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available to the parties. The standard contract theories, third, struggle with the soft devices and fail to explain and conceptualise their significance as legal governance tools, while the devices, nevertheless, are, in fact, effective and useful. The three observations lead to the awkward feeling that animates the paper: we do not seem to have an adequate legal theory of contract to explain why and how these novel instruments are and can be effective. In Section II , the article commences with an introduction to contract devices firms use in governing complex long

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Volume 2, Number 2 July 2001 Article 7 PROTECTING INVESTORS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Comparative Corporate Governance William W. Bratton∗ Joseph A. McCahery† ∗George Washington University Law School, †Tilburg University, Copyright c©2001 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law, The Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Re- search of the Law, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in

chapter eight From Social Contract Theory to Sociable Contract Theory Even if the jurisprudence of democratic experimentalism can success­fully avoid justifying the results of Supreme Court antiprecendents such as Lochner and would support the decisions that are thought suc­ cessful such as Brown, isn’t the Constitution a foundational contract that sets up the basic ground rules within which democratic processes must function? Further, wouldn’t following the evolutionary, democratic, and experimental aspects of democratic experimentalism be incompatible

Jahrbücher f. Nationalökonomie u. Statistik (Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2007) Bd. (Vol.) 227/5+6 Die Ausgestaltung von Versorgungsverträgen: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse A Contract Theory Approach to Health Care Contracting Von Axel Mühlbacher, Neubrandenburg JEL I11, I18, L14 Delivery of health care, integrated health care delivery systems; selektive contracting, risks, methods; transactioncost, contract theory, principal-agent theory, incomplete contracts. Summary Transaction costs are an obstacle to the efficient operation of selective contracting. Health

Issues in Legal Scholarship SYMPOSIUM: FULLER AND PERDUE  Article 5 The Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Perdue Peter Benson∗ ∗Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, benson@demo.bepress.com Issues in Legal Scholarship is one of The Journals of Legal Scholarship, produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). Copyright c©2001 by the authors. All rights reserved. The Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Perdue Peter Benson Abstract Despite their differences, modern

fundamental level and in one way or another are reflected in much of con- temporary contract theory, it is impor tant to assess them together and in greater depth. This is what I shall now try to do. To begin, I briefly recap some main points in the prior discussion of enforcement. I have tried to show through a detailed examination of the main doctrines and princi ples of the law of remedies that the organ izing aim of remedies, whether in specie or damages, is to vindicate a party’s per for mance interest in a manner required by compensatory justice. Unexcused

10 Social Contract Theory's Fanciest Flight (with Gauthier) There is less to say by way of preface to this discussion ofGauthier's work, because I can offer it straightforwardly as a current critical representation ofGauthier's Morals by Agreement, which I think is the technically most proficient of the grand programs in analytical political philosophy, and the most suited to inspiring rigorous criticism. Readers on the Right - any readers who stand with Milton Friedman and Frederic Bastiat or to the right of them - will rejoice in the political colouring given

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Contributions Volume 11, Issue 1 2011 Article 10 Sourcing Premia with Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Evidence Wilhelm K. Kohler∗ Marcel Smolka† ¨ ¨ ∗University of Tubingen, wilhelm.kohler@uni-tuebingen.de †University of Tubingen, marcel.smolka@uni-tuebingen.de Recommended Citation Wilhelm K. Kohler and Marcel Smolka (2011) “Sourcing Premia with Incomplete Contracts: The- ory and Evidence,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 1 (Contribu- tions), Article 10. Sourcing Premia with Incomplete

chapter one Introduction Shakespeare and the Predicament of Contract Theory This book presents a normative argument about contract law and its relationship to markets. Stated as simply as possible, well- functioning markets are morally desirable, and contract law should be organized to support such markets. Contracts are such a ubiquitous part of market ex- change that one would think that the moral status of markets would be entwined in contemporary scholarship with the moral status of contract law. Such is not the case. Markets, however, have not always

105 Lectures 9–13: Hobbes and Modern Contract Theory no full texts exist for lectures 9–13. Among the Papers of Judith N. Shklar in the Harvard Archives we found only a short text on Hobbes and no records that would confirm the existence or the survival of any fully written-out versions of the lectures on Locke, Hume, Rousseau, or Kant. To enable readers to follow Shklar’s overall logic and argumentation, we repro- duce here the short text of her Hobbes lecture, followed by edited versions of fragmentary lecture notes on Locke, Hume, and Rousseau located