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I. Elements of Object Theory 1. Data and Theory If there is anything of philosophical significance to be taken at face value in ordinary thought and language it is the reference and attribution of prop- erties to existent and nonexistent objects. We regularly speak of the creatures of fiction and myth, nonexistent idealizations, and objects falsely believed to exist in science and mathematics. We are understood when we suppose that nonexistent objects are distinguishable one from another, that they satisfy identity conditions whereby particular reference

Response: Literary Theory 443 IN WHAT DIRECTION IS LITERARY THEORY EVOLVING? NORBERT GROEBEN Response: Literary Theory: Object Theory or Metatheory?! According to the normal rules of compound formation in German, the word Literaturtheorie (›literary theory‹) means, first and foremost, theory about litera- ture. Literature (with its properties, processes, structures, and so on) is the object of the theory in question, literary theory an object theory. The basic structural arrangement here corresponds to that in the traditional natural sciences and the empirical

Dale Jacquette Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory Dale Jacquette: University of Bern, Switzerland 1 Elements of Object Theory Alexius Meinong developed his object theory as a continuation of his teacher Franz Brentano’s thesis that the intentionality of thought uniquely distinguishes psychological from purely physical phenomena.¹ Brentano in his 1874 Psycholo- gie vom empirischen Standpunkt taught that psychological occurrences are es- sentially marked by their aboutness or direction upon intended objects.² Belief, doubt, hope, fear, love, hate

ALEXIUS MEINONG ON ONTOLOGY AND OBJECT THEORY Francesca Modenato Summary Ontology and object theory are not, from Meinong’s point of view, contiguous territories, nor continuous nor even coincident, as a widespread interpretative tendency seems to understand, in truth led astray to some extent by the ambi- guities that weight on the concept of Außersein. It is permissible to attribute to ontology the treatment of objects in their different modes of being, as they manifest themselves to the intentional operations of the consciousness aimed at grasping

II. Formal Semantic Paradox in Meinong's Object Theory 1. Clark-Rapaport Paradox William J. Rapaport argues that Meinong's concept of being or Sein is sub- ject to an object theory paradox. He defines a set of ^'«-correlates as the objects corresponding to Meinongian objects that have Sein. Then he formu- lates a paradox in terms of self-.fo«-correlates and non-self-.fe'«-correlates. The paradox is similar to and was inspired by Romane Clark's antinomy in naive predication theory, and may therefore be called the Clark-Rapaport par- adox. . . . the M

CRY FOR A SHADOW EMOTIONS AND OBJECT THEORY Carola Barbero Summary In this paper we examine the emotions we feel while reading a book. Some philosophers think that since objects causing these emotions do not exist, then these emotions should not be considered as true ones. By suggesting an Object Theory in a Meinongian style, we wish to propose a realistic perspective on fictional emotions which is able to dissolve the paradox of fiction. 1. Crying for Anna She tried to fling herself below the wheels of the first carriage as it reached her; but the

IV. The Object Theory Intentionality of Ontological Commitment 1. The Poverty of Extensionalism Arthur N. Prior in his posthumous Objects of Thought describes the limita- tions of the extensional outlook in philosophy as something like the limita- tions of Newtonian mechanics.1 It is not that Newtonian mechanics or exten- sional theories of ontological commitment are false in and of themselves, but rather that they are unable to account for everything that needs to be explained in a complete theory of the kind. In physics, the recalcitrant phe- nomena are

BEAUTIFUL THINGS AND MEINONG’S OBJECT THEORY: AESTHETIC PROPERTIES IN FRONT OF US? Bruno Langlet Summary There is no complete theory of aesthetics in Meinong’s works, but more or less sparse remarks about the way Object Theory is to deal with so-called aesthetic properties. The apprehension and status of such properties mark anew mei- nongian problems about properties as abstracted from things, and as objects. Their status in object theory is to be clarified as they involve notions of inter- nal and external dependence. Such notions are operative in

Abstract

This paper discusses the problems of an ontological value of the variable in Russell’s philosophy. The variable is essential in Russell’s theory of denotation, which among other things, purports to prove Meinongian being outside of subsistence and existence to be logically unnecessary. I argue that neither Russell’s epistemology nor his ontology can account for the ontological value of the variable without running into qualities of Meinongian being that Russell disputed. The problem is that the variable cannot be logically grounded by Russell’s theory of denotation. As such, in so far as being is concerned, Meinong and Russell’s theories are much closer than is typically thought. The arguments are supported with concerns raised by Russell, Frege, and Moore regarding the ontological value of the variable. The problem can be summarised as follows: the variable is the fundamental denoting-position of a formal theory that is meant to explain the structure of the ontological. If such a formal theory is meant to ground the ontological, then the formal must also represent the actual structure of the ontological. Yet the variable, the fundamental symbol of denotation in a theory that defines objects, is ontologically indefinable.

Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy