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Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy Volume 1, Issue 1 2002 Article 11 Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions Peter Cramton∗ Jesse A. Schwartz† ∗University of Maryland, cramton@umd.edu †Vanderbilt University, jesse.schwartz@vanderbilt.edu Copyright c©2002 by the authors. All rights reserved. Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions Peter Cramton and Jesse A. Schwartz Abstract This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously

Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation Stefan Seifert and Karl-Martin Ehrhart University of Karlsruhe Abstract. This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders’ surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage

. The contribution of this paper is to spell out these externality effects, estimate their magnitude, and examine their competitive effects. From a spectrum policy standpoint, we are interested mainly in stage 2 of the model. This is because, apart from occasional United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions, the market for spectrum is thin. Major acquisitions of spectrum are infrequent, so wireless prices are usually set taking spectrum holdings as given. The FCC has regulatory authority over the sale and transfer of spectrum licenses. We

. Utility-Driven Relay for Hybrid Access Femtocells Based on Cognitive Radio Spectrum Auction. - Computer Networks, Vol. 80, 2015, No C, pp. 155-166. 5. Liu, Z., C. Li. On Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Double Auction-Based Methodology. - Wireless Networks, 2015, pp. 1-14. 6. Jiang, W., W. Feng, Y. Yu. Spectrum Allocation Based on Auction in Overlay Cognitive Radio Network. - Ksii Transactions on Internet & Information Systems, Vol. 9, 2015, No 9, pp. 3312-3334. 7. Gandhi, S., C. Buragohain, L. Caoet al. A General Framework for Wireless Spectrum

spectrum auction”: http://e n.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_2008_wireless_spectrum_auctio n. The sub 1 GHz frequency bands are of great value to broadband mobile operators as low fre- quencies allow the radio signal to propagate further, which means that fewer base stations and less capital is needed compared to higher frequencies (such as the 2.6 GHz band, also subject to auctions as of late). The lower frequency ranges are also attractive as they better penetrate walls and thus ensure a higher quality of wire- less broadband services within buildings.8 8 See Graham

that auctions have been a successful way to allocate spectrum. Long ago, Nobel laureate Ronald Coase suggested that the spectrum be auctioned to the highest bidder, so it would likely go to its most highly valued uses (Coase 1959; Hazlett, Porter, and Smith 2011). Governments, in part motivated by the prospect of revenues, signed on, launching a cottage industry in how to design auctions that yielded some remarkably efficient results. 1 Second, economists generally agree that revenues generated for the government – in this case from spectrum auctions – should be

. This type of mechanism commonly appears in sport competitions where strong teams compete in a high league while weak teams compete in a lower one. In the case of a public auction for mineral rights or construction contracts, the prizes may differ in size or amount and potential participants may attend an auction with a high or low prize. A well known example of auctions with different prizes can be found in frequency (spectrum) auctions for third generation mobile telephones. In the UK, authorities offered 15− 15MHz (large)2 licences and 10− 10MHz (small) licences

. (1997). The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6 (3): 431-495. Fiacco, A.V. and McCormick, G.P. (1990). Nonlinear Programming: Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Techniques , SIAM Classics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia, PA. Findeisen, W. (1968). Parametric optimization by primal method in multilevel systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 4 (2): 155-164. Findeisen, W., Bailey, F.N., Brdys´, M., Malinowski, K., Tatjewski, P. and Woz´niak, A. (1980). Control and

- mission spectrum auctions. These four fundamental problems suggest that the likely long-run outcome will be a “race to the bottom,” in which providers become in- creasingly unreliable, product and service qual- ity declines, and fraud and abuse increases. key features of a good auction design Competitive bidding techniques have im-proved dramatically over the last decade. Complex auctions like the Medicare program can be designed to achieve the objectives of low cost and high quality with little imple- mentation risk. The appropriate bidding mechanism would arise

1 Introduction In the auctions for licenses, it is frequently observed that firms submit bids that far exceed the expectations of the public. For example, in the first ever spectrum auctions conducted by the FCC in 1994, the U.S. Treasury collected $617 million, ten times more than the ex ante estimates (cf. Cramton, 1995 ). Similar things happened in subsequent spectrum auctions as well. There were a few common characteristics among these auctions. First, the product demand was highly uncertain. These licenses were for future telecommunication technologies