Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 16 items :

  • "super-truth" x
Clear All

or Acme is Sumo can’t be vague. Getting out of this predicament demands leaning on the supervaluationist maxim that “truth is super-truth ( Fine 1997 , 127)”. “Acme is Wilt,” and “Acme is Sumo,” are vague identity statements, and “Acme” is a vague term, the supervaluationist will claim, because “Acme” has two admissible precisifications, viz. Sumo and Wilt. On one precisification, “Acme is Sumo,” is true; “Acme is Wilt,” is false. On the other precisification, it’s the reverse. “Acme is Sumo,” and “Acme is Wilt,” are neither super-true nor super-false. And since


, Christoph, Journalist, Berlin; Siebert, John-Walter, Pfarrer, Oberstenfeld; Walter de Gruyter Stiftung, Berlin. Contents Research Articles Michele Paolini Paoletti A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism 1 Patrick Monaghan The Largest Proper Parts of a Mereological Whole: A Refutation of Classical Extensional Mereology 19 John Gabriel Super-Truth & Direct Reference 27 Kim Davies Powers, Double Prevention and Mental Causation 37 Howard Peacock Where are Universals? 43 Markku Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen and Antti Keskinen Why Realists Need Tropes 69 Jeremy

Supervaluationism is a currently fashionable theory of vagueness in language. The theory takes truth and falsity to be relative to particular ways of making the extension of a vague expression precise, with super-truth being identified with truth on all “admissible precisifications” of the expression’s extension (and similarly for super-falsity). Propositions may be true, false, super-true, super-false, or neither super-true nor super-false (or indeterminate). One way of distinguishing the different varieties of supervaluationism is by their treatment of the

system that, according to the dictates of a 'super truth table', scurries its customers along the pathways of a caste system that recognizes four levels of social rank. The highest favors are reserved for those who are endowed with the highest symmetry. Worst of all is the plight of those who happen to have an odd number of stems. Social alarmists go unheeded. Even-stemmers continue to heap derision on half of the population! More specifically, social rank is a matter of pedigree, which in turn is established by how much symmetry the 'internal anatomy' of each letter

precisifications then it will be super-true, if it is false in all such precisifications then it will be super-false. Supervaluationists equate truth with super-truth and falsity with super-falsity. Therefore they treat borderline sentences, which are true in some admissible delineations and false in some admissible delineations, as devoid of truth value. Shapiro, following Lewis, argues that there is more to truth than super-truth and wants to regard borderline statements as true enough. According to Lewis (1983: 244), if a sentence is true in all delineations it is true

a supervaluation (they are then called supertrue) if they are true on all admissible ways of making the terms in them precise, false (superfalse) if false under all admissible valuations, and (super-)truth-value-less if they are true on some admis- sible valuations and false on others. 6 See especially Fine (1975). 314 Peter Simons The supervaluation approach has the advantage that all the classical logical laws remain valid. It has the disadvantage that the connectives are no longer truth-functional, as they are in finite or infi- nite many-valued logic

truths, and there is no point in countering these truths with another alternative truth, nor a super-truth, but rather their weapons of belief must be transformed into pens writing myth. Thereby one recognizes the necessity of these truths, whilst also recognising their insufficiency, and through their insufficiency they are exposed as myths (literature). As Nancy argues myths are interrupted not by truths or “facts” but by literature.⁵⁰ Beyond tolerance is an agonism of literature, or the agony of myths inter- rupted by literature. Myths are not interrupted with mega

Fall (falls Fritz mittelgroß ist). Fine nimmt ferner das Prinzip der Komplettierbarkeit an: C) Ai(iel D Vj(jeS¡ Λ C(Vj)) Dabei besage C(Vj) wieder, daß Vj eine totale Bewertung ist. Aus dem Postulat C folgt nun, daß bei diesen Bewertungen a.l. Wahrheit mit klassischer a.l. Wahrheit zusammenfällt. So gilt z.B. für beliebige V¡ Vi(AV - . A ) = w , d .h . Vi(AA - .A) = f. Denn nach (C) gibt es zu jedem jeS¡ ein keSj mit C(Vjt), für das also gilt Vk(A) = f V Vj<( - . A) = f, so daß nach (α) Vi(AA - A ) = f ist. Fine gibt zwei Argumente fü r diese super-truth

. Quoting the immortal Tom Lehrer's "...'cause lying she knew was a sin!..." ("The Irish Ballad"), one can assume that the two celebrities thought so also. They could probably justify fiction and the theater as expressing the kind of "supertruth" White postulated for humor. Why wouldn't they accept the existence of this super- truth for humor as well? One possible explanation is that what they minded about humor is the (to them, frivolous) ease, with which one can slip in and out of BF into humor and back. Both fiction and the theater are fenced off from casual lan

"fuzzy sets theory" be- teuern, nur mit Hilfe dieser Theorie angegangen werden ( 2 3 ) ; andere Lösungsvorschläge gibt es von Seiten der sog. "super-truth theory", auf die ich nicht eingehen will ( 2 4 ) . Während auch Lakoff das Paradox als Argument dafür ein- bringt, daß das GAD in natürlichen Sprachen keine Gül- tigkeit besitze und eine andere Logik erforderlich sei, läßt Black die Grenzfallargumentation auf der Basis des Paradoxons nicht gelten. Nach Black zeigt das Paradox nicht, daß etwas mit der zweiwertigen Logik nicht stim- me ( 2 5 ) . Stattdessen führt Black