Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer (eds), Frankfurt: ontos, 2004, 105–130.
Meinong und Supervaluation
Meinong hat seine Gegenstandstheorie als eine philosophische Disziplin
verstanden, die im Vergleich zur Metaphysik viel umfassender ist. Die Me-
taphysik beschäftigt sich mit allen Entitäten, die existieren. Meinongs Ge-
genstandstheorie behandelt hingegen auch nicht-existierende Gegenstände
wie Zentauren, goldene Berge und runde Dreiecke. Er hat
Necessary Truths and Supervaluations
1 Hierarchies of theories and evidences
Logical complexity is one of the most fascinating and deep facts stemming from
the incompleteness phenomena, and it is also one of the main themes of Sergio
Galvan’s ongoing journey into logic and philosophy. Just tomention awell-known
example, the complexity of the set of elementary truths of a first-order theory1
containing a modicum of arithmetic will always exceed – in a formally precise
sense – the complexity of the set of theorems of that theory.
The mismatch between
The Problem of the Many: Supervaluation,
Rough Sets and Faultless Disagreement
Abstract: In the paper Imake three comments concerning the existing solutions to the problem
of the many: supervaluationism, fuzzy sets and Lewis’s combined solution consisting of super-
valuation and almost-identity. First, I try to defend supervaluationism from the charge that the
precisifications it postulates are not admissible, because they do not preserve penumbral con-
nections and clear cases. I argue that two types of vagueness should be distinguished
Supervaluationism & Direct Reference Roy Sorensen argues that supervaluationism does not allow vague terms to be directly referential ( Sorensen 2000 ). A term is directly referential just if the term’s meaning is its referent. There’s no Fregean sense that mediates between a directly referential term and its referent. Sorensen’s argument exploits the supervaluationist’s commitment that vagueness isn’t in the world; it’s in our “mode of describing the world ( Evans 1978 , 208).” Sorensen notes that, since a directly referential term has no Fregean sense mediating
Supervaluationism is a currently fashionable theory of vagueness in language. The theory takes truth and falsity to be relative to particular ways of making the extension of a vague expression precise, with super-truth being identified with truth on all “admissible precisifications” of the expression’s extension (and similarly for super-falsity). Propositions may be true, false, super-true, super-false, or neither super-true nor super-false (or indeterminate). One way of distinguishing the different varieties of supervaluationism is by their treatment of the
failure to compare things is a consequence of vagueness. We contrast two
theories of vagueness; fuzzy set theory and supervaluation theory. Some applications
of these theories are described.
Imagine that a university department is in the process of appointing a new
member, in order to fill a vacant position. Five candidates have been interviewed
for the position and each member of the department has been asked to rank them.
Imagine that a member of this department is comparing two of the candidates,
and what he or she cares about is how they fare with
Referências Dietz, Richard e Moruzzi, Sebastiano (eds.). 2010. Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fara, Delia Graff. 2010. Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism. In Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic , ed. por Dietz e Moruzzi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 373-382. Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, Truth and Logic. In Theories of Vagueness , ed. por Keefe e Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 119-150. Fine, Kit. 2008. The
References Eklund, Matti. 2001. Supervaluationism, vagueifiers, and semantic overdetermination. Dialectica 55: 363-378. Field, Hartry. 2003. The semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness. In Liars and Heaps, New Essays on Paradox. Edited by J.C. Beall. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, Hartry. 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese 30: 265-300. Graff Fara, Delia. 2000. Shifting sands. Philosophical Topics 28: 45-81. Gupta, Anil and Nuel Belnap. 1993. The Revision Theory
. Dunn, J. M. and Hardegree, G. Algebraic methods in philosophical logic . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 11. Goodman, N. The logic of contradictions, Zeitschrift fur Mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Arithmetik , 27:119-126, 1981. 12. Hardegree, G. M. Completeness and super-valuations, Journal of Philosophical Logic , 34(1):81-95, 2005. 13. Heyting, A. Intuitionism . Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1971. 14. Kolmogorov, A. N. Zur Deutung der Intuitionistischen Logic, Mathematische Zeitschrift , 35:58-65, 1932. 15. Mancosu, P. From Brouwer to