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I shall present in this article an original Meinongian version of presentism, according to which there is nothing that is not present (this is the presentist aspect of the theory), even if there are now things that do not now exist and, more generally, there are now things that do not exist (this is the Meinongian aspect). I shall try to demonstrate that this theory is a viable and serious option for presentists who aim at dealing with three problems typically connected with presentism: the triviality objection; the problem of the reference of true propositions

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• CONTENTS PREFACE ix ONE • THE THEORY OF IDENTITY FOR ENDUR­ ING OBJECTS 3 1.1 Toward a General Theory of Identity 3 1.2 The Identity of Indiscernibles as a General Theory 6 1.3 The Triviality Objection (I) 10 1.4 The Triviality Objection (II) 14 1.5 The Objection from the Paradoxes 18 1.6 Black's Counterexample 19 1.7 Identity through Time 20 TWO • ENDURING AND NONENDURING OBJECTS 24 2.1 Strawson on Ontological Priority 25 2.2 The Constructionist Program 36 THREE • IMPLICATIONS 43 3.1 Physical Objects and Spatiotemporal Con­ tinuity 43 3.2 The

rest of the paper I show how to meet this desideratum. Of course, I am not exluding the legitimacy of theories that claim that abstract objects exist only in the present. In fact, the classic view of universals in re would (arguably) be such a theory. Rather, the aim of the paper is to investigate how to achieve a neutrality between presentism and theories of abstract objects. The Lack of Neutrality (P’), which captures a standard approach in the characterizations of presentism, solves the triviality objection, but clearly faces the lack of neutrality with respect

-identity, since both α and c have that prop­ erty. It must, I submit, be the property of-being-identical- with-ΰ. So the second objection should also be rejected. 1.3 THE TRIVIALITY OBJECTION (I) Many have objected that this definition of identity, and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles upon which it is based, is either trivial or circular. Their claim is naturally reinforced by the proof that we have just offered, since it certainly involves the very property that is being defined. Nevertheless, this objection, despite its popularity, is in er­ ror. Let us

it is already wrong, as a moralized theory seems to maintain, it is hard to see how we can say without lapsing into circularity that A acts wrongly (as in [3]) because A makes a coercive proposal. Even if the circularity objection can be avoided (as I think it can), we encounter a second difficulty, which might be called the triviality objection. It might be argued that on a moralized theory of coercion, the "preanalytic" sense of coercion—the view that coercion has to do with the amount of pressure on B—is relatively unimportant. On a moralized theory, we

Welton, who takes Husserl to be a Cartesian foundationalist – at least in his static phenomenology, if not in the gen- etic one. He claims that the life-world in the narrow sense must comprise only the horizon of pregiven nature. In this way, originary perception may yield the foundation for all scientific theorizing. Otherwise, we would be caught up with a mere triviality, he seems to think, in that the Frode Kjosavik 33 grounding of science in the life-world would simply mean that scientific practices produce scientific theories.30 Welton’s triviality