Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 1,178 items :

  • "ontological argument" x
Clear All

December 2018. Nadler, Stephen. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006. Oppenheimer, Paul, and Zalta, Edward. “A computationally-discovered simplification of the ontological argument.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/2 (2011), 333-349. Oppy, Graham. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Oppy, Graham. “Ontological Arguments.” In Edward Zalta (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ . 2011. Accessed 30 December

I Ontological Arguments IN this essay I shall delimit an infinite class of valid arguments I shall call ontic arguments. These arguments proceed from a premise that asserts of a set of properties that it satisfies certain conditions, to the conclusion that there exists something that exemplifies that set of prop- erties. If the conclusion of an ontic argument can be read as asserting the existence of a Deity, then I call that argument an ontological argu- ment. In the present sense of this term, there are infinitely many onto- logical arguments, all of them

Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Miros law Szatkowski, Ontos Verlag, 2012 Ontological Arguments Redux Robert E. Maydole Oppy claims in “Maydole on Ontological Arguments” [3] that four of the ontological arguments that I support in “The Ontological Argument” [2] “are question-begging and subject to successful parodies” (p. 445). Even though he is technically correct about my rendition of Anselm’s Ontological Argument (AOA), it is easily repairable. He is completely wrong about my Descartes-Leibniz Argument (DLA), my Modal Perfection Argument (MPA), and my

SYMPOSIUM I DESCARTES' ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ANTHONY KENNY* I In the Discourse of Method, Descartes says: 'I saw quite well that, assuming a triangle, its three angles must be equal to two right angles; but for all that I saw nothing that assured me that there was any triangle in the real world. On the other hand, going back to an examination of my idea of a perfect Being, I found that this included the existence of such a Being; in the same way as the idea of a triangle includes the equality of its three angles to two right angles, or the idea of a

VI AN ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT? WITTGENSTEIN AND ANSELM COMPARED Is not Wittgenstein's "proof" disqualified then for inclusion among the "ontological arguments"? Consider, for example, that of St. Anselm. It is frequently said that Anselm argued from a concept to existence; that is, deduced the existence of God from his concept or idea of God.1 Nor is this remarkable when one considers the formulation in the second chapter of Anselm's Proslogion,2 where he emphasizes that " . . .it is one thing for an object to be in the intellect, and another to understand

Thought Experimenting with God Revisiting the Ontological Argument Prof. Dr. phil. Yiftach J.H. Fehige, Dipl. theol., St. Michael’s College and IHPST in the University of Toronto, 81 St. Mary Street, Box 577, M5S1J4 Toronto, ON, Canada I. Introduction: the epistemological challenge of thought experiments Since the time of ancient Greek philosophy there has been an impor- tant instrument of scientific and philosophical reasoning which relies on the performer’s imaginative ability.1 In determining the meaning and use of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of nature for the

17 1 THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT I propose to begin our investigation of the Modal Ontological Argument with Norman Malcolm, since, as I mentioned in the Introduction, it was he who brought this form of argument for God’s existence to the general at- tention of the contemporary philosophical world. Like all versions of the modal form of the Ontological Argument, Malcolm’s hinges on the claim that God could only exist non- contingently: that is to say, with logical (or “metaphysical”: i.e., absolute) necessity.1 Malcolm, of course, based his own argument

Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Miros law Szatkowski, Ontos Verlag, 2012 Maydole on Ontological Arguments Graham Oppy Maydole in [1] writes: “Ontological arguments are captivating. They convince some people but not others. Our purpose here was not to convince, but simply to show that some ontological arguments are sound, do not beg the question, and are insulated from extant parodies. Yet good logic does convince sometimes. Other times, something else is needed.” (p. 586) On the way I understand these matters, any argument that is both sound and non

Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Miros law Szatkowski, Ontos Verlag, 2012 More Modest Ontological Argument Richard M. Gale Traditional ontological arguments try to hit a home run by proving that there necessarily exists a greatest conceivable being, a being that essentially has every perfection. The aim of this paper is to present a more modest ontological argument, one that gets us on base by hitting a single, double or triple. This is quite helpful since it aids our effort to score a run. After a brief critique of some of these traditional arguments, a more

Lawrence Pasternack Predication and Modality in Kant’s Critique of the Ontological Argument Abstract: There is perhaps no more famous objection to the Ontological Argu- ment (OA) than Kant’s contention that existence is not a predicate (E~P). Howev- er, this is not his only objection against the Ontological Argument. It is rather part of a more comprehensive attack on the OA, one that contains at least four distinct arguments, only one of which involves (E~P). It is the purpose of this paper to explore Kant’s case for (E~P), consider three contemporary strategies