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Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory

Ed. by Brune, Jens Peter / Stern, Robert / Werner, Micha H.

eBook (PDF)
Publication Date:
March 2017
Copyright year:
2017
ISBN
978-3-11-047021-5
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Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments

Werner, Micha H.

Abstract

This paper argues that certain transcendental arguments can play a valuable role in moral reasoning: They can make explicit constitutive elements of our common practice of justifying our actions to one another, of addressing practical criticism, of deliberating together, or of constructing a sharable standpoint of practical judgment. Thereby, they can serve to reaffirm basic normative commitments that no one who makes practical claims or who complains against another person’s conduct can avoid making. This amounts to a more modest interpretation of the potential of transcendental arguments than can be usually found in more traditional (“first personal”) versions of Kantian constitutivism. However, the modest use of transcendental reasoning may suffice for all practical purposes, even though it is not designed to force a moral sceptic into endorsing moral principles.

Citation Information

Micha H. Werner (2017). Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments. In Jens Peter Brune, Robert Stern, Micha H. Werner (Eds.), Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory (pp. 231–246). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110470215-013

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110470215

Online ISBN: 9783110470215

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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