in French philosophy. Let us sum up brief ly here those steps that preceded
Martin’s appropriation of the notion.
In the 1923-1934 lessons that he gives in Marburg – now published and
entitled Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung (Heidegger 1994) –
Heidegger proposes an intense ref lection about the notion of problem and
its implications for the historyofphilosophy. In section 10, he notably deals
with the ‘clarification of problems (Klärung der Probleme)’ and distinguishes
between problems and questions. A question refers to an implicit care
example Marilyn Strathern’s
The Gender of the Gif t (1988), it is only recently that it was expressed programmatically with
Charbonnier et al.’s Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology Af ter Anthropology (2016). See also
Viveiros de Castro’s Cannibal Metaphysics (2014) for a sense of the intricacies of a truly plu-
ralist universe and the role of concepts therein. For a history of the concept of problems in
the historyofphilosophy from antiquity onwards, see Bianco (2018).
Introduction to Thinking the Problematic: Decentring as Method and Ethos 11
unknown, or as a conf
– condemns writing while positing direct speech as the only proper vehicle of truth.
To be sure, Derrida is not concerned with presenting yet another evidence of western
logo-centrism, but rather with unfolding a complexity intrinsic to the Platonic text itself.
He points to a double meaning embedded in the text – pharmakon is both a remedy and
a poison – suggesting the undecidable lies already in the text itself, Derrida explains:
“It has been necessary to analyze, to set to work, within the text of the
historyofphilosophy, as well as within the so-called literary
die gleichen Infor-
mationen zu kommen, löst sich die Situation der Zeugenschaft letztlich in
eine des Hinweises auf, man solle sich hier oder dort diese oder jene Infor-
Gruyter 2001, S. 829-839, sowie Gelfert, Axel: »Kant on testimony«, in: British
Journal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 14 (2006), S. 627-652.
5 Unabhängig von der Kantischen Konzeption hat Sybille Krämer den Zusam-
menhang zwischen der Glaubwürdigkeit des Zeugnisses und der Glaubwürdig-
keit der bezeugenden Person als eine ethische Dimension dargestellt, die sich
grundsätzlich in allen Formen von
recent philosophical debates have delivered insights into
Bergson’s concept of the problem in relation to the historyofphilosophy, dis-
cussing its difference from epistemology and positivism in the French tra-
dition of the 19th and 20th centuries (During 2004, Bowden 2018), Bergson
himself clarifies his own position in his praise for early pragmatist philoso-
pher William James.2 In a preface to a translation of James’ work on pragma-
tism Bergson states that real problems emerge when ‘we confine ourselves
purely and simply to what is given us by experience