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the properties an object has just are the causal powers of that object, then if the object itself is individuated in terms of its properties, a change in the object’s causal powers will result in a change in the identity of the object itself. It will result, that is, in a new object. The view that this is the nature of objects is called the bundle view and is endorsed or at least sympathetically developed among contemporary and recent philosophers by Bertrand Russell (1940 , esp. 337–340), Hector-Neri Castañeda (1974 ), Keith Campbell (1981 ), Jonathan

Change, Individuation and Individual Essence

postulated rather than detected. The bare substratum theory supresses the structure in favor of a primitive unity. 31 The basic tenet of the bare substratum theory is that the identity of the substances involves only these bare substrata as bare, propertiless particulars. In short, the identity of the substances is separable and is actually separate from their properties. Strange as it sounds though, the chief function of this claim is to circumvent the major problem of the rival bundle view. The latter makes the identity of the substances supervenient on their

ontologist cannot accept ways which are considered as universals. The other and more important caution is about the view not to think of tropes as real entities at all. Simons argues, and I think legitimately, that tropes are in the end meant to make up substantial objects. If tropes are not somehow real entities, even if they cannot exist independently like substances, then how can something real arise by bundling tropes together? To put the bundle view of objects in classical terms, we have no split-up into an underlying persisting substratum on the one side and

7 Introduction The goal of this book is to support a version of the trope-bundle view of individual substances. This preferred version is shown to match with a coherent account of change, individuation and individual essences. In particular, it is argued that qualitative individuation and qualitative individual essences can be defended on the basis of a trope account. The main motivation for the qualitative approach to substances identifying them for the purpose of analysis with bundles of qualitative features is the aim to account for change and

between the account given in EMS and, for example, Galen Strawson’s sceptical realist account of Hume on the self. Indeed, while EMS is critical of the traditional ontological reading of Hume’s bundle view of the self (the ‘Old Hume’), it does not propose either that Hume, pre- or post-Appendix, affirms or is committed to the existence of a self beyond the perceptions (the ‘New Hume’). EMS argues, however, that Hume does not deny the existence of a self beyond the perceptions (and it is this negative thesis that EMS shares with Strawson). Wunderlich presents four

rigid in specifying the essential tropes of the substance in the following sense: it excludes the possibility that a determinate of a determinable essential trope of the substance be replaced by another determinate of the same kind. As is familiar, the modal problem is intimately connected to change, and there are various ramifications of this issue. For example, radical change poses its own challenge to the two-tier trope-bundle view as we shall see later. Also, while there might not be changes in the essential generic features, there may be changes in their

significant ben- efit of Deely’s analysis is that it brings to the forefront of philosophical discussion this set of issues. Nonetheless, one omission in Deely’s gener- ally thoughtful analysis is his neglect in considering how late twentieth century analytic philosophy of mind has ventured nearer to his set of epis- temological worries than his book appears to indicate. The foil for this essay is the set of texts rooted in classical British em- piricism, with special reference to Berkeley and Hume, in which what has become known as the ‘‘bundle view of perception’’ was

theory is the most ap- propriate ontology for AQFT. I proceed in two steps. The first step of my argumentation consists in showing that a bundle conception of objects is the most natural understanding of the structure of AQFT. In the second step I argue that if one thinks that there are good reasons for adopting a bundle view, one is driven to understand properties as tropes. In other words, the gist of what I am saying is an argument in favour of a bundle conception of objects in opposition to a substratum approach. My ensuing plea for a trope theory is conditional on

consequence of a bundle analysis, for any change of a quality results in a different bundle. (Just think of Sartre’s Humean style 50 bundle view of the self and one easily sees how he can speak of meeting a “new” self or “stranger” in the mirror each morning). Alternatively, an individuating bare particular, however disguised, can be seen to carry the burden of the “trans-world” identity of Socrates for others. Saul Kripke’s discussion clearly reveals that, in spite of his denial that he holds such a view. (His implicit metaphysics of bare substances is still