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Its Natural and Social Histories

TWO ETHICAL LIFE* THE traditional Chinese social system was based on the fam- ily, not the individual, and to preserve the family, Confucian ideology insisted that filial piety or hsiao be the foundation of its ethics. To the Chinese, family existence, clan harmony, social peace, and the preservation of Chinese culture all rested on the proper observance of this virtue. In the Hsiao- ching, or the Classic on filial piety, we read, "Filial piety is the basis of virtue and the source of the teachings. We receive our body, our hair, and skin from our parents

VI THE ETHICAL LIFE IN THIS CHAPTER and the next I shall continue to apply the no- tion of a linguistic continuum to the supposed conflict between the scientific and the humanistic conceptions of life. And I shall begin with some ethical issues, for it is here—in the contrast between man as a free moral agent making responsible choices and man as a machine (or, if not a machine, a collection of protein molecules, amino acids, and polypeptide chains)—that the two views seem to come into sharp opposition (see pp. 10-12). In this connection it is important

• F O U R • The Collapse of Greek Ethical Life H EGEL sometimes depicts the collapse of the unified, harmoni-Gus Ethical Life of early Greece in the language and Images of the biblical Fall of Man. Like the biblical Fall, the collapse of Greek Ethical Life represents the destruction of a State of harmony and innocence through the acquisition of a certain kind of insight, and like the biblical Fall, it represents a loss of innocence which leads man to hide from Cod.* An example of such a use of the biblical story which illus- trates the skeptical character

Introduction: The Possibility of Ethical Life The subject of this book is the possibility of ethical life. Ethical life de- pends on the sharing by a collection of persons of authoritative norms, by which I mean imperatival rules binding on those persons' interac- tions. The fundamental theoretical problem of ethical life concerns the necessary authoritative nature of the shared norms. This authority has been thought to derive from the existence of a world of value indepen- dent of human beings, a world we aspire to realize in our individual and collective lives

Rogério Lopes Nietzsche on the Banishment of Supererogation by Luther and its Influence on Modern Ethical Life and Moral Theorizing* Abstract: Nietzsche on the Banishment of Supererogation by Luther and its In- fluence on Modern Ethical Life and Moral Theorizing. Much attention has been paid to Nietzsche’s refusal of obligation-centered moral theories (such as Kant- ian deontology and Utilitarian consequentialism), but few or no attention at all to the historical roots of such conceptions. The aim of this paper is to explore the ways Nietzsche connects the

FOUR Modernity and the Substance of Ethical Life WE ARE MET to discuss the relations of ethics to modern life. When such a subject is proposed, the discussion almost always turns to ethical discon- tent with modern life, to the feeling that the modern world is, from an ethical point of view, peculiarly problematical or unsatisfactory. That feel- ing may not be altogether wrong. But it makes a great deal of difference how such feelings are brought to bear on the discussion, and how we understand ethical discontent itself. I should like first to say something about

people to confront what it means to be Hindu, Indian, moral, and modern as categories of being that are permeable and negotiable (DeNapoli and Srinivas 2016). As these practices help to shape changeable views of power, practice, pluralism, and the prob lem of how to live with otherness, they sediment into an ongo- ing interrogation of ethical life. Krishna Bhattar, Dandu Shastri, and the localites encouraged me to con- sider the larger question of how these emergent Hindu ritual worlds, defined in the context of Chris tian ity and the colonial definition of

Chapter 6 The Basic Structure of the Philosophy of Right: From Abstract Right to Ethical Life In this chapter, I follow the movement of the Philosophy of Right through the three major moments that constitute its basic structure: the movement from abstract right through morality to ethical life. The chapter focuses on the first two of these moments—abstract right and morality—showing what exactly they involve, wherein their sig- nificance lies, and why, in Hegel's view, they are ultimately abstract and must give way to the more concrete standpoint of ethical life