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Chapter Six JUSTICE AS SOCIAL FREEDOM THE INSTITUTIONS of a society are just if and only if they could not be re- jected, freely and rationally, by anyone living in the society who desires such acceptability on the part of all who share this desire. The requirement of rational acceptability is met only if rejection is precluded by some relevant rationale that does not depend on ignorance. In the moral defense of a social system, it would be no better than a vicious pun to say, "They are in no position to complain. For they are taught that what they do is

Chapter i "The Principles of Social Freedom" Ten weeks after the opening of Woodhull, Claflin & Company, Brokers, in 1871, Victoria Woodhull took another swipe at the male monop- oly on public life; she nominated herself as a candidate for the 1872 presi- dential contest. She saw herself as eligible because she embodied the many facets of women's rights activism. In an open letter to the New York Herald, Woodhull said: While others of my sex devoted themselves to a crusade against the laws that shackle the women of the country, I asserted my individual

Chapter Six Towards a Critical Theory of Democracy: Participatory Democracy and Social Freedom In this chapter we consider participatory democracy as a model of democracy that is most compatible with the main themes and concerns of a critical theory of society and an account of radical democracy that could emerge from it. Indeed, the link between participatory democracy and critical theory would seem obvious. Critical theory aims to identify the barriers within existing social structures to the realization of freedom and reason, where this

recognition relate to each other. This is a more complex problem than the one posed by Taylor and McBride. Indeed, this is what Georg Lohmann (2018) objects to in Axel Honneth’s (2011) distinction between a reflexive, or moral, and a social dimension of freedom. In this essay I will discuss Lohmann’s objection to Honneth as follows: First, I will present Lohmann’s criticism of Honneth’s theory of social freedom, showing how he correctly identifies not a practical-political tension between forms of recognition, but a normative tension between the “I” and the “We” of

Der Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiver und sozialer Freiheit

and social freedom. Social freedom constitutes the core concept of the whole analytical project and pervades the reflections of the work. Honneth provides an in-depth treatment of the concept of social freedom , its meanings and characteristics along with the realisation and development of social freedom within the sphere of friendship and family and within intimate relationships. The analysis moves on to consider the spheres of the market, consumers and consumption and employment. Very detailed coverage is provided of the developments and problems of the

distinct, comple- mentary forms of personal, moral and social freedom. However, Neuhouser’s study does not examine Hegel’s justificatory methods and principles. The pres- ent article aims to reinforce and extend Neuhouser’s findings by explicating Hegel’s basic principles for justifying practical norms. Surprisingly, Hegel’s basic principles of normative justification are rooted in Kant’s constructivism, as explicated by O’Neill. Hegel’s adaptation and development of Kant’s con- structivism results in a powerful form of constructivism about moral principles which