Search Results

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 198 items :

  • "supervaluationism" x
Clear All

References Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30: 265–300. Keefe, Rosanna. 2000a. Supervaluationism and Validity. Philosophical Topics 28: 93–105. Keefe, Rosanna. 2000b. Theories of Vagueness . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Montminy, Martin. 2008. Supervaluationism, Validity and Necessarily Borderline Sentences. Analysis 68: 61–67. Varzi, Achille. 2007. Supervaluationism and its Logic. Mind 116: 633–676. Williamson, Timothy. 1994. Vagueness . London: Routledge.

Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer (eds), Frankfurt: ontos, 2004, 105–130. Meinong und Supervaluation ARKADIUSZ CHRUDZIMSKI* Meinong hat seine Gegenstandstheorie als eine philosophische Disziplin verstanden, die im Vergleich zur Metaphysik viel umfassender ist. Die Me- taphysik beschäftigt sich mit allen Entitäten, die existieren. Meinongs Ge- genstandstheorie behandelt hingegen auch nicht-existierende Gegenstände wie Zentauren, goldene Berge und runde Dreiecke. Er hat

Carlo Nicolai Necessary Truths and Supervaluations 1 Hierarchies of theories and evidences Logical complexity is one of the most fascinating and deep facts stemming from the incompleteness phenomena, and it is also one of the main themes of Sergio Galvan’s ongoing journey into logic and philosophy. Just tomention awell-known example, the complexity of the set of elementary truths of a first-order theory1 containing a modicum of arithmetic will always exceed – in a formally precise sense – the complexity of the set of theorems of that theory. The mismatch between

Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska The Problem of the Many: Supervaluation, Rough Sets and Faultless Disagreement Abstract: In the paper Imake three comments concerning the existing solutions to the problem of the many: supervaluationism, fuzzy sets and Lewis’s combined solution consisting of super- valuation and almost-identity. First, I try to defend supervaluationism from the charge that the precisifications it postulates are not admissible, because they do not preserve penumbral con- nections and clear cases. I argue that two types of vagueness should be distinguished

Supervaluationism & Direct Reference Roy Sorensen argues that supervaluationism does not allow vague terms to be directly referential ( Sorensen 2000 ). A term is directly referential just if the term’s meaning is its referent. There’s no Fregean sense that mediates between a directly referential term and its referent. Sorensen’s argument exploits the supervaluationist’s commitment that vagueness isn’t in the world; it’s in our “mode of describing the world ( Evans 1978 , 208).” Sorensen notes that, since a directly referential term has no Fregean sense mediating

Supervaluationism is a currently fashionable theory of vagueness in language. The theory takes truth and falsity to be relative to particular ways of making the extension of a vague expression precise, with super-truth being identified with truth on all “admissible precisifications” of the expression’s extension (and similarly for super-falsity). Propositions may be true, false, super-true, super-false, or neither super-true nor super-false (or indeterminate). One way of distinguishing the different varieties of supervaluationism is by their treatment of the

failure to compare things is a consequence of vagueness. We contrast two theories of vagueness; fuzzy set theory and supervaluation theory. Some applications of these theories are described. 0. Introduction Imagine that a university department is in the process of appointing a new member, in order to fill a vacant position. Five candidates have been interviewed for the position and each member of the department has been asked to rank them. Imagine that a member of this department is comparing two of the candidates, and what he or she cares about is how they fare with

Referências Dietz, Richard e Moruzzi, Sebastiano (eds.). 2010. Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fara, Delia Graff. 2010. Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism. In Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic , ed. por Dietz e Moruzzi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 373-382. Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, Truth and Logic. In Theories of Vagueness , ed. por Keefe e Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 119-150. Fine, Kit. 2008. The

References Eklund, Matti. 2001. Supervaluationism, vagueifiers, and semantic overdetermination. Dialectica 55: 363-378. Field, Hartry. 2003. The semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness. In Liars and Heaps, New Essays on Paradox. Edited by J.C. Beall. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, Hartry. 2008. Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit. 1975. Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese 30: 265-300. Graff Fara, Delia. 2000. Shifting sands. Philosophical Topics 28: 45-81. Gupta, Anil and Nuel Belnap. 1993. The Revision Theory

. Dunn, J. M. and Hardegree, G. Algebraic methods in philosophical logic . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 11. Goodman, N. The logic of contradictions, Zeitschrift fur Mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Arithmetik , 27:119-126, 1981. 12. Hardegree, G. M. Completeness and super-valuations, Journal of Philosophical Logic , 34(1):81-95, 2005. 13. Heyting, A. Intuitionism . Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1971. 14. Kolmogorov, A. N. Zur Deutung der Intuitionistischen Logic, Mathematische Zeitschrift , 35:58-65, 1932. 15. Mancosu, P. From Brouwer to