Nash bargaining, regulation, advertising ∗We thank the editor and three referees for their many useful suggestions. We are grateful to David Sappington and

of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing the following generalized Nash bargaining expression: (8) max f ˆ i k , w ˆ i k [ w ˆ i k − c q ˆ i k + f ˆ i k ] β [ π ˆ i k ] 1 − β , $$\mathop {\max }\limits_{\hat f_i^k,\,\hat w_i^k} {[\left( {\hat w_i^k - c} \right)\hat q_i^k + \hat f_i^k]^\beta }{[\hat \pi _i^k]^{1 - \beta }},$$ where β ∈ 0 , 1 $\beta \in \left( {0,1} \right)$ (resp. ( 1 − β ) $1 - \beta )$ ) shows the bargaining power of the manufacturer (resp. retailer). Maximizing eq. ( 8 ) with respect to f ˆ i ${\hat f_i}$ gives the following (9) f ˆ i k