and Brain Sciences 36, no. 03 (June 2013): 181–204. Decock, Lieven. “Cognitive Metaphysics.” Frontiers in Psychology 9: 1700, (2018). Dennett, Daniel C. “Kinds of Things—Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image.” In ScientificMetaphysics , edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid. Oxford University Press, 2013. Dennett, Daniel C. “Real Patterns.” The Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 1 (1991): 27–51. Downing, Lisa. “George Berkeley.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , edited by Edward N. Zalta, 17. Winter 2018 Edition, 2004. https
that Kant’s use of terms such as
thing-in-itself, noumenon, and transcendental object becomes perfectly consist-
ent if we take them to acquire a different meaning in the various parts of the work.
Challenging the opposed interpretations of Allison and Langton, I argue that
Kant’s account of things in themselves is primarily relevant to the second-order re-
flection on the possibility and limits of a scientificmetaphysics that the Critique
Keywords: Kant, metaphysics, thing-in-itself, transcendental object, affection
Karin de Boer: Leuven; karin
. Mind 117: 843-865. Fischer, John Martin. 2006. My way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 66: 829-839. Ismael, Jenann. 2013. Causation, free will, and naturalism. In ScientificMetaphysics, ed. by Don Ross and James Ladyman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ismael, Jenann. 2016. How Physics Makes Us Free. New York: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert. 1999. Responsibility, luck, and chance: reflections on free will and indeterminism. The
interpreted «äs dispensing with metaphysics. He intended no such
thing. Indeed he seems to have regarded his Critique of Pure Reason äs
an essay on the foundations of scientificmetaphysics" (S. 63). Mt
Carl H. H a m b u r g : Kant, Cassirer and the Concept of Space. A Sym-
posium on Kant. Tulane Studies in Philosophy III (1954), S. 89—111.
Die bei Kant und Cassirer sehr unterschiedliche Fassung des Raum-
begriffes dient Hamburg zu einer grundsätzlichen Betrachtung über Cassi-
rers philosophische Leistung. Cassirer sah das große Verdienst Kants in
seminar setting (8). Overall, there is little to
complain about the way the commentary is compiled, and despite the (inevitable) occasional
deviations from the structure and approach by some authors, Kants Prolegomena is an important
contribution with its relatively uniform collection of first rate articles that should, indeed, be use-
ful to both students and scholars.
The Quest for ScientificMetaphysics. Schliemann’s opening article goes directly into the
heart of the Prolegomena: to Kant’s task of founding a scientificmetaphysics. He explains how
Kant sought to
language in which scientificmetaphysics can be stated. Natural language, they argue, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980 ) and Lakoff (1987 ), is so deeply semantically structured by folk metaphysics that to use it to try to present scientificmetaphysics – in particular, a metaphysics without self-subsistent individuals and with causal influence not modeled on mechanical collisions – in its terms is a self-defeating project. Ultimately, Ladyman and Ross argue, a scientifically adequate metaphysics will need to be expressed in mathematics. This is why, they say, the
. On norms and ideals . New York: Fordham University Press. Potter Vincent G. 1997 On norms and ideals New York Fordham University Press Reynolds, Andrew. 2002. Peirce’s scientificmetaphysics . Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Reynolds Andrew 2002 Peirce’s scientificmetaphysics Nashville Vanderbilt University Press Rosenthal, Sandra B. 1972. Charles Peirce and the Firstness of process. In Andrew J. Reck (ed.), Knowledge and value , 39–50. Dordrecht: Springer. 10.1007/978-94-010-2824-0_4 Rosenthal Sandra B. 1972 Charles Peirce and the Firstness of process
semiotics. Bloomington. Indiana University Press.
Liszka, J. J. (1996). A general introduction to the semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Nino, D., & Servanti, G. 2009. Cognitive type and visual metaphorical expression. Journal of
Cognitive Semiotics, V(1–2), 367–392.
Nöth, W. (2012). Charles S. Peirce’s theory of information: A theory of the growth of symbols
and of knowledge. In B. Sørensen & T Thellefsen (Eds.), The scientificmetaphysics of C. S.
Peirce. Cybernetics & Human Knowing (special issue), 19(1–2), 137
Idealism against Realism in Kant's Third Antinomy
by Martin G. Kaiin, Chicago
The Proofof Transcendental Idealism
More than the similarity of topic ties the Third Antinomy to the Second Analogy, al-
though their jointconcern with causality may be chiefly responsible for an emphasis that
each receives in excess of its share äs just one part of architectonic. Kant singles out the
Analogy in the Analytic because the possibility of scientificmetaphysics purportedly
rests on proof of the causal law in particular, and he places special emphasis on the An-