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Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Deci- sion Making in the East and West, ed. Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski. New York: Oxford University Press. Gadbois, George H., Jr. 1969. ‘Selection, Background Characteristics, and Voting Behavior of Indian Supreme Court Judges.’ In Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision Making in the East and West, ed. Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski. New York: Oxford University Press. Galanter, Marc. 1974. ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the

, 16, 21; education of, 30–2, 252; gender of 7, 22, 29–30, 33–9, 41–2, 204–9, 252; independence of, 111; influences on selection, 15–16, 18– 25, 184–5; party of, 8–9, 28, 40–2, 183, 195–6, 244; political prefer- ences of, 39–42, 176–7, 180, 184, 222, 228, 243–4, 246; regional represen- tation, 27–9, 42; religion of 29–30, 42; removal of, 25, 111; role of Par- liamentary committees, 16–20; role of prime minister in selection, 15– 25; selection prior to 2004, 15–16; voting behaviour, 174–209 Kerwin court, 212 Klein, David, 176 Knight, Jack, 176, 179 Knopff

it a useful explanatory factor; also, prelimi- nary analysis suggests that whatever power a measure of prior judicial ex- perience had in the earlier period, it is no longer a significant predictor of the justices’ voting behaviour. Consequently, these two Tate and Sittiwong variables were not included in the analyses reported in this chapter. 7 Since tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8 uncovered no relationship between any of these three variables and the tendency to support pro-government outcomes in other public law cases, no model of pro-government behaviour will be

extending the content analysis of articles and editorials on appointments to the Supreme Court to Canada’s nine leading national and regional papers. According to the authors, ‘the results provide substantial support for the general propo- sition that the political preferences of the justices are related to their overall pattern of support for liberal versus conservative outcomes in the cases before them’ (Ostberg et al. 2004, 19). Both the cumulative ideology measure and the score derived from the Ottawa Citizen were found to be related to the voting behaviour of the

determining panel size may reflect variables that are related to una- nimity. For the measure of the ideological range we used a measure of the voting behaviour of the justices in non-unanimous votes.5 For each justice we used all votes that could be categorized as either unambigu- ously liberal or conservative over their career on the bench and com- puted the percentage of those votes that were liberal. Then, to construct our measure of the ideological range on the panel deciding each case, we simply subtracted the value of the most conservative member from the value for