Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 13 items :

  • "double prevention" x
Clear All

In recent papers ( Gibb 2013 , 2014 ) S.C. Gibb aims to provide an anti-physicalist solution to the problem of mental causation through a “Double Prevention” theory founded on a powers theory of causation. The aim of this paper is not to engage with the causal powers metaphysic or the concept of double prevention themselves, both of which have significant merits, but to question the plausibility of the solution thereby provided to the mental causation issue. The initial problem is set out in familiar terms ( Gibb 2013 , 193): Each of the following four claims

FREE ACCESS

, Christoph, Journalist, Berlin; Siebert, John-Walter, Pfarrer, Oberstenfeld; Walter de Gruyter Stiftung, Berlin. Contents Research Articles Michele Paolini Paoletti A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism 1 Patrick Monaghan The Largest Proper Parts of a Mereological Whole: A Refutation of Classical Extensional Mereology 19 John Gabriel Super-Truth & Direct Reference 27 Kim Davies Powers, Double Prevention and Mental Causation 37 Howard Peacock Where are Universals? 43 Markku Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen and Antti Keskinen Why Realists Need Tropes 69 Jeremy

proposes a revised process theory of causation that the authors believe to be superior to the outcome theories. More relevant to the topic of causation by omission, the idea is to analyze cases of causation by omis- sion as double prevention. Lack of rainfall caused the drought, for instance, can be said to involve a two-step process of causation (double prevention): Climate change prevents rainfall and Rainfall prevents drought, which logically licenses Lack of rainfall caused the drought. This appears to be a sensible proposal, much akin to the logical deduction

think about causation or which causal concepts we should employ and, since these recommendations in turn entail particular causal judgments, also as normative proposals about the causal judgments we ought to make. For example, on this way of looking at matters, philosophical accounts of causa- tion according to which so-called double prevention relations (see section 5 below) are not genuine causal relationships because of the absence of a connect- ing process linking cause and effect can be thought of as normative proposals about how we should conceptualize the

,76; process, 55, 72,73, 77,134, 237n4; theory of chance, 86,90, 109, 110,232 Causation: by double prevention, 56; efficient, 54-5, 60, 63-4, 68, 70, 85, 164-5, 208-9, 233, 238n26; generic, 56-7; by omission, 56; and time, 61-2, 133-5 Church, A., 240n21 Classical physics, 81, 206 Classical world, 177-9 Coherent quantum state, 156 Collapse of wavefunction, 152,181,198, 200, 203, 204, 207, 217 Collective, 97,101; deceitful vs. honest, 99-100, 102 Complementarity, 159 Complete, 81,119, 209; vs. maximal, 5, 77-80, 83, 242n5; set of observables, 219; state of affairs, 77-80, 81

qualify as causal, even though the there is no “physical connection” between the specified cause and effect – all that M re- quires is that there be counterfactual dependence of the right sort between the values of X and Y, whether or not a physical connection of some kind is associ- ated with this dependence relation. So-called double prevention relationships, discussed in (Woodward 2018) provide one illustration of this possibility of de- pendence without physical connection. The previous paragraph introduced a distinction between “type cause” and “actual cause

some other positive epistemic valence. Suppose I start out at the very beginning of my philosophical career, for example, with some ordinary beliefs about causality. These are the beliefs that guide my judgments about the various problem cases—late preemp- tion, double prevention, and so on—that figure so prominently in the re- cent philosophical dialectic about singular causation, as well as guiding, less prominently but no less importantly, those judgments about unproblem- atic cases that a theory of causality must replicate to qualify even as a prima facie

overdetermination and other cases; c. The notion that causation “peters out” over time, space, and numbers of intervening events; d. The residual selectivity of what is eligible on a given occasion to be con- sidered a cause of a particular effect. 3. Nomic sufficiency (at best construed, at least) countenances absences as causes and effects; it is thus unable to distinguish causation from: a. Omissions that fail to prevent some harm; b. Preventions of some harm that did not happen; c. Allowings and other double-preventions, viz, a prevention of a would-be preventer of some harm

Darwinism 235 Darwinist adaptationism 235 decision-making 7f., 10, 36–38, 45, 47, 139–154, 224, 249 decision-making models 141 deductive model of scientific explanation 34 deductive nomological model of scientific ex- planation 34 demography 39 direct cause 25, 35 distributed brain system(s) 142–144, 152 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 147 double prevention 72, 78, 97–99, 107, 115, 120, 129 dualist approaches 187 dual systems theory 88 dynamic level interaction hypothesis 8f., 159 f., 167 f., 171–173 econometrics 24, 28 f., 37, 39, 85 economics 7 f., 32, 36 f., 40

- gular causal statement. The INUS condition explains why we reach the singular causal statement contained in the conclusion. Such a theory seems to be preferable to me compared to the alternatives available at the moment because it combines the precision of conditional anal- ysis with the explanatory power of the INUS condition account. A conditional analysis also has the advantage that we are able to avoid unnecessary complica- tions connected with a denial of the possibility of causation by omission, preven- tion or double-prevention⁵⁴ and that we do not have to