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Causal Exclusion and the Preservation of Causal Sufficiency ANDERS STRAND IFIKK, CSMN, PSBio, University of Oslo Email: Abstract The causal exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of non-reducible mental properties relies on a causal closure principle for the physical domain, and on a cau- sal exclusion principle ruling out systematic causal overdetermination. The notion of causal sufficiency is typically used in formulating both these principles. I argue that the causal exclusion principle has to be substantially revised in


seems individually plausible and yet they appear to form an inconsistent set: (1) Relevance : Mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain. (2) Closure : Every physical event contains only other physical events in its transitive causal closure. (3) Exclusion : As a general rule, events are not causally overdetermined. (4) Distinctness : Mental events are not physical events. Gibb’s aim is to show that all four claims can be reconciled, providing space for a dualist model of psychophysical causation which gives mental events a specific causal role in the

central part of this paper demonstrates that the synergetic principle is not an appropriate principle on which to construct a valid functional explanation of quantitative linguistics. The final section analyses the concept of law in quantitative linguistics. We examine a series of laws as models and econo- mization principles and we outline a conception of laws as various categories of conservation principles. Keywords: synergetic principle, synergetic linguistics, quantitative linguistics, functional explanation, physicalism, causal closure, downward causation

closed with respect to efficient causation. This form of self-organisation is thereby considered as basic criterion by which living systems, such as cells and organisms, are distinguished from machines and computers. Die causal closure of the cell is possible through the definition of the cell model as a cartesian closed category. It follows the conclu- sion that computer simulations of differential equations may be able to reproduce cellular processes but not this aspect of causal closure. The article ends with a discussion about the role of systems theory in the life


, Causal Closure, and Mechanism 59 The Argument from Reason 64 Mechanism and Darwinist Epistemology 75 4. FREE WILL AND AGENCY 81 Libertarian Free Will 82 The Frankfurt Counterexamples 86 Vlll Contents Free Will Without an Agent 94 Agent Causation 99 5. THREE ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM IIO Descartes according to Swinburne III Descartes according to Taliaferro II6 The Unity-of-Consciousness Argument 122 6. PROBLEMATIC DUALISMS 147 Cartesian Dualism 147 Objections to Cartesian Dualism 148 The Swinburne Variations 157 Thomistic Dualism 161 Critique of

, if it has a cause, it has a physical cause. The first assumption emphasizes the difference between the mental and the physical. The second stresses the efficacy of the mental. And the third as- serts the causal closure of the physical domain. Physicalism proposes to solve this problem by rejecting the first as- sumption. To many philosophers this seemed to be a promising strategy, a way in line with the natural sciences. (Accordingly, physicalists often claim that philosophy should commit to a “naturalistic” worldview.) As I already mentioned, however

the 20th century, Cartesian substance dualism had been abandoned by most philosophers. Contemporaneous with the birth of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, traditional materialism (which posited material entities as comprising the only possible reality) was replaced by some new patterns of physicalism. The following statement could characterize today’s physicalist position: ‘Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical.’5 Commitment to the causal closure of

causation are afterwards men- tioned: (i) “how mental states qua mental can cause something physi- cal” and (ii) “how mental states qua contentful can cause something physical” (188). While problem (i) is that mental causation threatens the causal closure of the world, problem (ii) is that content seems causally irrelevant and this is a challenge for semantic externalism. Chapter 7 deals in great detail with the different strategies that se- mantic externalism may use to answer problem (ii). Semantic Externalism is a great book for anyone who wishes to dwell on the

affected by bodily movements and that the body can causally act on the mind; but even when these two substances are substantially united, body and mind remain two distinct substances with their own essence and their different types of properties. Cartesian Dualism is not among the most popular theories of mind, especially because the claim that an immaterial mind causes physical effects violates the principle of causal closure:  The causal closure principle is an empirical thesis and a recent one; see Papineau 2009. at every time at which a physical event has a cause

and so being perturbed by it (Tim. 34c-36e). Zur Diskussion 233 Here she is appealing to a well-known principle of contemporary philosophy of physics that is almost unanimously shared, that of the causal closure of physics. Ac- cording to this principle, any cause that produces a physical effect or an effect that belongs to the physical world must itself belong to the physical world and be physical in nature. The soul too, in that it moves a body, that is, its causal action produces a movement in a body, must therefore belong to the world of bodies. But is this so