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Jahrbücher f. Nationalökonomie u. Statistik (Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2001) Bd. (Vol.) 221/1 Dummensteuern und die (Un-)Möglichkeit ihrer Vermeidung Fool's Taxes - And How To Avoid Them Von Andreas Wagener, Siegen JEL H20, H21 Dummensteuern, Steuervereinfachung, steuerliche Wahlrechte, Entscheidungsneutralität. Fool's taxes, simplification of tax laws, neutrality of taxation. Zusammenfassung Dummensteuern entstehen, wenn Steuerpflichtige die ihnen offenstehenden legalen Steuergestal- tungsmöglichkeiten nicht optimal nutzen. Oft wird der Gesetzgeber

Abstract

This paper employs a novel firm-level dataset that combines financial accounts of German firms with data from a business survey to shed new light on the demand for capital. The empirical analysis employs firm-specific indicators in order to explore the effects of sales, the cost of capital and indicators of the business climate, which are used by the ifo Institute to provide a leading indicator for the German economy. The empirical results support a robust significant effect of a firm’s cost of capital on the stock of capital with an elasticity not significantly different from –1. Controlling for sales, a good rather than normal business situation is found to be associated with about 8 % higher investment.

corporations is carried out by a simplified three-year investment model as shown in the Annex. The basis for assessing the impact of corporate income tax on the choice between debt- and equity-financing of the investment is the capital that remains after the final payments for taxes, interest on loans and dividends in the company. The decision neutrality of taxation concerning the way of financing investments is ensured when this last capital is the same for both debt- and equity-financing. 1. Results according to a traditionally designed corporate tax As a reference for the

deterministic depreciation: Fs…0† ˆ 0 …26† Fs…Ps† ˆ Vs…Ps† ÿ Is ˆ P s ÿ Is value matching condition …27† with Is ˆ …1ÿ sz†I 26. For more details on investment neutrality of taxation cf. e.g. Schneider (1969), Boadway and Bruce (1979, 1984), Elschen and HuÈchtebrock (1983), Sinn (1985, 1987), Wenger (1986), Wagner (1989) and KoÈnig (1997). 27. Cf. equation (6) for the tax-free model. ß Verein fuÈr Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 193 Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation where Is denotes the effective after-tax investment expenditure

those which produce the most feathers with the least squawking. On the contrary, taxes came to be regarded as tools to be used to effect social, political, and economic reforms and to provide some control of market forces. Indeed, neutrality of taxation gave way to a concept of functional taxation. The new taxes and the new tax philosophy provided a warm invit- ation to those in authority to reform the taxes—to what may be called "tinkering with the taxes." With ever changing social and economic conditions, adjustments of taxes had to be made frequently to

by ensuring that transfers of assets from one EU country to another are accomplished on a tax- deferred basis.24 The so-called Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which was also first submit- ted by the Commission in draft form in 1969, created a common system of taxation that applies in cases of parent companies with subsidiaries in different EU countries.25 In order to ensure neutrality of taxation and to reduce compliance costs, the Directive attempts to abolish double taxa- 110 Sovereignty Concerns tion and withholding taxes levied in the source country on profits

about low-cost, secure sources of energy for all Canadians, and the Alberta government concerned with maximizing the amount of rent it can collect for Albertans. Notably, the focus of the energy tax debate has shifted from emphasis on risk and neutrality of taxation to the maximization of government revenue. Objectives are now couched in terms of appropriating economic rent. The conflict between the federal and Alberta governments arises over the distri- bution of the rent between the Alberta government, the federal government, and the Canadian consumer. From the

neutrality of taxatiOn. References CSIS1 Indonesia. Report to the Th1rd PECC General Meetmg, Bah. Jakarta: CSIS1 1984. Findley, Ronald. 11Some Aspects of Technology Transfer and Dlfect Foreign Investment". Amencan Economic Review (May 1978). Papers and Pro- ceedmgs of the 19th Annual Meetmg of AER. Hellemer1 G.K. aThe Role of Multmat1onal Corporations m the Less Developed Countries1 Trade m Technologyn In 7echnology Transfer m PaCific Economic Development1 edited by Miguel S. Wionczek and K1yosh1 KoJima. Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center1 1975. Japan

Community" and that their inclusion would "create an inequitable situation where the threshold in terms of goods would be reduced-the more so the higher the 25. The EC representative added that "it was a matter of concern that so many Parties included the taxation element, with the result that the threshold was not the same for all Parties." The EC thus suggested that "serious consideration should there- fore be given by other Parties to a solution similar to that practiced by the EC which secured neutrality of taxation." See GPR committee, "Minutes," Aprilg, 1981