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and Brain Sciences 36, no. 03 (June 2013): 181–204. Decock, Lieven. “Cognitive Metaphysics.” Frontiers in Psychology 9: 1700, (2018). Dennett, Daniel C. “Kinds of Things—Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image.” In Scientific Metaphysics , edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid. Oxford University Press, 2013. Dennett, Daniel C. “Real Patterns.” The Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 1 (1991): 27–51. Downing, Lisa. “George Berkeley.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , edited by Edward N. Zalta, 17. Winter 2018 Edition, 2004. https

that Kant’s use of terms such as thing-in-itself, noumenon, and transcendental object becomes perfectly consist- ent if we take them to acquire a different meaning in the various parts of the work. Challenging the opposed interpretations of Allison and Langton, I argue that Kant’s account of things in themselves is primarily relevant to the second-order re- flection on the possibility and limits of a scientific metaphysics that the Critique undertakes. Keywords: Kant, metaphysics, thing-in-itself, transcendental object, affection Karin de Boer: Leuven; karin

Metaphor and the Creation of Modern Cell Biology

. Mind 117: 843-865. Fischer, John Martin. 2006. My way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 66: 829-839. Ismael, Jenann. 2013. Causation, free will, and naturalism. In Scientific Metaphysics, ed. by Don Ross and James Ladyman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ismael, Jenann. 2016. How Physics Makes Us Free. New York: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert. 1999. Responsibility, luck, and chance: reflections on free will and indeterminism. The

interpreted «äs dispensing with metaphysics. He intended no such thing. Indeed he seems to have regarded his Critique of Pure Reason äs an essay on the foundations of scientific metaphysics" (S. 63). Mt Carl H. H a m b u r g : Kant, Cassirer and the Concept of Space. A Sym- posium on Kant. Tulane Studies in Philosophy III (1954), S. 89—111. Die bei Kant und Cassirer sehr unterschiedliche Fassung des Raum- begriffes dient Hamburg zu einer grundsätzlichen Betrachtung über Cassi- rers philosophische Leistung. Cassirer sah das große Verdienst Kants in seiner gründlichen

seminar setting (8). Overall, there is little to complain about the way the commentary is compiled, and despite the (inevitable) occasional deviations from the structure and approach by some authors, Kants Prolegomena is an important contribution with its relatively uniform collection of first rate articles that should, indeed, be use- ful to both students and scholars. The Quest for Scientific Metaphysics. Schliemann’s opening article goes directly into the heart of the Prolegomena: to Kant’s task of founding a scientific metaphysics. He explains how Kant sought to

language in which scientific metaphysics can be stated. Natural language, they argue, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980 ) and Lakoff (1987 ), is so deeply semantically structured by folk metaphysics that to use it to try to present scientific metaphysics – in particular, a metaphysics without self-subsistent individuals and with causal influence not modeled on mechanical collisions – in its terms is a self-defeating project. Ultimately, Ladyman and Ross argue, a scientifically adequate metaphysics will need to be expressed in mathematics. This is why, they say, the

. On norms and ideals . New York: Fordham University Press. Potter Vincent G. 1997 On norms and ideals New York Fordham University Press Reynolds, Andrew. 2002. Peirce’s scientific metaphysics . Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Reynolds Andrew 2002 Peirce’s scientific metaphysics Nashville Vanderbilt University Press Rosenthal, Sandra B. 1972. Charles Peirce and the Firstness of process. In Andrew J. Reck (ed.), Knowledge and value , 39–50. Dordrecht: Springer. 10.1007/978-94-010-2824-0_4 Rosenthal Sandra B. 1972 Charles Peirce and the Firstness of process

semiotics. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. Liszka, J. J. (1996). A general introduction to the semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nino, D., & Servanti, G. 2009. Cognitive type and visual metaphorical expression. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics, V(1–2), 367–392. Nöth, W. (2012). Charles S. Peirce’s theory of information: A theory of the growth of symbols and of knowledge. In B. Sørensen & T Thellefsen (Eds.), The scientific metaphysics of C. S. Peirce. Cybernetics & Human Knowing (special issue), 19(1–2), 137

Idealism against Realism in Kant's Third Antinomy by Martin G. Kaiin, Chicago The Proofof Transcendental Idealism More than the similarity of topic ties the Third Antinomy to the Second Analogy, al- though their jointconcern with causality may be chiefly responsible for an emphasis that each receives in excess of its share äs just one part of architectonic. Kant singles out the Analogy in the Analytic because the possibility of scientific metaphysics purportedly rests on proof of the causal law in particular, and he places special emphasis on the An- tinomy in