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from other infrastructures increases. We argue that wholesale price regulation at average costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss other forms of cost-based regulation, retail-minus and deregulation as potential alternatives. KEYWORDS: access regulation, margin squeeze, telecommunications, fixed networks Author Notes: The views expressed are those of the authors entirely and do not represent those of RTR or Telekom-Control-Kommission (TKK). The usual caveat applies. We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the participants of the 35th EARIE

1 Introduction Access regulation plays a key role in the development of competition in network industries. Indeed, in post, telecommunications, energy, railway, etc., incumbents usually own essential infrastructures that cannot be replicated and are required to provide entrants with an access to these infrastructures at a regulated price. Although it facilitates entry, access regulation has been criticized for limiting the entrants’ quality of service. The fact that entrants do not have their own integrated network infrastructures may actually lessen their

Published by De Gruyter, 2012 2. If firms are allowed to set up an access contract for the new network, this will lead to more investments than if those contracts are forbidden or the associated transaction costs are too high. 3. Access contracts may increase investment incentives more strongly for the com- petitor than for the incumbent if access regulation for the old technology leads to access fees strictly larger than marginal costs. In a next step, we also investigate access regulation of the new technology. It is useful to derive the market outcomes and

Bundesgesetzblatt vom 12.7.2005, BGBI 2005 I 1970. Abstract: This article analyses the reform process in the European and the German natural gas sector. Competition in the industry and intra-European trade have been underdeveloped thus far. We argue that the European gas pipelines are a monopolistic bottleneck that require some form of access regulation, e.g. in the form of an Entry-Exit System. We discuss how regulation should be implemented at the European level and, subsequently, in Germany. We conclude that the European Gas Directive 2003/55/EC and the new Energy Law in

perceived urgency of NGA deployment and in view of the huge variation of public policies as well as NGA investment activities in international comparison. For instance, while many of the fiber-leading East-Asian countries take a state aid-driven approach, the US adopted a deregulatory and primarily market-driven strategy a decade ago. The European Union (EU), in contrast, relies on competitive market forces but still foresees a set of ex-ante access regulations to foster NGA investment. Switzerland, which is not part of the EU, actively promotes NGA deployment on the

Price Convergence and Information Efficiency in German Natural Gas Markets Christian Growitsch Institute of Energy Economics University of Cologne Marcus Stronzik Scientific Institute for Infrastructure and Communication Services (WIK) Rabindra Nepal University of Queensland Abstract. In 2007, Germany changed network access regulation in the natural gas sector and introduced a so-called entry–exit system. The spot market effects of the rere- gulation remain to be examined. We use cointegration analysis and a state space model with time-varying coefficients to

Bae S., Hoeel J. & Youngbae K. (2008). Innovation patterns and policy implications of ADSL penetration in Korea: A case study. Telecommunications Policy , 32: 307-325. DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2007.08.003 10.1016/j.telpol.2007.08.003 Bouckaert J. & van Dijk T. (2010). Access regulation, competition, and broadband penetration: An international study. Telecommunications Policy 34: 661-671. DOI:10.1016/j.telpol.2010.09.001. 10.1016/j.telpol.2010.09.001 Brandão A. & Sarmento P. (2007). Access pricing: A comparison between full deregulation and two alternative

://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090929-715810.html?mg=com-wsj Kirsh, F. - von Hirschhausen, C. (2008a). Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All? In Communications and Strategies , no. 69, p. 63-83. Kirsh, F. - von Hirschhausen, C. (2008b). Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All? In Communications and Strategies , no. 69, p. 63-83. Lévěque, F. - Glachant, J-M. - Saguan, M. - Muizon, G. (2008). Comparing Electricity Transmission Arrangements: Revisiting the Main Arguments from the Economic Literature to Shed

complication in implementing open access policies; openness typically refers to a lack of vertical foreclosure, but since there are two vertical relationships, there are two types of openness: open access refers to the ability of any ISP to access the conduit, while open content describes an ISP that is neutral with respect to content. Open access regulation typically requires vertically integrated firms to offer access to their conduit. However, no such rules apply to the ISP-content relationship and, thus, Hogendorn argues that open access does not play the same

of need. This article examines whether in countries with gatekeeping systems utilization is in fact stronger oriented at need than in countries with free access to outpatient care. Based on the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement of 2004, we analyze the doctor-patient contacts for different need levels in eleven European countries. Our results show that utilization differs more across levels of need in countries with gatekeeping systems than in countries with no or weak access regulations. Marianne Egger de Campo Exit and Voice on Welfare Markets. An