.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/-research/-workingpapers/2008/twerp563.pdf Leech, D. and Aziz, H., The double majority voting rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a democratic ideal for an enlarging union: an appraisal using votingpower analysis, 2007, 6-10 http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/-fac/soc/-economics/-research/-working-papers/20-07/twerp_24.pdf Zbíral, R., Teorie a praxe vyjednávání v Radě Evropské unie, 2007, 88 (in Czech) Leech, D. and Leech, R., IPNICE: A Computer Program for the Analysis of Qualified Majority VotingPower under the Treaty of Nice, 2004, http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/ Eurostat, Population on 1 January
Working Papers 1200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js3f5d3n2vl-en (accessed July 26, 2016).  Leech, Dennis. 2001. “Designing the voting system for the Council of the European Union.” Public Choice 113: 437-464.  Napel, Stefan, and Mika Wildgren. 2011. “Strategic versus non-strategic votingpower in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure.” Social Choice and Welfare 37: 511-541.  Oliver, Tim. 2016. “European and international views of Brexit.” Journal of European Public Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1174534: 1-8.  Treaty of Lisbon
-making efficiency, Penrose–Banzhaf index, straight majority rule, unanimity
rule, votingpower, voting profiles
2 Birkmeier -- Käufl -- Pukelsheim
requires more than half of the plenum to vote Yea. This implies that those who do not vote
Yea are counted as opposers, whether they vote Nay or abstain. The second way requires
more Yea-votes than Nay-votes. Voters who abstain are acknowledged to be undecided,
and are not included in the comparison of Yea- and Nay-votes.
While much of the literature on decision rules focuses on the binary case of Yea-Nay
voting, the analysis of
In conflict zones, the phrase, “The democratic process is a vital part of the peace process”, is often heard. Yet many voting procedures are far from “peace-ful”. Indeed, in many instances, divisive and adversarial voting procedures have not only failed to heal the dispute, they have in fact exacerbated the situation and, at worst, been the catalysts of violence.
In the democratic process, voting may be used either (a) by the people (i) to make a decision in a referendum and (ii) to choose their representatives in local and general elections, and/or (b) by these representatives (i) when formulating policies and (ii) when electing a power-sharing administration and/or sub-committees. This article looks at all of these voting procedures: first in regard to the present situation; next with respect to those jurisdictions which have tried to use more inclusive methodologies; and thirdly, as part of a polity which at the very least could facilitate the resolution of conflicts and, at best, help to prevent any recurrence. In all three sections, it concludes by asking, and answering, the following question: Will consensus voting work?
principle calling for a voting
ban, e.g. the principle that votingpower and economic exposure ought necessarily to be
aligned. She concludes that there is, in fact, no such principle; to date, the law imposes voting
bans only where there is, for some specific reasons, considerable risk that a shareholder will
harm the company’s and/or the other shareholders’ interests by exercising his voting rights.
This finding entails certain conclusions about the appropriate answer to the phenomenon of
Die Mitgliedschaft in einer Gesellschaft wird
Existing literature has not yet defined a clear-cut relationship between ownership structure and capital structure. This study aims to contribute to this controversial argument by examining the impact of internal (managerial) ownership and external ownership on financing preferences using the case of non-financial firms listed on Karachi stock exchange during the period of 2008-2012. Our results suggest that the external ownership has a significant effect on capital structure in accordance with the presence of blockholders. In contrast, the internal ownership has a complicated effect; it shows significant positive and negative relationship to leverage at lower and certain higher proportion of managerial shareholding respectively. Besides, the combined analyses suggest that the presence of blockholders negates the impact of managerial ownership on capital structure. This implies that the presence of large and dominant shareholders in Pakistani firms may have caused a bias for debt financing to protect their voting power and returns.
Bank and IMF,
which incorporates all their member states. But instead of tweaking the existing
country constituencies to better reflect the multipolar world economy we ask what
they would look like if rethought from the beginning.
The Bretton Woods system of representation has the big advantage of
being well oiled and accepted over many decades of operation; but it also has
significant flaws. First, it has no Heads-of-State forum, an absence which causes
the Bretton Woods organizations to suffer from lack of political weight. Second,