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Abstract

Als der Bundessicherheitsrat unter Kanzler Helmut Schmidt im Frühjahr 1982 neue Politische Grundsätze für den Rüstungsexport verabschiedete, wurde eine geheime Protokollnote angenommen, die als Israel-Klausel firmierte. Sie gab vor, dass bei Entscheidungen zur Waffenausfuhr „auch die geschichtliche Verantwortung der Deutschen gegenüber dem jüdischen Volk berücksichtigt wird“. Hintergrund war der Wunsch Saudi-Arabiens, Hunderte Leopard 2-Panzer zu erwerben, der in Bonn eine monatelange Kontroverse ausgelöst und zu einer tiefen Krise der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen geführt hatte. Hubert Leber untersucht den Panzer-Streit von 1981/82 erstmals auf Basis deutscher wie israelischer Regierungsakten und verknüpft dabei Internationale Geschichte mit vergangenheitspolitischen Perspektiven. Das Verantwortungspostulat, das sich die Bundesregierung auf Initiative von Außenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher zu eigen machte, markierte eine Zäsur für die Bonner Israel-Politik. Galt im Umgang mit dem jüdischen Staat bis dahin eine Art Verjährungsparadigma, so wurde die Erinnerung an den Holocaust zu Beginn der 1980er Jahre als dauerhaft wirksamer Faktor deutschen Regierungshandelns anerkannt.

Abstract

The top 5 oil majors (British Petroleum, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and Royal Dutch Shell) are analyzed in terms of investments, earnings and financial & operational performance along the entire business value chain, for a period of 5 years. One of the key objectives is to understand how the Upstream and Downstream segments may play different roles in the definition of a winning corporate strategy, considering how they may reveal very different strengths and weaknesses during crude oil price crises. When the crude oil price goes down, the upstream sector is running big cost cutting measures, in order to reduce expenditures and keep acceptable gross margins per barrel of oil equivalent. On the other hand, the downstream segment receives cheaper raw material without a significant decrease in the final price of the oil products. Thus, how can oil companies leverage this flexibility in order to pass successfully through periods of crude oil price slides, and even take advantage of those? The paper aims to analyze the correlation between oil price and oil volume produced on one hand, and investments and earnings, split by business segments, on the other hand. The variation of investment and earnings is hence compared to crude oil price fluctuations for a clearer picture of the business profitability per segment during the peak and bottom periods of the oil market. Upstream and Downstream segments are also benchmarked against each other to understand the role that each of them is playing in the industry. The results are expected to provide some trend lines to understand how much the cost cutting measures are impacting the overall business, as well as to appreciate whether the reduction in the oil production, which in theory should be followed by a rise in prices, is indeed in the best interest of the oil majors. Going further into analysis, the paper is trying to define an optimum production interval, that will maximize profits along the entire value chain (upstream and downstream) of the oil business, defined by both the production volume of crude oil (replacement cost per barrel in accordance with volume), as well as the price per barrel of oil equivalent. The analysis takes into account official sources exclusively, i.e. oil companies’ websites, corporate crude oil production reports, annual financial reports and investors’ analyses.

foregoing analysis. First, in line with findings by Carstensen/Hansen (2000), wage shocks have been demonstrated to be of only minor importance in explaining unemployment fluctuations and affect unemploy- ment only in the short run. Second, demand, price and labor supply shocks appear to be important short/medium run determinants of unemployment. In that sense, price shocks like the oil price crises in the 1970s together with a large productivity slowdown certainly contributed to the initial rise in unemployment during that period. Moreover, adverse demand shocks

-term market efficiency. However, since the data for VIX are only available from 1990, we are unable to include observations from the oil price crises and large stock market downturns in the 1970s and 1980s. Figure 4 plots the S&P500 and the VIX. The pattern suggests that periods of high volatility, marked by a high value of the VIX, tend to correspond to low values of the S&P500 index. Thus, we detect high volatility in the market whenever the S&P500 index is facing a downturn. No such pattern is immediately visible for the opposite scenario. High values of the S&P500 do

1975 and even more strongly from 1979 to 1985. The evidence indicates that it was not princi- pally the oil price crises that influenced the companies' social policy. Instead, combined with the companies' critical financial situations, they had an impact on the corporate social policies of these automobile manufacturers. If both companies disengaged from certain activities during the economic crises, these decisions were not necessarily linked to them. Nevertheless, the crises gave the companies a justification for cancelling social measures. Since cuts in the

ENERGY E XPOSITION, KNOX VILLE, 1982 This assessment would of course change dramatically over the next two decades. As the postwar economic boom set in, bringing industrialization to more countries around the world, the demand for cheap energy sources increased dramatically. Finally, in the 1970s the world was shaken by the oil price crises that – for many rather abruptly – turned the narrative of abundance into one of scarcity.63 Whether the energy shortage was due to natural causes as the world approached peak oil or a result of artificially constructed

economy, which had just undergone its first major postwar shock with the oil price crises of the 1970s—made the im- plementation of these reforms politically feasible. They then spread to the majority of the developed world and subsequently, as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s, to a good portion of the developing world. In the following subsections, I will summarize the major principles of these reforms in developed countries. Taxation From the perspective of distribution, the most important reforms were the changes in taxation, particularly the in- come

face difficulties because of high energy and raw material costs, and increased competition from Asian NICs. Yet Japan maintained her competi- tiveness in world markets by .inventing energy-saving devices and by developing new products through larger investments in R&D, both on the part of government and individual firms . In the 1970s, precision machinery, automobile and transport machinery (with the exception of ships) figured among the ranks of rapidly growing industries. Following the first and especially the second oil price crises, industries such as

climate— national economies were adapting to a changing world economy, which had just undergone its first major postwar shock with the oil price crises of the 1970s—made the im- plementation of these reforms politically feasible. They then spread to the majority of the developed world and subsequently, as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s, to a good portion of the developing world. In the following subsections, I will summarize the major principles of these reforms in developed countries. Taxation From the perspective of distribution, the most important

- nificant deterioration in economic performance. Three critical and mutually reinforcing events marked these years: the domestic shock generated by the wave of strikes and worker militancy commonly referred to as the Hot Autumn of 1969 (Brandini 1975; Pizzorno, Reyneri, Regini, and Regalia 1978), the external shocks resulting from the collapse of the international monetary system, and the oil price crises of 1973 and 1978. The consequences of the Hot Autumn for industrial output, profit- ability, productivity, and labor costs were substantial. Between 1970 and