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Realism - Relativism - Constructivism

Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg

Ed. by Kanzian, Christian / Kletzl, Sebastian / Mitterer, Josef / Neges, Katharina

Series:Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society – New Series 24

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June 2017
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Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality

Tegtmeier, Erwin


Epistemological realism is anti-idealism. Idealism was dominant the 18th century and is still very influential, particularly in its Kantian version. The rise of idealism is the consequence of a change of paradigm made by Descartes. In the classical tradition cognition was understood as transfer. Descartes conceived it as representation of objects by ideas in the mind. Already the Cartesians were aware the difficulty to connect idea and object. The idealists then solved it in their way by collapsing both. An epistemologically realist view was developed by the later Brentano who rejected the representational analysis of cognition and assumed a direct and specific intentional relation between mental states and objects. Brentano’s new view has been misconstrued by those who introduced the subject of intentionality into mainstream analytical philosophy. It was even portrayed as a kind of representationalism although Brentano’s explicit aim was to overcome it.

Citation Information

Erwin Tegtmeier (2017). Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality. In Christian Kanzian, Sebastian Kletzl, Josef Mitterer, Katharina Neges (Eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (pp. 129–136). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110524055-010

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110524055

Online ISBN: 9783110524055

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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