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1 Introduction This paper examines the possibility that collective intentionality might play a role in the existence and powers of social entities. In doing so, it brings together two paradigms or traditions of work on social ontology, centred on the concepts of collective intentionality and causal powers respectively, in the hope that a productive synergy might be found between them. The collective intentionality tradition, notably including John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and Michael Bratman, focuses on whether and how there could be collective

Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns GABRIEL M . A . SEGAL 0. Introduction In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call 'nature concepts', these being lay concepts of natural phenomena such as liquids (water) and types of animal (tiger). I will argue that the reference of singular concepts, which is obviously a variety of wide content, has a role to play in psychology. Singular concepts, I will claim, have both wide and narrow contents. In my view, no other concepts have wide contents. I shall

Discussion 213 Berichte und Diskussionen Brian A. Chance Causal Powers, Hume’s Early German Critics, and Kant’s Response to Hume Indessen kennen wir denn doch das System des H. Hume aus sei- nen Versuchen; und, ob der Uebersetzung derselben gleich, von einem berühmten deutschen Philosophen, Anmerkungen und Zusätze beygefügt worden sind: so scheint doch H. Reid der Quelle des Uebels – wenn ja Uebel bey der Sache ist – näher gekommen zu seyn, als irgend ein anderer Gegener des H. Hume, – wenn ich die einzelen Stellen, wo H. Kant (in der Critik der reinen Vernunft

“To Be Is to Have Causal Powers”: Existence and Nature in Analytic Metaphysics Francesco Berto Whatever has a native power, whether of affecting anything else, or of being affected in ever so slight a degree by the most insignificant agents, even on one solitary occasion, is a real being. In short, I offer it as the definition of be- ings that they are potency—and nothing else. – Plato, Sophist 247d–e 1. Existential questions as quantificational questions Quine notoriously claimed that one could answer the fundamental onto- logical

real emergent powers of social structures differ from the causal powers of concrete social systems composed of interacting persons” (p. 182). Global-level emergence : Levels of reality (e.g., society, mind, matter) have emergent properties not derivable from the properties of lower levels of reality. “Each emergent level has its own synchronically emergent properties which are autonomous with respect to those of other levels” (p. 186). The three concepts are successively more demanding, and Kaidesoja finds that they are inconsistent with each other. Within the

In recent papers ( Gibb 2013 , 2014 ) S.C. Gibb aims to provide an anti-physicalist solution to the problem of mental causation through a “Double Prevention” theory founded on a powers theory of causation. The aim of this paper is not to engage with the causal powers metaphysic or the concept of double prevention themselves, both of which have significant merits, but to question the plausibility of the solution thereby provided to the mental causation issue. The initial problem is set out in familiar terms ( Gibb 2013 , 193): Each of the following four claims

1989 [1979]), that seems to invoke the authority of Kant in the analytical tradition, but in the process introduces a series of unfortunate associations. The most central of these is Bhaskar’s use of the concept of a transcendental argument to describe his argument for the existence of real causal powers, which he derives from the practice of scientific experimentation. This Kantian terminology has prompted critical responses from scholars who read into it a claim to infallible certainty for his conclusions, and who take it to imply that Bhaskar’s argument proceeds

recent work on extended and distributed cognition to identify some of the issues, in particular Edwin Hutchins’s account of distributed cognition in the navigation system of a US warship. It then argues that the critical realist theory of social structures as entities with emergent causal powers can be modified productively to encompass such cases, an argument that is illustrated by discussing the causal powers of a string quartet. The closing sections look beyond these specific cases to discuss the distinct but complementary roles of human and non-human objects in

I will begin my reply by further clarifying the naturalist position outlined in my book and my motivation to naturalize critical realist social ontology. This section responds to Ruth Groff’s doubts concerning the viability of the naturalist approach of my book. After that, I will address Groff’s and Petri Ylikoski’s points regarding transcendental ontological arguments and my naturalist alternative to them. The rest of this paper seeks to clarify my interpretations and critiques of the accounts of causal powers and social structures offered by Bhaskar and his Olivier Massin Realism’s Kick Abstract: Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if