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Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty

Ed. by Fréchette, Guillaume / Taieb, Hamid

Series:Phenomenology & Mind 19

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November 2017
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Austro-German Transcendent Objects before Husserl

Taieb, Hamid


In the famous Appendix to paragraphs 11 and 20 of his 5th Logical Investigation, Husserl criticizes the concept of ‘immanent object’ defended by Brentano and his pupils. Husserl holds that intentional objects, even non-existent ones, are ‘transcendent’. Yet long before Husserl’s criticism, Brentano and his pupils, in their theories of intentionality, besides immanent objects also took into account transcendent ones, in a similar way to Husserl, since such transcendent objects were not necessarily objects that exist. The ‘immanent object’ (immanenter Gegenstand) was also called ‘presented-thing as presented’ (Vorgestelltes als Vorgestelltes), whereas the ‘transcendent object’ was called ‘object tout court’ (Gegenstand schlechtweg) or ‘presented-thing tout court’ (Vorgestelltes schlechtweg). Even if it is in Marty that one finds the clearest distinction between these two kinds of objects, other pupils of Brentano, and Brentano himself, made similar distinctions. Despite its importance, this point has been neglected in the Brentanian literature. In the first part of this article, I present the way in which immanent and transcendent objects have been distinguished in the School of Brentano. In the second part of the article, I present some problems linked to the distinction of two objects for every mental act, an immanent and a transcendent one; these problems could explain the abandonment of the notion of ‘immanent object’ by many philosophers of the Brentanian tradition. I conclude with some remarks on the distinction between content and object in the School of Brentano.

Citation Information

Hamid Taieb (2017). Austro-German Transcendent Objects before Husserl. In Guillaume Fréchette, Hamid Taieb (Eds.), Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty (pp. 41–62). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-003

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480

Online ISBN: 9783110531480

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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