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. subjects could be treated satisfactorily within the limits of the space allotted to this paper. We shall therefore give a broad sketch of the findings with respect to two or three of the more interesting of them to illustrate some of the distinguishing features of voting behaviour in the riding. The discussion which follows will deal briefly with the relationship of some of the main social characteristics of respondents to their voting choices, the reaction of respondents to the issues raised in the campaign, and an attempt to explain the basis of the change in

" ( 2), "Liberals try to Split Socreds on Religion" (3), 11 Pearson, Douglas Both Blast P .M. 1s 'Cruel' Ethnic-Vote Bid11 ( 4), "Quebeckers Cheer as Pear- son Advocates Bilingualism for All of Canada" ( 5), 11 Tory Ethnic Boss Woos Indians" ( 6) • At first glance these are popular and over-simplified conceptions that have grown up about the connection between ethnic membership and voting behaviour. ( 7) But they are popular conceptions supported by numerous empirical studies. For both the United States and Canada evidence has been accumulated •1 wish to

to whether an endorsement is from a national or local civil society leader. The chapter begins by surveying the academic literature on endorse- ments and voting behaviour and notes that much of that literature is based on empirical evidence gathered from elections in the United States. To our knowledge, there have not been any empirical studies published that assess whether and/or how endorsements matter in the Canadian context. The chapter then constructs and tests a number of hypotheses before ending with a discussion about the impact of en- dorsements and

of ritualized participation are symbols of satisfaction for a pluralist, they may instead reveal the weakness of the transfor- . Social Structure and Politicization 83 mative potential of a society. The third section looks at the citizen's discriminating abilities and partisan activity. This chapter focuses on the inherent contradictions of the pluralist vision of a developing democratic polity, drawing on evidence from the survey of voting behaviour, governmental access, and partisan orientation to show the complex patterns through which hegemonic

single, unified party has primary control over policy making” (341), such as majority governments, tend to re- ward or punish voting behaviour, while lower-clarity systems, defined as systems where “power is dispersed among multiple parties or in which policy-making coalitions are continuously shifting” (344), such as minority governments, tend to suppress such behaviour. Powell and Whitten (1993) examined a variety of institutional contexts, such as one-party versus multi-party rule, bicameral opposition, opposi- tion influence over decision making, and party

, but there are also some limits to applying this assumption equally across the electorate. Background, Theory, and Expectations Much of the early literature on voting behaviour paid little attention to the quality of a local candidate. What little work there was on local can- didate effects focused mainly on exploring incumbency effects (Irvine 1982; Krashinsky and Milne 1986; see also Blais et al. 2003, 657–8; Marsh 2007, 500–1). It was not until the late 1980s and then again during the The Quality of Local Candidates 105 2000s that scholars began to look

democ- racy, it is appropriate to consider in modest detail the example of responses to a widely cited article by political scientist Philip Converse (1964) that challenged the rationality of democratic voting behaviours. According to Converse, only 10 per cent of the public in mass democra- cies, those he terms ideologues, exercise voting choices rationally as part of some ‘political belief system.’ The majority are non-ideologues whose votes reflect simply perceived self-interest (42 per cent), whether times are good or bad (25 per cent voting for incumbents in good

where he served as secretary from 1877 to 1880. An issue which had a much more controversial disciplinary dimension was that of voting behaviour. The Orangeman's oath, while pledging loyalty to the monarchy, laws, and constitution of the country, did not involve any obligation to vote for a specific political party or candidate. Nevertheless, it was generally assumed that the defence of the public good required the support of solidly protestant candidates. Some lodges attempted to direct and control voting behaviour. For example, LOL 137, Toronto, passed a resolution

vacuum and suc- ceeded in attracting the attention of both urban and rural Senegalese. The marabouts were clever enough to adapt Islamic ideas to African cul- ture. Because most Africans could not read the Koran, the teachings and words of the marabouts became more important than the Koran. Among the most popular marabouts were Amadou Bamba M' Backe, the founder of the Mourides Islamic brotherhood, and Al Haji Malick Sy of the Tijaniya sect. By winning the hearts of the Africans, the marabouts eventually came to control the voting behaviour of the enfranchised Africans

referendum for the future of the country also might influence voting behaviour. Early in the campaign, Prime Minister Mulroney argued that the Charlottetown Accord was Canada's "last, best chance" for survival, and that rejection of the package would markedly enhance the prospect of Quebec separating from the rest of the country. Raising the spectre of Quebec separatism was 100 Table 4.2 Attitudes towards the Referendum Process by Region Atlantic Agree Disagree % % The referendum won't settle any of the important issues facing the country. The referendum gives ordinary