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Laws of Nature and Causal Necessity 531 Michael Friedman Laws of Nature and Causal Necessity Abstract: This paper consider the necessity of causal laws of nature in relation to Kant’s works explicitly addressed to natural science (such as the Prolegomena and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science), and also to the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction and the Critique of the Power of Judge- ment. Keywords: causal necessity, laws of nature, Prolegomena, B Deduction, reflective judgement Michael Friedman: Stanford University, Stanford, CA


Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining premise – that it is impossible for an object to begin to exist uncaused – seems more old fashioned. I argue that Shepherd can do without her old-fashioned premise and that she provides the materials for arguing that her remaining premises demonstrate a stronger anti-Humeanism than is maintained even by the contemporary representatives of those views, even though she may have to concede more to Humeanism than she would like.

FRED WILSON Hochberg, Hume, and Wittgenstein on Causal Necessity Hochberg has compared Hume and Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus) with regard to their views on causation.1 Both Hume and Witt- genstein propose what is called, whether in praise or pejoratively, a “regu- larity” view of causation. Which is to say that both reject as entities in their ontologies necessary connections, or, more exactly, objective necessary connections: the regularities reckoned as causal are just regularities, the cause and effect are not connected in

Inka Mülder-Bach DOI 10.1515/iasl.2011.014 Der »Weg der Geschichte« oder: Finden und Erfinden Geschichtserzählung in Robert Musils Roman Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* Focusing on the 83rd chapter of The Man without Qualities – »Seinesgleichen geschieht oder warum erfindet man nicht Geschichte?« – this essay suggests a new reading of Musil’s narration of history. It argues that Musil avoids the Scylla of causal necessity and the Charybdis of the law of large numbers by means of a micrological method of ›smallest steps‹ aimed at motivating contingency. The narration

.e. “causal necessity”). This definition states that a valid surrogate satisfies P ( Y i ( 1 ) = 1 ) = P ( Y i ( 0 ) = 1 ) $$P({Y_i}(1) = 1) = P({Y_i}(0) = 1)$$ for all subjects i with S i ( 1 ) = S i ( 0 ) $${S_i}(1) = {S_i}(0)$$ , which departs from the Prentice definition in (1) being required for all individuals and in (2) being unidirectional (instead of if and only if). Gilbert and Hudgens [ 5 ], focusing on what could be evaluated from the sampling scheme of a typical randomized trial, modified the causal necessity condition to “average causal necessity” (ACN

Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 1 LARRY LEE BLACKMAN: Hochberg and Moore on Intentionality and Perception 5 GUIDO BONINO: Hochberg and Sellars: Perspicuity and Bradley’s Regress 51 ROSARIA EGIDI: Wittgenstein, Bergmann, and Hochberg on Intentionality 73 FRASER MACBRIDE: Hochberg’s Micro-Metaphysical Relations: Order All The Way Down 87 INGVAR JOHANSSON: Hochberg on Sartre 111 ERWIN TEGTMEIER: Hochberg on the Structure of Facts 143 FRED WILSON: Hochberg, Hume, and Wittgenstein on Causal

. Boutou, F. Courvoisier, J.-P. Wolf, and H. Rabitz, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 253001 (2009). H. M. Wiseman and G. J. Milburn, Phys. Rev. A 49, 4110 (1994). S. Lloyd, Phys. Rev. A 62, 022108 (2000). P. Zanardi and M. Rasetti, Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 3306 (1997). D. Lidar, I. Chuang, and K. Whaley, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 2594 (1998). J. Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (Cambridge University Press, 2000). B. Skyrms, Causal Necessity (Yale University Press, 1980), chap. IIC. The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision, pp. 128–139. A. Gibbard, in Ifs

argues for the role that the Aristotelian-Schol- astic matter-form distinction played in shaping Kant’s view about the legislative role of the understanding and what he calls Kant’s transcendental hylomorphism; Michael Friedman draws our attention to causal necessity in empirical laws. Friedman sees Kant’s mature view on laws of nature as a response to Hume and as a way of transforming empirical rules in necessary and universally valid laws. Knowledge of empirical laws is the focus of the last two essays in this special issue. Peter McLaughlin analyses the Appendix to


Fantl Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity 87 Marcus Arvan A Refutation of the Lewis-Stalnaker Analysis of Counterfactuals 109 Metaphysica 2016 | Volume 17 | Issue 1

P A R T I V Analyticity, Morality, Causality, and Liberty In this part, I deal with a number of fundamental problems in the philosophy of language. An article on analytic truth and one on the paradox of analysis are concerned with pivotal concepts in semantics, and several other articles in this part treat the concepts of causal necessity and possibility, especially as they bear on the problem of free will. Though they are more technical than the preceding articles, I see in retrospect that the one on analytic truth encouraged me to think that there is no sharp