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Forum for Health Economics & Policy Volume 9, Issue 1 2006 Article 4 (FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH) Adverse Selection in Retiree Prescription Drug Plans Dana P. Goldman∗ Geoffrey Joyce† Pinar Karaca-Mandic‡ Neeraj Sood∗∗ ∗RAND, dana.goldman@usc.edu †RAND, geoffrey joyce@rand.org ‡RAND Corporation, pkmandic@umn.edu ∗∗RAND Corporation, nsood@sppd.usc.edu Adverse Selection in Retiree Prescription Drug Plans∗ Dana P. Goldman, Geoffrey Joyce, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Neeraj Sood Abstract We used claims data from a large U.S. employer that introduced changes in

insurance encourages overuse of medical services (Gruber and Poterba 1996a). At the same time, economists commonly argue that employer provision ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health insurance provision. A firm is a place where people come together for reasons other than health insurance. 2 Though this is a widely held position among economists, 3 there has been very little theoretical work delineating the conditions under which the labor market solves the adverse selection problem in health insurance, and very little applied work measuring its empirical

Contributions to Theoretical Economics Volume 3, Issue 1 2003 Article 4 Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis Matthew Joseph Ryan∗ Rhema Vaithianathan† ∗University of Auckland, m.ryan@auckland.ac.nz †University of Auckland, r.vaithianathan@auckland.ac.nz Copyright c©2003 by the authors. All rights reserved. Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis Matthew Joseph Ryan and Rhema Vaithianathan Abstract Stiglitz (1977) established three well-known features of monopoly insurance markets

Volume 5, Issue 1 2010 Article 5 Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance Testing for Adverse Selection in China's Auto Insurance Market Feng Gao, Tsinghua University Jun Wang, Tsinghua University Recommended Citation: Gao, Feng and Wang, Jun (2010) "Testing for Adverse Selection in China's Auto Insurance Market," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5. DOI: 10.2202/2153-3792.1082 ©2011 Asia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association. All rights reserved. Testing for Adverse Selection in China's Auto Insurance Market Feng Gao and Jun

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Topics Volume 12, Issue 1 2012 Article 14 Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection Manuel Willington∗ Alexander Alegrı́a† ˜´∗Universidad Adolfo Ibanez, manuel.willington@uai.cl †Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Cali, aalegria@javerianacali.edu.co Recommended Citation Manuel Willington and Alexander Alegr´ıa (2012) “Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 12: Iss. 1 (Article), Article 14. DOI: 10

Forum for Health Economics & Policy Volume 1 1998 Article 2 (FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH) Adverse Selection in Health Insurance David M. Cutler∗ Richard J. Zeckhauser† ∗Harvard University and NBER †Harvard University and NBER Copyright c©1998 by the authors. All rights reserved. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser Abstract Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals’ being

Volume 2, Issue 1 2007 Article 1 Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance Assessing Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets: An Application of Parametric and Nonparametric Methods Shiva S. Makki, Ohio State University Agapi L. Somwaru, United Stated Department of Agriculture Recommended Citation: Makki, Shiva S. and Somwaru, Agapi L. (2007) "Assessing Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets: An Application of Parametric and Nonparametric Methods," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 1. DOI: 10.2202/2153-3792.1012 ©2007

Conviction, Partial Adverse Selection and Labor Market Discrimination DARIO SCIULLI University ‘G. d’Annunzio’ of Chieti-Pescara This paper analyzes data from the 1999-2000 sweep of the U.K. National Child Development Study to investigate convicted individuals’ prospects in the labor market. Decomposition analysis makes it clear that convicted workers are in fact discriminated against as compared to non-convicted ones, both in terms of employment and wage. Adopting a simple theoretical model accounting for the problem of partial adverse selection in the

rural financial system will be promoted. The effective agricultural insurance can improve agricultural production management level and international competitiveness, which is important part of solving the “three agricultural” problems. However, in the practice of agricultural insurance, due to the particularity of agricultural risk, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems become a seriously barrier to the development of agricultural insurance. Meanwhile, because agriculture has not insurable risk, demand for agricultural insurance has the characteristics of

Forum for Health Economics & Policy Volume 7 2004 Article 3 (FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH) Adverse Selection and the Challenges to Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Insurance Mark V. Pauly∗ Yuhui Zeng† ∗University of Pennsylvania and NBER †University of Pennsylvania Copyright c©2004 by the authors. All rights reserved. Adverse Selection and the Challenges to Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Insurance Mark V. Pauly and Yuhui Zeng Abstract This paper investigates a possible predictor of adverse selection problems in unsubsidized stand-alone prescription drug