Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 661 items :

  • "incomplete contract" x
Clear All

Contributions to Theoretical Economics Volume 3, Issue 1 2003 Article 5 Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments Sergei Guriev∗ ∗New Economic School, Moscow, sguriev@nes.ru Copyright c©2003 by the authors. All rights reserved. Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments Sergei Guriev Abstract We study an incomplete contract model where both contracting parties can invest, and the investments have both self- and cross-effects. We analyze the performance of non-contingent contracts, message games, option contracts and property rights. We find that the first best

Theoretical Inquiries in Law Volume 2, Number 2 July 2001 Article 7 PROTECTING INVESTORS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Comparative Corporate Governance William W. Bratton∗ Joseph A. McCahery† ∗George Washington University Law School, †Tilburg University, Copyright c©2001 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law, The Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Re- search of the Law, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in

Contributions to Theoretical Economics Volume 1, Issue 1 2001 Article 2 Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation ¨Christoph Lulfesmann∗ ∗University of Bonn, cluelfes@sfu.ca Copyright c©2001 by the authors. All rights reserved. Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation Christoph Lülfesmann Abstract The paper reconsiders the hold-up problem in long-term bilateral trade with specific invest- ments. In our framework, the parties face several trading opportunities (goods) whose character- istics cannot be described at

Organization American Economic Review 62 5 777 95 https://doi.org/10.1109/EMR.1975.4306431 Bajari, P., S. Houghton, and S. Tadelis. 2014. “Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: an Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs.” American Economic Review 104 (4): 1288–319. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 . Bajari P. Houghton S. Tadelis S. 2014 Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: an Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs American Economic Review 104 4 1288 319 https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1288 Bajari, P., and S. Tadelis. 2001. “Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of

Chapter 2 A Theory of Incomplete Contracting and State Sovereignty Introduction What determines the organizational boundaries of states? When and how do states cede control over their sovereign assets and functions to an exter- nal actor? Can seemingly disparate patterns of sovereign integration and contraction be explained by a common logic? This chapter develops a theory of incomplete contracting and the trans- fer of state sovereignty. Complete contracts are agreements that aim to specify and proscribe behaviors for the contracting parties in such a way that

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Contributions Volume 11, Issue 1 2011 Article 10 Sourcing Premia with Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Evidence Wilhelm K. Kohler∗ Marcel Smolka† ¨ ¨ ∗University of Tubingen, wilhelm.kohler@uni-tuebingen.de †University of Tubingen, marcel.smolka@uni-tuebingen.de Recommended Citation Wilhelm K. Kohler and Marcel Smolka (2011) “Sourcing Premia with Incomplete Contracts: The- ory and Evidence,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 1 (Contribu- tions), Article 10. Sourcing Premia with Incomplete

Chapter 5 Incomplete Contracting and Modalities of Regional Integration Introduction In the preceding chapters we explored how states negotiated transfers of sovereignty over territory and installations in bilateral settings. How did France negotiate a decolonization agreement with Algeria that allowed it to maintain military bases and to exploit hydrocarbons in its former col- ony? How did the Philippines and the United States apportion the sover- eignty of U.S. military installations on Philippine territory? How did Rus- sia sign agreements with some of the

Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy Volume 1, Issue 1 2001 Article 2 Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs Eric Bennett Rasmusen∗ ∗Indiana University/Harvard Law School, erasmuse@indiana.edu Copyright c©2001 by the authors. All rights reserved. Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs Eric Bennett Rasmusen Abstract Much real-world contracting involves finding new clauses to add to a basic agreement, clauses which may or may not increase the welfare of both parties. The parties must decide which

Chapter 4 Incomplete Contracting and the Politics of U.S. Overseas Basing Agreements I believe that we should take every opportunity to challenge the assumption that our European allies are doing us a favor whenever they provide us with the necessary facilities from which to defend their own continent. —Chester Bowles, June 4, 1962 Introduction In the previous chapter we explored how great powers across different decades used incomplete contracts over specific assets to facilitate the pro- cess of colonial disengagement. In this chapter, we examine the political

Shooting Rampages and Maintenance of Campus Safety: An Incomplete Contracts Perspective BERND SÜSSMUTH and ROBERT K. VON WEIZSÄCKER∗ University of Leipzig; TUM Munich University of Technology This paper addresses the question of whether in-house or contracted maintenance of campus safety in U.S. colleges will be justified on efficiency grounds in the future. According to our analysis, the answer will crucially depend on whether emergency exceptions to amendments such as the Buckley Amendment (FERPA) will be more frequently applied by schools and tested in the