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1 Introduction The relationship between changes in non-labor income and labor effort is important for understanding both the independent behavioral effects of changes in nonlabor income, and for yielding insights into the income effect component of the total labor supply response to changes in labor income. Direct inferences about compensated wage elasticities from non-labor income effects requires similar behavioral responses across income sources, most notably a similar propensity to consume leisure out of non-labor income. See Cesarini et al. (2017) . Recent

dowry explains Iranian men’s differential responses to their children’s gender. First, we find that the effect of having daughters on a man’s income increases and becomes more significant as daughters approach the age of marriage, whereas similar effects do not appear for sons. Second, the effects of having daughters on a man’s income are stronger, more significant, and emerge earlier in rural areas, where the presence of the dowry tradition is more evident and girls’ options outside marriage are more limited. Third, the responsiveness of a man’s nonlabor income

in the nonlabor income of the household, and not from implicit tax rates. I use a sample of individuals in poor neighborhoods in the metropolitan area of Mexico City from the Mexican Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) for the period 2000-2004 and a triple-differences approach. My identification strategy exploits the fact that the metropolitan area of Mexico City has both neighborhoods that belong to the state of Distrito Federal and to State of Mexico. Individuals in poor elderly households in Distrito Federal were affected by the program after 2001, whereas

income as having no direct effect on the log wage, but from static models of consumption and labor supply we take nonlabor income as helping determine consumption.8 In other words, if Vi is nonlabor income, we use for identification assumptions [ | ] 0ijk i iE u V C = and [ ] 0i iE CV ≠ . The conditional exogeneity of nonlabor income is not testable but the needed covariation of consumption with nonlabor income is testable via the first-stage regression of Ci on Vi and the other exogenous variables in the model. Because fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and

the series using the consumer price index taking 2005 as the base year. The standard deviations are between parenthesis. Furthermore, in Table 3 , we show the main sources of annual individual income by income group. This table documents two main points. First, benefits or nonlabor income account for roughly 50% of total income for low-income individuals. On the contrary, these sources of income account for only a low share of total income for the top 10%, the main source of income being labor income. Second, whereas pensions, transfers and benefits have been

_i^h\right]+\left[\sum_{j=1}^I\widehat r_j^h\right]+\left[\sum_{k=1}^MNL_k^h\right]\right]/M^h$$ where w ^ i h $\hat{w}_{i}^{h}$ is the estimated labor income for formal worker i from household h ; w ^ j h $h;\hat{w}_{j}^{h}$ is the estimated labor income for informal worker j from household h ; N L k h $h;NL_{k}^{h}$ is the nonlabor income for member k from household h ; F and I are the number of formal and informal workers in each household h ; M h is the number of members in household h ; and r ^ j h $\hat{r}_{j}^{h}$ is the simulated income for informal worker j from

which we now turn. Juxtaposed to the productivity discursive system, and outside and often in intentional conflict with orthodox neoclassical economics, is a wide variety of conceptions of exploitation. In the list below, no effort is made to avoid conceptual over- lapping or to take a position on interpretive conflicts (for example, within dependency theory). (1) Emphasis is placed on the wage system, coupled with a view that the entire product is created (directly or indirectly) by labor. But nonlabor income is received, or payment is made in accordance with

Jv asset value of vacancy to an employer kt fraction of working time devoted to training l leisure l0 maximum available leisure hours Lf number of female workers hired Ld labor demand xxi Ls labor supply m nonlabor income, outflow from unemployment M number of hirings MLC marginal labor costs MRS marginal rate of substitution MRTS marginal rate of technical substitution OV option value N sample size NPV net present value p probability parameter, participation rate, penalty r rate of return to additional year of schooling R threshold value of match productivity s

where we must rely on the labor force participation rate as one key indicator of the energy intensity of time use. In addition, the household’s cash income constraint is w X I CWt V P X P I P C+ = + + , (4) where W is the wage rate per unit of time, V is a household’s nonlabor income, and IX PP , and CP denote the price in the market for food (X), purchased health inputs (I), and other purchased consumer goods (C). Let us confine the analysis to an interior solution of choices for the

, some individuals may have tiny landholdings that are leased out for cultivation. To the extent that such assets augment income possibilities, such individuals are more easily able to participate in the labor market. This is expressed diagrammatically in Figure 13.8, which compares two individuals. The left-hand panel of this figure depicts another worker, Timir, who has access to a source of nonlabor income, of size R let us say (think of this as rent from his own landholding). Now work capacity depends on rent plus wages. We can easily draw this on the same