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) and the 2011 Canadian Election Study (CES), allowing us to measure information flow and voting behaviour daily over a one-month election campaign.2 The results fall squarely in line with recent work on campaigns by showing that the campaign did matter in these elections, which is to say that information conveyed during the campaigns had an effect on indi- viduals’ voting choices. But we use the two-moderator model to show that the more complete story is that campaign information has strong effects on only a subset of voters: those with both relatively high

configurations. The chapter begins by summarizing the literature on accountability and vote choice. It then draws upon this literature to formulate expectations before explaining the experimental design and analysing the data collected from the experiment. It con- cludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for winning and keeping power in Canada. Background, Theory, and Expectations Accountability is a core feature of democracy, and political scientists have spent considerable time and effort mapping the relationship Parliamentary Configurations 131

seeing the avoidance of “wasted voting” by the public) find at least relatively rudimentary forms of strategic reasoning in the pub- lic’s voting choices. Most of the time, this reasoning is indeed seen in a simple strategic environment. Most of the time, that is, it is seen in the actions of voters in a predominately two-party system embedded (not coincidentally) in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems. And theory does show that the nature of strategic choices in two-party, FPTP systems, and especially in plurality systems in particular, as we have in the cases

investigate in this chapter is wheth- er conservative partisans increased in numbers and/or whether they became more loyal to their party over time. Again, our assumption is that if there was indeed a shift to the right among the Canadian elector- ate, then we should see a significant increase in the proportion of voters identifying with the right-wing party options, and especially with the single one that remained after the merger. Likewise, we should observe a stronger correlation between conservative partisanship and conserva- tive vote choice since the beginning of

sub- sequent elections, although not to the same degree as when the scandal first emerged. Finally, using an experiment involving a real political scandal in Bavaria, Maier (2011, 293) found that “support significantly declined between the pre- and post-test not only for the politician in- volved in scandal but for other politicians not involved in the scandal.” Overall, the majority of studies suggest that the effect of scandals on public opinion and vote choice is modest or marginal. This variation may be partially explained by the nature of the scandal

which a candidate or party has offered “a legitimate critique of an opponent’s policy stands, qualifica- tions, or other substantive information” (Stevens et al. 2008, 528). This definition would be an evaluative conception of a positive campaign. In terms of the extent to which negative campaigns affect vote choice, the evidence is mixed. Although some studies have found that nega- tive messages can be effective, depending on their content and tone and the timing with which they are deployed (Wu and Dahmen 2010; Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Marks, Manning, and Ajzen

such situations, the voting choice may be driven by partisan or ideological cues or by familiarity with one or more of the issues in a long-standing political debate. On the other hand, the 1994 Nordic referendums on European Union membership or the 1992 Canadian con- stitutional referendum found political parties who regularly oppose each other in elections campaigning together on the same side of an issue, thus providing mixed cues to their electorates. In some other instances parties that might normally provide their supporters with reliable voting cues are

Party of Japan; Japan Socialist Party security policy: and vote choice, 34, 111–15; as main line of cleav- age in 1955 system, 28, 101, 205; declining salience after end of Cold War, 30 –1; party views on, 7, 19 –20, 36, 38, 40; re-emergence as a salient cleavage between par- ties, 100, 102– 4, 109 –11, 115 Security Treaty Crisis, 19, 205 Self-Defense Forces, 19, 87, 100 –2, 104 – 6, 108, 111–12 Shinseitou, 5, 14, 33, 64, 103 Shintou Sakigake. See Sakigake shitamachi areas, 75, 93 Shoukou Chuukin Bank, 168–9, 170 shuntou (spring offensive), 180 –1 small

post-material considerations as leisure time, free speech, political infl uence, and urban aesthetics. 2 People are less tolerant of authority, more tolerant of diversity, and substantially more likely to support gay rights, abortion, euthanasia, and environmentalism. 3 General leftward shifts in public opinion, however, have not been refl ected in voting choices. Comparative studies of party platforms and governing coalitions indicate that right-wing parties are receiving as many votes, winning as many seats, and participating in government as often as they

measures are closely related and follow on earlier work on the relationship between self-control and turnout (Fowler and Kam 2006; Loewen and Dawes 2011). The first measure of self- control problems is excessive discounting; individuals prefer an im- mediate payment over future payments of a substantially larger value. The second measure is self-reported procrastination: individuals put off paying a cost now, instead accepting a larger cost in the future. The logic by which both of these anomalies are related to vote choice are the same as those expressed in Fowler