Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 166 items :

  • "Phenomenological facts" x
Clear All

Abstract

The paper presents and discusses phenomenological facts about perceptual spaces and percepts, but ends with a few thoughts about possible causal explanations of such spaces. The overarching double-sided hypothesis claims that - from a phenomenological point of view - each individual animal has at each consciously perceived moment of time a sense-modality-neutral perceptual space, and that these perceptual spaces are so-called container spaces. This means, to be concrete, that blind persons, deaf persons, and all perceptually non-handicapped persons have the same kind of phenomenological perceptual space, a sense-modality-neutral container space. The causal reflections bring in James J. Gibson’s work on such matters.

contrast to Hartmann’s approach which started from the diversity of scientific accounts, Plessner also derived his catego- rical analysis from the phenomenological approach. This emphasized the sys- tematic character and coherence of the categories that were deduced from one phenomenological fact that Plessner considered to be unpresentable in science. Keywords: Helmuth Plessner, Nicolai Hartmann, Biology, Organic, Phenomenol- ogy, Categories Einleitung Die Beschäftigung mit dem Organischen spielte sowohl für Nicolai Hartmann als auch für Helmuth Plessner zu Beginn ihrer

complete is fixed and can be replayed innumerable times by purely mechanical means; there is no need for staging, actors, rehearsals, etc. But the heart of the matter points to the phenomenological facts of viewing, and to the continuity of the camera's motion as it ingests the world. My critical starting point is Christian Metz's The Imaginary Signifier (1982) and the philosophical questioning of my hermeneutics is provided by Paul Ricoeur's The Rule of Metaphor (1977). First, let us consider what Metz (1982: 48-49) has to say about the subject in cinema: In the cinema

phenomena, or some aspect of mental phenomena, which on his view cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. And, again for the most part, he uses the term ‘experience’ to talk about these mental phenomena, or this aspect of mental phenomena. However, he also uses a number of other expressions, including ‘conscious mental phenomena’, ‘consciousness’, ‘conscious mental states’, ‘conscious experience’, ‘subjective phenomena’, ‘phenomenological features’, ‘phenomenological facts’, and ‘facts of experience’. I shall present the claims and arguments of the paper by employing

in SATS

they account for the self-same particular remaining the same through change. It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that our commonsense beliefs about time and change are false, much less that time itself is unreal. It would show, at most, that the particular philosophical analyses of the phenomena are mistaken, and that we should search for a more consistent ontological ground that can accommodate the phenomenological facts. As C. D. Broad once put it, “The only justifiable conclusion would be that one particular way of describing and extending the temporal

rather than appearing . As a matter of fact, manifestation means appearing, but conceived in a radically new manner without the limiting bonds to appearing objects. The manifestation is for Henry primarily a “self-manifestation of Being,” or, in other words, “the self-manifestation of the pure essence of manifestation.” Henry , The Essence of Manifestation , 143. The “pure essence” refers to the phenomenological fact that the “self-hiding of the essence of phenomenality is the self-manifestation of a being.” Henry , The Essence of Manifestation , 108. The notion of

space is the modo essendi of any geometrical space, geometrical construction is still the modo cognoscendi of metaphysical space. This means that perceptual or quasi-perceptual facts about metaphysical space cannot be used to justify or verify the axioms of geometry, along the lines of Parsons’s interpretation.47 In particular, infinite extension cannot be given to us like a phenomenological fact, through mere “intuitive insight”, as it were, so it cannot justify the second axiom of Euclidean geometry, to the effect that any straight line segment can be extended in

throughout the Reflexionen there is a line of argument that seems to be both clearly incompatible with the limitations that transcendental idealism places on our knowledge and reminiscent of a dogmatic anti-skeptical argument that Kant presented in the 1770 Dissertatio. The argument of the Dissertatio was the follow- ing: [I]n as much as they [phenomena] are sensual concepts or apprehensions, they are witnesses, as being things caused, to the presence of an object, and this is opposed to idealism.30 29 Kant seems to rely on another phenomenological fact for rebutting the

of succession, and infers that if one denies that analysis, then one is thereby denying the commonsense fact of transition – the timelike character – and thereby the reality of time. However, one can deny the ontology implicit in commonsense (if it has an ontology, which I doubt), without denying the phenomenological fact upon which it is based. All that needs to be done is to provide an alternative ontology that comports with the phenomena in question. Thus, the fallacy in the second way of characterizing the debate is that it either (1) erroneously assumes that

warned away from unbeneficial consequences in virtue of an inference from the phenomenological fact that it is clearly a divine (thus benevolent) sign that warns him’ (2005, 18, emphasis added). 28 Indeed, I do not believe that an argument on this topic can ever be conclusive – unless somebody discovers a previously unknown set of primary texts on Socrates’ daimonion. Anna Lännström42 fore trusting the daimonion. On my reading, this evidence is important to us, not to him. If we do understand Socrates’ experience of the daimonion in the way in which I have outlined