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?" "Yes." "Were the windows square or round?" "Let me reflect a moment. I did not particularly notice the windows, but now I bring the whole before me again I see they were square windows, but one in the middle was a bow window." This is properly an analytic judgment. But if I a An example of the transcriber"s eye skipping a line 1 b ms: the c ms: as 1 The chapter is freely drawn from Cdr V 10-14 (48-51). The examples of the house, the spark of fire, and the eyes of horses are C's. z See above, pp 125-6. 174 Of Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 175 asked

misguided and insufficient response. Over the course of time, the doubts expressed by Maaß about the absolute distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments have been emulated by a considerable number of thinkers. These philosophers may, in fact, have been ignorant of the precursory contribution of Maaß himself, who was a contemporary of Kant.  Gottlieb Söhngen, in his doctoral dissertation at Munich University, mentions Friedrich Schleiermacher, Adolf Trendelenburg and Gottlob Ernst Schulze, the author of Aenesidemus , as supporters of the relative character of

distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in his essay concern- ing human understanding. (AA 17:278) By contrast I find a hint [Wink] of this division [between analytic and synthetic judgments] already in Locke’s essays on human understanding. For in Book IV, Chapter III, §9 f., after he had already discussed the various connections of representations in judgments and the sources of the connections, of which he located the one in identity or contradiction (ana- lytic judgments) but the other in the existence of representations in a subject (synthetic  See AA

APPENDIX A GREEN'S TABLE OF CONTENTS GREEN'S TABLE OF CONTENTS Coleridge's Logic- Chapter 1. History of Logic " 2 Philosophy of Education. " 3-Logic as the Canon " 4-Logical acts- , 5-Logic as Criterion or Dialectic- " 6-0n the discussion of the premises in all logical , , , , , " , " " " reasoning- 7. Retrospective 8. Judicial Logic, including the pure .t'Esthetic. (Time and Space) 9 Of analytic and synthetic Judgements I 0-Common principles of analytic judgements. 11. Synthetic judgements and their principle. 12. On mathematical or


Aesthetic 150 Chapter v. Of Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 174 Chapter vr. Analytic Judgments-the Common Principle of 178 Chapter VII. Of Synthetic Judgments and Their Principle 180 Chapter vm. On Synthesis a priori 181 vii viii Logic Chapter IX. On Mathematical or Intuitive and Logical or Discursive Synthesis a priori page 198 Chapter x. On Mathematical Evidence 211 Chapter XI. Of the Ways and Means by Which the Mind Arrives at Mathematical Evidence 21 S Chapter xn. On Synthetic Judgments a priori Other Than Mathematical, or on the a priori Connections

's article as their authority for denying, for example, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the argu- ment of that article must be presented as clearly as possible. Couturat's target in his attack on Kant's philosophy of mathe- matics was the entire "critical philosophy", which to him meant an irrationalistic "moralism" exalting "reasons of the heart" above the "lifeless" reasoning of the intellect. Talk about "the logic of the emotions" infuriated him, and his attack upon Kant was made in the name of rationalism, but of a rationalism which was

Anderson R. Lanier The Poverty of Conceptual Truth. Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics Oxford University Press Oxford 2015 Much has been written on the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, yet Lanier Anderson’s elaboration on this longstanding topic is in many respects fresh. Not only does Anderson succeed in throwing light on Kant’s intellectual struggle towards a fully fledged analytic-synthetic distinction, he does this against the backdrop of Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. This kind of contextualization

Quine’s text are some considerations about Kant in general, about Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and about the sense of that distinction in the history of philosophy. Considering the evidently non-historical character of Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine’s references to Kant have been hitherto almost ig- nored. Some other aspects of the paper of course deserve much attention. How- ever, it will be interesting to better analyze these few indications in order to re- consider the historical sense of Quine’s text and perhaps even to lay the

stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other syn- thetic. (1, p. 48) Slight, but interesting differences are manifest in the F. Max Müller translation which runs thus:3 Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something contained (though covert- ly) in the concept A; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the judgment analytical, in the latter syn- thetical. The crucial word for the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in

important for Allison's concerns, is the attack on the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Eberhard claimed that Leibniz had already discovered whatever there is of value in Kant's famous classification by distinguishing between judgments which predicate the "essence" or an essential part of the subject (judgments governed by the principle of non-contradiction), and those which predicate an attribute which has its "sufficient reason" in the subject and so can be "deduced" from its concept. If this latter claim holds, then there can be a