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I It is well known that virtue ethics has become very popular among moral theorists. Even ancient Aristotelian virtue ethics continues to have defenders. The well-respected moral philosopher Bernard Williams (1995) , though, has claimed that this “neo-Aristotelian enterprise” might “require us to feign amnesia about natural selection”. Williams’ worry about a neo-Aristotelian project is that such a project works best, he says, “if you can help yourself to Aristotle’s cosmology,” rather than entertain the possibility that “the evolutionary success of humanity

. “BDI-Agents: From Theory to Practice.” In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent Systems, June 12-14, 1995 , 312-319. San Francisco: AAAI Press, 1995. Reyes, Jeremiah. “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction to a Filipino Virtue Ethics.” Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East 25:2 (2015), 148-171. Schelling, Thomas. “Models of Segregation.” The American Economic Review 59:2 (1969), 488-493. Schelling, Thomas. Micromotives and Macrobehavior . New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. Schmidt, Bernd. The

Howard J. Curzer Rules Lurking at the Heart of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Abstract: Aristotle speaks often of orthos logos which might be translated “right rule.” Nevertheless, many contemporary interpreters and translators avoid the term “rule” and similar terms. I shall show that Aristotle does indeed provide numerous rules including right rules for all of the virtues on his list in the Nico- machean Ethics. But these rules do not undermine Aristotle’s credentials as a founder of virtue ethics or of moderate particularism. Keywords: Aristotle, orthos logos

Volume 1, Issue 1 2007 Article 4 Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology QUESTIONS OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement Colin Farrelly, University of Waterloo Recommended Citation: Farrelly, Colin (2007) "Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement," Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 4. DOI: 10.2202/1941-6008.1016 Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement Colin Farrelly Abstract In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on the ethics of prenatal

CHAPTER 9 Nietzschean Virtue Ethics CHRISTINE SWANTON 1. Introduction In Gorgias (S.5o6) Plato claims that"all good things whatever are good when virtue is present in them." 1 Provided virtue is understood in the Greek sense of arete, or excellence, the claim marks the fact that goodness in things is to be un- derstood through the idea of excellence, as opposed to quantities or amounts of, say, pleasantness or power. This is the key not only to understanding virtue ethics, in general, but to understanding Nietzschean virtue ethics, in particular

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110466034-010 Sandra L. Borden 10 Virtue Ethics & Media Abstract: Virtue ethics (VE) theory and scholarship in media and communication have become increasingly vibrant and worthy of serious attention. For all VE has to offer, however, it is not unusual for the theory to be explained and applied inaccu- rately in the literature and in textbooks. This limits the theory’s potential for address- ing enduring issues in media and communication, as well as emerging ones. This chapter argues that a major source of this theoretical

Introduction Only a few decades ago, interest in the virtue of integrity was soaring among virtue ethicists. Article after article appeared, written by eminent moral philosophers, exploring and extolling integrity (see e. g. Taylor 1981 ; McFall 1987 ; Calhoun 1995 ), sometimes taking their cue from Bernard Williams’s (1981) famous ‘integrity objection’ to utilitarianism, but sometimes just showcasing a general interest in the salience of this virtue for any reasonable form of virtue ethics. Those were the days when it was fashionable – and scarcely

Kantian Virtue and ‘Virtue Ethics’ Thomas E. Hill, Jr. The reputations of various systematic ethical theories rise and fall over time, for good and bad reasons. Some rise like splendid towers only to be demolished by withering attacks from critics. Others like castles on hilltops were apparently too formidable to be destroyed by frontal assault, but their defenders abandoned them in search of newer, less cumbersome quarters, leaving only their impressive ruins behind as tourist attractions.1 We can hope that, as in the history of medicine, there is progress in

Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight