Arabia and in some of the smaller states, it has weakened the authority of the
Traffi cking in Evil?
Th e Global ArmsTrade and the
Politics of Disorder
9780520275010_PRINT.indd 121 16/10/13 7:50 PM
122 Contagions and Commodities
Persian and Turkish Governments and threatens in the end to produce widespread
and incurable disorder.”1 Once imagined by colonial authorities as a sign of Euro-
pean dominance, guns became synonymous with disorder in the early twentieth
century, a condition that local elites sought to tame in constructing more
claimed to contribute to countries’ dynamic performance ( McGrattan & Prescott, 2009 ) and trade is widely accepted to be a relevant channel to technology diffusion ( Schiff & Wang, 2003 ; Zhu & Jeon, 2007 ). This could be true in particular for less developed countries that can learn from the knowledge embedded in the inputs they import. In this sense, Long and Leeds (2006) show an increase in commercial relationships among allies although specific to military alliances with economic cooperation clauses. This evidence concentrates on civil goods trade. Armstrade is
affect target policies.
KEYWORDS: sanctions, armstrade, United Nations
∗This paper is an outgrowth of a joint project with George Lopez, University of Notre Dame. Fi-
nancial support by the Fritz Thyssen-Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged. A publication of the
major results of the project is forthcoming. The paper was originally presented at the Annual
Convention of the International Studies Association 2007, Chicago, February 28-March 3. I thank
panelists, as well as Marc von Boehmcken, Wolf-Christian Paes and Kyle Atwell for their com-
economic elites, whose interests often do not align with Kyiv, or, for that matter, Moscow, as well as Ukraine’s Soviet infrastructural inheritance, much of which was directed toward military-industrial production. Ukraine remains a small but significant player in the global armstrade – as a producer of components of military hardware, as well as a source of and destination for illicit weapons. A. Martyniuk , Research Report. Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine, Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2017, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10639 , 27.06.2019. This
), Study Notes in System Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Hayakawa, H. und Venieris, Y. (1977), Consumer interdependence via reference groups,
Journal of Political Economy 85, 599±615.
Kunz, H. (1993), KriminalitaÈt, in: B-Th. Ramb und M. Tietzel (Hrsg.), OÈkonomische
Verhaltenstheorie. Verlag Vahlen, MuÈnchen.
Levine, P. und Smith, R. (1997), The armstrade, Economic Policy 25, 337±369.
Mahnke, M. (1995), EuropaÈische Drogenpolitik, in: M. Erlei (Hrsg.), Mit dem Markt gegen
Drogen!? SchaÈffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart.
Maital, Sh. (1986), Prometheus rebound: On welfare
arms market. Despite the importance of the global arms market, these large firms have a major role for ensuring national security (see Garcıa-Alonso and Smith 2006; Levine and Smith 2000a,b; Levine, Sen, and Smith 1994). Accordingly, the armstrade is heavily regulated by national governments with a labyrinth of export controls and export subsidies in which national governments play an enormously important role (see the early work by Anderton 1995; Garcıa-Alonso 2000, 2003; Garcıa-Alonso, Levine, and Morga 2004; Golde and Tishler 2004; Levine, Mouzakis, and Smith